Is Anchoring on Estimates of Severity an Adaptive Heuristic?

Decisions to either to prepare or not prepare for weather threats involve uncertainty. Uncertainty in decision making often involves the potential for making either a false positive (preparing for a storm that never arrives) or a false negative error (not preparing for a real storm). Error Management Theory (EMT; Haselton & Buss, 2000) posits that, depending on the uncertain context, people select a decision-making strategy that favors one error over the other. Related to weather, research has shown that people prefer a false positive, or an overestimation (Joslyn et al., 2011). Particularly, this overestimation appears when people receive severe information prior to making a judgment. Thus, the present study tested whether or not the quality of severity influenced people to select a bias towards a false positive error. In two studies, participants made judgments about Friday’s weather after viewing nine different sequences of two forecasts (sunny, cloudy, or stormy) from early in the week (Study 1) or after viewing weather forecasts from Monday and Wednesday (Study 2). In both studies, participants tended to base their judgments on the second forecast. The interpretation of this pattern, however, differs between the two studies based on anchor-type. In Study 1, bias toward the second forecast was the best available, least biased decision-making strategy. In Study 2, however, bias toward the second forecast was irrational because Wednesday’s weather is not informative for Friday’s weather. Thus, Study 2 demonstrated an anchoring-like bias

Many Labs 2: Investigating Variation in Replicability Across Samples and Settings

We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings, with protocols that were peer reviewed in advance, to examine variation in effect magnitudes across samples and settings. Each protocol was administered to approximately half of 125 samples that comprised 15,305 participants from 36 countries and territories. Using the conventional criterion of statistical significance (p < .05), we found that 15 (54%) of the replications provided evidence of a statistically significant effect in the same direction as the original finding. With a strict significance criterion (p < .0001), 14 (50%) of the replications still provided such evidence, a reflection of the extremely highpowered design. Seven (25%) of the replications yielded effect sizes larger than the original ones, and 21 (75%) yielded effect sizes smaller than the original ones. The median comparable Cohen’s ds were 0.60 for the original findings and 0.15 for the replications. The effect sizes were small (< 0.20) in 16 of the replications (57%), and 9 effects (32%) were in the direction opposite the direction of the original effect. Across settings, the Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity in 11 (39%) of the replication effects, and most of those were among the findings with the largest overall effect sizes; only 1 effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity according to this measure. Only 1 effect had a tau value greater than .20, an indication of moderate heterogeneity. Eight others had tau values near or slightly above .10, an indication of slight heterogeneity. Moderation tests indicated that very little heterogeneity was attributable to the order in which the tasks were performed or whether the tasks were administered in lab versus online. Exploratory comparisons revealed little heterogeneity between Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) cultures and less WEIRD cultures (i.e., cultures with relatively high and low WEIRDness scores, respectively). Cumulatively, variability in the observed effect sizes was attributable more to the effect being studied than to the sample or setting in which it was studied.UCR::Vicerrectoría de Investigación::Unidades de Investigación::Ciencias Sociales::Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas (IIP

A replication of stereotype susceptibility: Identity salience and shifts in quantitative performance

Awareness of stereotypes about a person’s in-group can affect a person’s behavior and performance when they complete a stereotype-relevant task, a phenomenon called stereotype susceptibility (Shih, Pittinsky, Ambady, 1999).This is direct replication of this study with a larger sample as a foundation for further studies in stereotype susceptibility, as well as evaluating the study on its own

Politics, Personality, and Impulsivity Can Color People’s Perceptions of—and Responses to—Hurricane Threats of Varying Severity

Theory and research suggest that objective features of a threatening situation and individual differences influence threat responses. We examine three ways individual traits may relate to a threat response: (1) directly and independent of objective threat features, (2) indirectly through relationships with threat perception, or (3) as moderators of the relationship between objective threat features and responses. Using Integrative Data Analysis (IDA; Curran &amp; Hussong, 2009), we aggregated data across three studies examining hurricane preparation intentions. Analysis supported two of the potential pathways. Supporting the first path, both openness and extraversion had direct, positive relationships with preparation likelihood. Supporting the second path, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and social conservatism positively related to preparation likelihood through a positive relationship with threat perception, whereas impulsivity and sensation-seeking negatively related to preparation likelihood through a negative relationship with threat perception. This work shows the pivotal role individual differences play regarding responses to uncertain threats. **Differences between preprint versions reflect changes made to address reviewer comments from a prior submission

Financial Resources and Decisions to Avoid Information about Environmental Perils

Environmental perils pose threats that require mitigation. Mitigation requires knowledge of the threat. Ironically, people may opt to avoid information about an environmental peril, especially if they lack resources to respond. Three experiments (N=845), examined how available resources and the demands associated with responding to an environmental peril affect perceptions of burden of taking action, and how perceiving burden, in turn, affects avoidance of information about the threat. Experiments 1a and 1b revealed that lower perceived likelihood of taking action and low income predicted a greater tendency to avoid hurricane risk information among Florida residents. Experiment 2 examined receptivity to information about home radon levels and manipulated the burden required to make repairs ($200 vs.$2,000). Having low income and learning repairs were costly corresponded with greater perceived burden of taking action, which predicted a lower likelihood to repair and greater information avoidance