12 research outputs found
Russian approaches to energy security and climate change: Russian gas exports to the EU
The proposition that EU climate policy represents a threat to Russia’s gas exports to the EU, and therefore to Russia’s energy security, is critically examined. It is concluded that whilst the greater significance of climate-change action for Russian energy security currently lies not in Russia’s own emissions reduction commitments but in those of the EU, an even greater threat to Russia’s energy security is posed by the development of the EU internal gas market and challenges to Russia’s participation in that market. However, the coming decades could see Russia’s energy security increasingly influenced by climate-change action policies undertaken by current importers of Russian gas such as the EU, and potential importers such as China and India. The challenge for Russia will be to adapt to developments in energy security and climate-change action at the European and global levels
What proportion of riverine nutrients reaches the open ocean?
Globally, rivers deliver significant quantities of nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) to the coastal ocean each year. Currently, there are no viable estimates of how much of this N and P escapes biogeochemical processing on the shelf to be exported to the open ocean; most models of N and P cycling assume that either all or none of the riverine nutrients reach the open ocean. We address this problem by using a simple mechanistic model of how a low-salinity plume behaves outside an estuary mouth. The model results in a global map of riverine water residence times on the shelf, typically a few weeks at low latitudes and up to a year at higher latitudes, which agrees well with observations. We combine the map of plume residence times on the shelf with empirical relationships that link residence time to the proportions of dissolved inorganic N (DIN) and P (DIP) exported and use a database of riverine nutrient loads to estimate the global distribution of riverine DIN and DIP supplied to the open ocean. We estimate that 75% of DIN and 80% of DIP reaches the open ocean. Ignoring processing within estuaries yields annual totals of 17 Tg DIN and 1.2 Tg DIP reaching the open ocean. For DIN this supply is about 50% of that supplied via atmospheric deposition, with significant east-west contrasts across the main ocean basins. The main sources of uncertainty are exchange rates across the shelf break and the empirical relationships between nutrient processing and plume residence time
The processing of Holliday junctions by BLM and WRN helicases is regulated by p53.
BLM, WRN, and p53 are involved in the homologous DNA recombination pathway. The DNA structure-specific helicases, BLM and WRN, unwind Holliday junctions (HJ), an activity that could suppress inappropriate homologous recombination during DNA replication. Here, we show that purified, recombinant p53 binds to BLM and WRN helicases and attenuates their ability to unwind synthetic HJ in vitro. The p53 248W mutant reduces abilities of both to bind HJ and inhibit helicase activities, whereas the p53 273H mutant loses these abilities. Moreover, full-length p53 and a C-terminal polypeptide (residues 373-383) inhibit the BLM and WRN helicase activities, but phosphorylation at Ser(376) or Ser(378) completely abolishes this inhibition. Following blockage of DNA replication, Ser(15) phospho-p53, BLM, and RAD51 colocalize in nuclear foci at sites likely to contain DNA replication intermediates in cells. Our results are consistent with a novel mechanism for p53-mediated regulation of DNA recombinational repair that involves p53 post-translational modifications and functional protein-protein interactions with BLM and WRN DNA helicases
“One of the baddies all along” : Moments that challenge a player’s perspective
Reflection has become a core interest for game designers. However, empirical research into the kinds and causes for reflection within games is scarce. We therefore conducted an online questionnaire where participants (n=101) openly reported perspective-challenging moments within games, their causes, experience, and impact. Where past work has emphasised transformative reflection that changes player’s views and behaviour outside the game, we found that players report predominantly moments of ‘endo’-transformative reflection, which is focused on players’ game-related behaviour and concepts. We further identify some causes of perspective-challenging moments relating to narrative, game systems, game-external sources, and player expectations. Narrative reveals emerge as a key cause of perspective challenge
A critical analysis of Russian state and Gazprom conceptions of natural gas as a strategic resource and Russia’s gas exports to the European Union during the Medvedev presidency (2008-2012)
As the largest external supplier of natural gas to the EU with reserves sufficient for another 74 years at current production levels, Russia is a strategic energy partner for the EU, and will remain so in the coming decades. The first eight years of the 21st century brought a dramatic rise in European oil and gas prices, and the idea of Russia as an ‘energy superpower’. However, such a characterisation of Russia failed to account for the interdependent nature of the Russia-EU gas relationship, and reflected a lack of nuanced Western understandings of the relationship between political and commercial entities in Russia’s energy sector.
This thesis contributes to the gap in the literature by employing a social constructivist approach to the examination of Russian state and Gazprom conceptions of natural gas as a strategic resource and Russia’s gas exports to the EU. The crux of this research is the analysis of the convergence and divergence of Gazprom and Russian state interests and strategies, on the basis of their conceptualisations of natural gas as a strategic commodity. These interests are then played out in the relationship between Gazprom and the Russian state: where Gazprom and Russian state interests diverge, the degree to which the Russian state is able to impose its interests on Gazprom is highly significant. The extent to which Russia’s political leadership conceptualises gas as a political, rather than purely economic, resource not only influences Russian state interests, but also the degree to which those state interests converge with the commercial interests of Gazprom. The identification of Gazprom and Russian state conceptions of, and interests in relation to, natural gas therefore offers the possibility of rationalising Gazprom’s actions and strategies in commercial terms, where previously the presence of political interests may have led to the reductionist interpretation of those actions being little more than further evidence of Russia wielding the ‘energy weapon’.
In Russia itself, the state conceptualisation of gas as a strategic national resource has led to the government using state-owned Gazprom as a vehicle for state control over Russia’s resources. In Russia’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus, natural gas is both political and economic – the Russian government views gas exports to Ukraine and Belarus as potentially lucrative, but it is willing to trade economic utility for political concessions, with Gazprom again the vehicle for such deals. It is in relation to Russia’s gas exports to the EU that the Russian state sees gas as an overwhelmingly economic resource, where prices are highest and the potential for barter or leverage is lowest. The examination of the Nord Stream gas pipeline highlights the convergence of Gazprom and state interests in strategic gas projects, and further emphasises the economic interests of the Russian state in such projects, thus demonstrating that state interests are not always completely political. Again, this challenges the interpretation of the fusion of energy and foreign policy as evidence of the ‘energy weapon’, and offers the possibility of rationalising Gazprom’s policies. Such a rationalisation increases our ability to understand the dynamics of Russia’s gas exports, which in turn offers the possibility of more constructive cooperation between supplier and consumer.
The Medvedev presidency of 2008-2012 is particularly noteworthy, because it was marked by dramatic fluctuations of European gas prices, which exposed Russia’s economic vulnerability to commodity price shifts. At the same time, the EU gas market underwent a significant development in terms of increased supply-side competition, increased spot trading, and regulatory development (particularly the Third Energy Package), which rendered that market an increasingly competitive environment for Gazprom. The extent to which Gazprom is able to adapt to these developments, and the extent to which the Russian state will be willing to continue supporting Gazprom if it does not, will be significant factors in Russia’s future role as a strategic gas supplier to the EU
An Expanded Field (Exhibition at GLOAM)
Artists from Spain, Turkey, Germany, The Netherlands, Australia, USA, UK, Ireland and Panama were invited to exhibit in this group show, providing a cross section of international expanded painting from across five continents. Stu Burke was invited by Deb Covell and Kieran Brimm to host an exhibition of expanded painting on the back of Border Crossing at Pineapple Black, Middlesborough (2021) curated by Kieran Brimm and Yellow Archangel: Perceiving Anomalies at General Practice, Lincoln (2021) curated by Paul Bramley and Allyson Keehan. An Expanding Field continues the rigorous examination of expanded painting initiated by its predecessors. “Painting today is a boundless practice, only limited by the artist’s imagination. Expanded painting requires you to ‘think outside the box’, or in a lot of cases ‘…off the canvas’. An Expanding Field celebrates 21 international artists who stretch the boundaries of painting, conceptually and physically dismantling the traditions of painting and reconfiguring, reducing and modifying them to become an existence of process and ideas. The show will be unapologetically colourful and playful and immersive.