Representation recovers information

Early agreement within cognitive science on the topic of representation has now given way to a combination of positions. Some question the significance of representation in cognition. Others continue to argue in favor, but the case has not been demonstrated in any formal way. The present paper sets out a framework in which the value of representation-use can be mathematically measured, albeit in a broadly sensory context rather than a specifically cognitive one. Key to the approach is the use of Bayesian networks for modeling the distal dimension of sensory processes. More relevant to cognitive science is the theoretical result obtained, which is that a certain type of representational architecture is *necessary* for achievement of sensory efficiency. While exhibiting few of the characteristics of traditional, symbolic encoding, this architecture corresponds quite closely to the forms of embedded representation now being explored in some embedded/embodied approaches. It becomes meaningful to view that type of representation-use as a form of information recovery. A formal basis then exists for viewing representation not so much as the substrate of reasoning and thought, but rather as a general medium for efficient, interpretive processing

A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: explaining the puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synesthesia

Normal perception involves experiencing objects within perceptual scenes as real, as existing in the world. This property of “perceptual presence” has motivated “sensorimotor theories” which understand perception to involve the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. However, the mechanistic basis of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery has remained unclear. Sensorimotor theory also struggles to explain instances of perception, such as synesthesia, that appear to lack perceptual presence and for which relevant sensorimotor contingencies are difficult to identify. On alternative “predictive processing” theories, perceptual content emerges from probabilistic inference on the external causes of sensory signals, however, this view has addressed neither the problem of perceptual presence nor synesthesia. Here, I describe a theory of predictive perception of sensorimotor contingencies which (1) accounts for perceptual presence in normal perception, as well as its absence in synesthesia, and (2) operationalizes the notion of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery. The core idea is that generative models underlying perception incorporate explicitly counterfactual elements related to how sensory inputs would change on the basis of a broad repertoire of possible actions, even if those actions are not performed. These “counterfactually-rich” generative models encode sensorimotor contingencies related to repertoires of sensorimotor dependencies, with counterfactual richness determining the degree of perceptual presence associated with a stimulus. While the generative models underlying normal perception are typically counterfactually rich (reflecting a large repertoire of possible sensorimotor dependencies), those underlying synesthetic concurrents are hypothesized to be counterfactually poor. In addition to accounting for the phenomenology of synesthesia, the theory naturally accommodates phenomenological differences between a range of experiential states including dreaming, hallucination, and the like. It may also lead to a new view of the (in)determinacy of normal perception

Cross-sensory correspondences:heaviness is dark and low-pitched

Everyday language reveals how stimuli encoded in one sensory feature domain can possess qualities normally associated with a different domain (e.g., higher pitch sounds are bright, light in weight, sharp, and thin). Such cross-sensory associations appear to reflect crosstalk among aligned (corresponding) feature dimensions, including brightness, heaviness, and sharpness. Evidence for heaviness being one such dimension is very limited, with heaviness appearing primarily as a verbal associate of other feature contrasts (e.g., darker objects and lower pitch sounds are heavier than their opposites). Given the presumed bi-directionality of the crosstalk between corresponding dimensions, heaviness should itself induce the cross-sensory associations observed elsewhere, including with brightness and pitch. Taking care to dissociate effects arising from the size and mass of an object this is confirmed. When hidden objects varying independently in size and mass are lifted, objects that feel heavier are judged to be darker and to make lower pitch sounds than objects feeling less heavy. These judgements track the changes in perceived heaviness induced by the size-weight illusion. The potential involvement of language, natural scene statistics, and Bayesian processes in correspondences, and the effects they induce, is considered

Causal connectivity of evolved neural networks during behavior

To show how causal interactions in neural dynamics are modulated by behavior, it is valuable to analyze these interactions without perturbing or lesioning the neural mechanism. This paper proposes a method, based on a graph-theoretic extension of vector autoregressive modeling and 'Granger causality,' for characterizing causal interactions generated within intact neural mechanisms. This method, called 'causal connectivity analysis' is illustrated via model neural networks optimized for controlling target fixation in a simulated head-eye system, in which the structure of the environment can be experimentally varied. Causal connectivity analysis of this model yields novel insights into neural mechanisms underlying sensorimotor coordination. In contrast to networks supporting comparatively simple behavior, networks supporting rich adaptive behavior show a higher density of causal interactions, as well as a stronger causal flow from sensory inputs to motor outputs. They also show different arrangements of 'causal sources' and 'causal sinks': nodes that differentially affect, or are affected by, the remainder of the network. Finally, analysis of causal connectivity can predict the functional consequences of network lesions. These results suggest that causal connectivity analysis may have useful applications in the analysis of neural dynamics

Neuromorphic analogue VLSI

Neuromorphic systems emulate the organization and function of nervous systems. They are usually composed of analogue electronic circuits that are fabricated in the complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) medium using very large-scale integration (VLSI) technology. However, these neuromorphic systems are not another kind of digital computer in which abstract neural networks are simulated symbolically in terms of their mathematical behavior. Instead, they directly embody, in the physics of their CMOS circuits, analogues of the physical processes that underlie the computations of neural systems. The significance of neuromorphic systems is that they offer a method of exploring neural computation in a medium whose physical behavior is analogous to that of biological nervous systems and that operates in real time irrespective of size. The implications of this approach are both scientific and practical. The study of neuromorphic systems provides a bridge between levels of understanding. For example, it provides a link between the physical processes of neurons and their computational significance. In addition, the synthesis of neuromorphic systems transposes our knowledge of neuroscience into practical devices that can interact directly with the real world in the same way that biological nervous systems do

Conservation, Creation, and Evolution: Revising the Darwinian Project

There is hardly anything more central to our universe than conservation. Many scientific fields and disciplines view the law of conservation as one of the most fundamental universal laws. The Darwinian model pivots the process of evolution on variability, reproduction, and natural selection. Conservation plays a marginal role in this model and is not really universal, as the model allows exceptions to conservation, i.e. non-conservation, to play an equally important role in evolution. This anomalous role of conservation in the Darwinian model raises questions: What is the reason for this anomaly? Is conservation really universal, as we tend to believe or is it not, as the Darwinian model suggests? This contribution proposes a new model of evolution that focuses on levels of organization, rather than of species, organisms, or populations. It argues that conservation is central to evolution. Not only does this new model restores the universal status of conservation but it also makes possible to resolve some outstanding problems and controversies that continue to plague the Darwinian model. The article tries to advance the broad Darwinian project that seeks to explain the process of evolution as a product of the spontaneous processes in nature

Cross-modal correspondences in non-human mammal communication

For both humans and other animals, the ability to combine information obtained through different senses is fundamental to the perception of the environment. It is well established that humans form systematic cross-modal correspondences between stimulus features that can facilitate the accurate combination of sensory percepts. However, the evolutionary origins of the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms involved in these cross-modal associations remain surprisingly underexplored. In this review we outline recent comparative studies investigating how non-human mammals naturally combine information encoded in different sensory modalities during communication. The results of these behavioural studies demonstrate that various mammalian species are able to combine signals from different sensory channels when they are perceived to share the same basic features, either be- cause they can be redundantly sensed and/or because they are processed in the same way. Moreover, evidence that a wide range of mammals form complex cognitive representations about signallers, both within and across species, suggests that animals also learn to associate different sensory features which regularly co-occur. Further research is now necessary to determine how multisensory representations are formed in individual animals, including the relative importance of low level feature-related correspondences. Such investigations will generate important insights into how animals perceive and categorise their environment, as well as provide an essential basis for understanding the evolution of multisensory perception in humans

Creating the cognitive form of phonological units: The speech sound correspondence problem in infancy could be solved by mirrored vocal interactions rather than by imitation

Theories about the cognitive nature of phonological units have been constrained by the assumption that young children solve the correspondence problem for speech sounds by imitation, whether by an auditory- or gesture-based matching to target process. Imitation on the part of the child implies that he makes a comparison within one of these domains, which is presumed to be the modality of the underlying representation of speech sounds. However, there is no evidence that the correspondence problem is solved in this way. Instead we argue that the child can solve it through the mirroring behaviour of his caregivers within imitative interactions and that this mechanism is more consistent with the developmental data. The underlying representation formed by mirroring is intrinsically perceptuo-motor. It is created by the association of a vocal action performed by the child and the reformulation of this into an L1 speech token that he hears in return. Our account of how production and perception develop incorporating this mechanism explains some longstanding problems in speech and reconciles data from psychology and neuroscience

Dynamic Perceptual Changes in Audiovisual Simultaneity

Background: The timing at which sensory input reaches the level of conscious perception is an intriguing question still awaiting an answer. It is often assumed that both visual and auditory percepts have a modality specific processing delay and their difference determines perceptual temporal offset. Methodology/Principal Findings: Here, we show that the perception of audiovisual simultaneity can change flexibly and fluctuates over a short period of time while subjects observe a constant stimulus. We investigated the mechanisms underlying the spontaneous alternations in this audiovisual illusion and found that attention plays a crucial role. When attention was distracted from the stimulus, the perceptual transitions disappeared. When attention was directed to a visual event, the perceived timing of an auditory event was attracted towards that event. Conclusions/Significance: This multistable display illustrates how flexible perceived timing can be, and at the same time offers a paradigm to dissociate perceptual from stimulus-driven factors in crossmodal feature binding. Our findings suggest that the perception of crossmodal synchrony depends on perceptual binding of audiovisual stimuli as a common event