What Constitutes an Explanation in Biology?

One of biology's fundamental aims is to generate understanding of the living world around—and within—us. In this chapter, I aim to provide a relatively nonpartisan discussion of the nature of explanation in biology, grounded in widely shared philosophical views about scientific explanation. But this discussion also reflects what I think is important for philosophers and biologists alike to appreciate about successful scientific explanations, so some points will be controversial, at least among philosophers. I make three main points: (1) causal relationships and broad patterns have often been granted importance to scientific explanations, and they are in fact both important; (2) some explanations in biology cite the components of or processes in systems that account for the systems’ features, whereas other explanations feature large-scale or structural causes that influence a system; and (3) there can be multiple different explanations of a given biological phenomenon, explanations that respond to different research aims and can thus be compatible with one another even when they may seem to disagree

How Can We Teach Philosophy of Science to Biologists?

So, we now have a book on philosophy of science written for biologists, which contains topics that its editors (both of them biologists) thought would be useful. Whereas we hope that many biologists will read it and reflect on philosophy of science, this is not the only role we envisaged for this book. We also believe that the book could be used in courses for biology undergraduates and graduates. It could be used in a course on philosophy of science, or as a supplement to a biology-focused course that would at the same time aim to promote philosophical reflection among participants. In either case, what is important for anyone who would use this book for teaching purposes is that the contributors to the present book have highlighted some major themes to be discussed