Inter-organisational communication in civil-military cooperation during complex emergencies: a case study in Afghanistan1

This paper seeks to contribute to an improved information management and exchange between humanitarian organisations and military agents in complex emergencies. To do so, a theoretical information management process model was developed and applied to the case of information management between International Security Assistance Force troops and humanitarian organisations such as Cordaid, DACAAR and the International Office for Migration in Kabul, Afghanistan. Based on this analysis the main shortcomings and problems in each stage of the information management process were identified. These include a lack of structured information databases, the absence of identification of information needs, and an over-classification of documents by the military. Using a logical framework analysis, six major improvement tactics were developed, including the creation of more overlap in rotations of personnel, the specification of aims and tasks regarding information management, the improvement of skills and competences of personnel involved, and the introduction of regular joint civil–military evaluations

The responsibility to protect and the crisis in Darfur

Governments that have endorsed the 'sovereignty as responsibility' approach have shown little inclination to protect civilians suffering at the hands of their own government in the Sudanese province of Darfur. After providing an overview of Darfur's crisis and international society's feeble response, we explore why the strongest advocates of 'sovereignty as responsibility', the NATO and EU states, failed to seriously contemplate military intervention. We suggest that three main factors help explain the West's unwillingness to intervene in Darfur: increased scepticism about the West's humanitarian interventionism, especially after the invasion of Iraq; Western strategic interests in Sudan; and the relationship between the crisis in Darfur and Sudan's other civil wars. We conclude that the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention remains weak and strongly contested, and that advocates of the 'responsibility to protect' approach have yet to persuade their governments to help save populations in danger