When greediness fails: Examples from stochastic scheduling

The purpose of this paper is to present examples which show that deterministic and stochastic scheduling problems often have a surprisingly different behavior. In particular, it demonstrates some seemingly counterintuitive properties of optimal scheduling policies for stochastic machine scheduling problems.Economics ;

The Price of Anarchy for Minsum Related Machine Scheduling

We address the classical uniformly related machine scheduling problem with minsum objective. The problem is solvable in polynomial time by the algorithm of Horowitz and Sahni. In that solution, each machine sequences its jobs shortest first. However when jobs may choose the machine on which they are processed, while keeping the same sequencing rule per machine, the resulting Nash equilibria are in general not optimal. The price of anarchy measures this optimality gap. By means of a new characterization of the optimal solution, we show that the price of anarchy in this setting is bounded from above by 2. We also give a lower bound of e/(e-1). This complements recent results on the price of anarchy for the more general unrelated machine scheduling problem, where the price of anarchy equals 4. Interestingly, as Nash equilibria coincide with shortest processing time first (SPT) schedules, the same bounds hold for SPT schedules. Thereby, our work also fills a gap in the literature

Scheduling Parallel Jobs with Linear Speedup

We consider a scheduling problem where a set of jobs is distributed over parallel machines. The processing time of any job is dependent on the usage of a scarce renewable resource, e.g., personnel. An amount of k units of that resource can be allocated to the jobs at any time, and the more of that resource is allocated to a job, the smaller its processing time. The dependence of processing times on the amount of resources is linear for any job. The objective is to find a resource allocation and a schedule that minimizes the makespan. Utilizing an integer quadratic programming relaxation, we show how to obtain a (3+e)-approximation algorithm for that problem, for any e>0. This generalizes and improves previous results, respectively. Our approach relies on a fully polynomial time approximation scheme to solve the quadratic programming relaxation. This result is interesting in itself, because the underlying quadratic program is NP-hard to solve in general. We also briefly discuss variants of the problem and derive lower bounds.operations research and management science;

Note on VCG vs. Price Raising for Matching Markets

In \cite{EK10} the use of VCG in matching markets is motivated by saying that in order to compute market clearing prices in a matching market, the auctioneer needs to know the true valuations of the bidders. Hence VCG and corresponding personalized prices are proposed as an incentive compatible mechanism. The same line of argument pops up in several lecture sheets and other documents related to courses based on Easley and Kleinberg's book, seeming to suggest that computing market clearing prices and corresponding assignments were \emph{not} incentive compatible. Main purpose of our note is to observe that, in contrast, assignments based on buyer optimal market clearing prices are indeed incentive compatible

The Quality of Equilibria for Set Packing Games

We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which $n$ selfish players select subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this class of games. Assuming that players are able to approximately play equilibrium strategies, we show that the total quality of the resulting equilibrium solutions is only moderately suboptimal. Our results are tight bounds on the price of anarchy for three equilibrium concepts, namely Nash equilibria, subgame perfect equilibria, and an equilibrium concept that we refer to as $k$-collusion Nash equilibrium

A Study of Spiders (Araneae) on Maple Trees (Acer Spp.)

We began this study to determine whether spider species occur randomly on maple species or whether they are selective in picking either their host species or their position on that host. Several papers have been published on habitat selection of spiders in relation to structural components or microclimate (Barnes, 1953; Barnes & ,Barnes, 1954, 1955; Cherrett, 1964; Duffey, 1962a. 1962b, 1966; Hackmann, 1957; Kuenzler, 1958; Norgaard, 1951). Duffey (1956) and Kuenzler (1958) also discussed the influence of microclimate on the activities of spiders. None of the above, however, dealt with arboreal spiders with the exception of Duffey (1956) who discussed aerial dispersal rather than habitat selection

Mechanism design for decentralized online machine scheduling

Traditional optimization models assume a central decision maker who optimizes a global system performance measure. However, problem data is often distributed among several agents, and agents take autonomous decisions. This gives incentives for strategic behavior of agents, possibly leading to sub-optimal system performance. Furthermore, in dynamic environments, machines are locally dispersed and administratively independent. Examples are found both in business and engineering applications. We investigate such issues for a parallel machine scheduling model where jobs arrive online over time. Instead of centrally assigning jobs to machines, each machine implements a local sequencing rule and jobs decide for machines themselves. In this context, we introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the classical dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. Our main result is a polynomial time, online mechanism that |assuming rational behavior of jobs| results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive with respect to the maximal social welfare. This is only lightly worse than state-of-the-art algorithms with central coordination