260 research outputs found

    Superstars need social benefits : an experiment on network formation

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    We investigate contributions to the provision of public goods on a network when efficient provision requires the formation of a star network. We provide a theoretical analysis and study behavior is a controlled laboratory experiment. In a 2x2 design, we examine the effects of group size and the presence of (social) benefits for incoming links. We find that social benefits are highly important. They facilitate convergence to equilibrium networks and enhance the stability and efficiency of the outcome. Moreover, in large groups social benefits encourage the formation of superstars: star networks in which the core contributes more than expected in the stage-game equilibrium. We show that this result is predicted by a repeated game equilibrium

    Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game

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    We experimentally investigate a repeated “inspection game” where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategies with positive probabilities of shirking/inspecting while combined payoffs are maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect. We examine the effects of allowing the employer discretion to sanction or reward the employee after observing stage game payoffs. When employers have limited discretion, and can only apply sanctions and/or rewards following an inspection, we find that both instruments are equally effective in reducing shirking and increasing joint earnings. When employers have discretion to reward and/or sanction independently of whether they inspect we find that rewards are more effective than sanctions. In treatments where employers can combine sanctions and rewards employers rely mainly on rewards and outcomes closely resemble those of treatments where only rewards are possible

    Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game

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    We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided

    Applying Lean: Implementation of a Rapid Triage and Treatment System

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    Objective: Emergency department (ED) crowding creates issues with patient satisfaction, long wait times and leaving the ED without being seen by a doctor (LWBS). Our objective was to evaluate how applying Lean principles to develop a Rapid Triage and Treatment (RTT) system affected ED metrics in our community hospital.Methods: Using Lean principles, we made ED process improvements that led to the RTT system. Using this system, patients undergo a rapid triage with low-acuity patients seen and treated by a physician in the triage area. No changes in staffing, physical space or hospital resources occurred during the study period. We then performed a retrospective, observational study comparing hospital electronic medical record data six months before and six months after implementation of the RTT system.Results: ED census was 30,981 in the six months prior to RTT and 33,926 after. Ambulance arrivals, ED patient acuity and hospital admission rates were unchanged throughout the study periods. Mean ED length of stay was longer in the period before RTT (4.2 hours, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 4.2-4.3; standard deviation [SD] = 3.9) than after (3.6 hours, 95% CI = 3.6-3.7; SD = 3.7). Mean ED arrival to physician start time was 62.2 minutes (95% CI = 61.5-63.0; SD = 58.9) prior to RTT and 41.9 minutes (95% CI = 41.5-42.4; SD = 30.9) after. The LWBS rate for the six months prior to RTT was 4.5% (95% CI = 3.1-5.5) and 1.5% (95% CI = 0.6-1.8) after RTT initiation.Conclusion: Our experience shows that changes in ED processes using Lean thinking and available resources can improve efficiency. In this community hospital ED, use of an RTT system decreased patient wait times and LWBS rates. [West J Emerg Med. 2011;12(2):184-191.

    Height and timing of growth spurt during puberty in young people living with vertically acquired HIV in Europe and Thailand.

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    OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to describe growth during puberty in young people with vertically acquired HIV. DESIGN: Pooled data from 12 paediatric HIV cohorts in Europe and Thailand. METHODS: One thousand and ninety-four children initiating a nonnucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor or boosted protease inhibitor based regimen aged 1-10 years were included. Super Imposition by Translation And Rotation (SITAR) models described growth from age 8 years using three parameters (average height, timing and shape of the growth spurt), dependent on age and height-for-age z-score (HAZ) (WHO references) at antiretroviral therapy (ART) initiation. Multivariate regression explored characteristics associated with these three parameters. RESULTS: At ART initiation, median age and HAZ was 6.4 [interquartile range (IQR): 2.8, 9.0] years and -1.2 (IQR: -2.3 to -0.2), respectively. Median follow-up was 9.1 (IQR: 6.9, 11.4) years. In girls, older age and lower HAZ at ART initiation were independently associated with a growth spurt which occurred 0.41 (95% confidence interval 0.20-0.62) years later in children starting ART age 6 to 10 years compared with 1 to 2 years and 1.50 (1.21-1.78) years later in those starting with HAZ less than -3 compared with HAZ at least -1. Later growth spurts in girls resulted in continued height growth into later adolescence. In boys starting ART with HAZ less than -1, growth spurts were later in children starting ART in the oldest age group, but for HAZ at least -1, there was no association with age. Girls and boys who initiated ART with HAZ at least -1 maintained a similar height to the WHO reference mean. CONCLUSION: Stunting at ART initiation was associated with later growth spurts in girls. Children with HAZ at least -1 at ART initiation grew in height at the level expected in HIV negative children of a comparable age

    Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment

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    Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the process of belief formation and evolution in a signaling game in which a common prior is not induced. Both prior and posterior beliefs of Receivers about Senders' types are elicited, as well as beliefs of Senders about Receivers' strategies. In the experiment, subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of observations. However, the speed of updating is influenced by the strength of initial beliefs. An interesting result is that beliefs about the prior distribution of types are updated slower than posterior beliefs, which incorporate Senders' strategies. In the medium run, for some specifications of game parameters, this leads to outcomes being significantly different from the outcomes of the game in which a common prior is induced. It is also shown that elicitation of beliefs does not considerably change the pattern of play in this game

    How do risk attitudes affect measured confidence?

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    We examine the relationship between confidence in own absolute performance and risk attitudes using two confidence elicitation procedures: self-reported (non-incentivised) confidence and an incentivised procedure that elicits the certainty equivalent of a bet based on performance. The former procedure reproduces the “hard-easy effect” (underconfidence in easy tasks and overconfidence in hard tasks) found in a large number of studies using non-incentivised self-reports. The latter procedure produces general underconfidence, which is significantly reduced, but not eliminated when we filter out the effects of risk attitudes. Finally, we find that self-reported confidence correlates significantly with features of individual risk attitudes including parameters of individual probability weighting
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