The Vital Habit in Kant’s Philosophy

In this article I focus on the concept of habit in Kant’s philosophy. First of all, I concentrate on the criticisms he delineates against Gewohnheit in his epistemological and moral philosophy. In particular, habit is seen as absence of moral freedom. This conclusion is pretty different from Kant’s position expressed in his Anthropology From the Pragmatic Point of View and in the last part of the Conflict of the Faculties. After a deep insight on the different terms referred to the conceptual field of habit, I focus on the relation between Gewohnheit and desire: in fact, Kant recognized that habit is not the mere repetition of an act, but more precisely it is the desire of repetition. That is why it is not strictly bonded to the deterministic world and it does not refer to machines: only the living beings may have habits. This way, it is possible to understand its role within the theme of health: in the reflections on dietetics, habit is particularly useful. The last part of the article is devoted to the new perspective on Kantian political philosophy opened by this positive view on this concept.En este artículo me centro en el concepto de hábito en la filosofía de Kant. En primer lugar, me enfoco en las críticas que él delinea contra Gewohnheit en su filosofía epistemológica y moral. En particular, el hábito es visto como ausencia de libertad moral. Esta conclusión es bastante diferente a la posición expresada por Kant en su Antropología en sentido pragmático y en la última parte de El conflicto de las facultades. Tras profundizar sobre los diferentes términos referidos al campo conceptual del hábito, me concentro en la relación entre Gewohnheit y deseo: de hecho, Kant reconoció que el hábito no es una mera repetición de un acto, sino, más precisamente, es el deseo de repetición. Es por esto que no está estrictamente ligado al mundo determinista y no se refiere a máquinas: solo los seres vivos podrían tener hábitos. De esta forma, es posible comprender su rol en el tema de la salud: en la reflexión sobre dietética, el hábito es particularmente útil. La última parte del artículo está consagrada a la nueva perspectiva en la filosofía política kantiana abierta por esta visión positiva de este concepto

La frammentazione dell'ordine. Comunità e critica in Friedrich Schlegel

This work is focused on Schlegel’s philosophy, as a thinking which makes possible to affront the problem of the role of subjectivity and philosophy in politics. In particular it deals with the three main spheres elaborated by Schlegel, and so I decided to evolve this text in three chapters: a. history, b. philosophy and critics as production of truth, c. possible interactions between philosophy and political institutions. I made interact these three spheres with the arguments that Schlegel uses to understand the role of philosophy and subjectivity: 1. the effort to rebuild links in the theoretical and political fragmentation which Schlegel sees; 2. the volatility of this effort; 3. the importance of philosophy in the production of an opening or window in established system of theory and politics, to continue in the effort to grasp the absolute, life and to give a key to the interpretation of chaos. These two groups of themes cross each other, and so they mark the weave of the present text, which faces the points 1., 2. and 3. in every field pointed out (a., b., c.). So I focused on Schlegel’s interpretation of the writing of subjective history, which always aims (without success) to objectivity (chap.1); on Schlegel’s conception of truth as a coherent construction (chap. 2); on the possibility of a community (chap.3). In every case the reconstruction is precarious, and can never became objective, universal and stable. From this results the rejection of an a priori history (chap.1), of an objective beauty (chap.2) and of modern natural law. Schlegel turns to the impossibility of the Universal and of a stable system of interpretation of, pointing to a lively and chaotic dimension through opening of those systems to life and changes. From this results the decision of writing fragments and not fixed philosophical systems, to defence of a subjective history and the project of a future not rationally necessary or inferable, but to the realisation of, people should work (chap.1); the importance of irony (chap.2); and the insertion in the State of a class (Stand) of savant not restricted in national borders, whose duty is to help keeping the order inside the States and to keep the attention on the processes of production of truth

Depression in Cancer: the many biobehavioural pathways driving tumor progression

Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is common among cancer patients, with prevalence rates up to four-times higher than the general population. Depression confers worse outcomes, including non-adherence to treatment and increased mortality in the oncology setting. Advances in the understanding of neurobiological underpinnings of depression have revealed shared biobehavioral mechanisms may contribute to cancer progression. Moreover, psychosocial stressors in cancer promote: (1) inflammation and oxidative/nitrosative stress; (2) a decreased immunosurveillance; and (3) a dysfunctional activation of the autonomic nervous system and of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis. Consequently, the prompt recognition of depression among patients with cancer who may benefit of treatment strategies targeting depressive symptoms, cognitive dysfunction, fatigue and sleep disturbances, is a public health priority. Moreover, behavioral strategies aiming at reducing psychological distress and depressive symptoms, including addressing unhealthy diet and life-style choices, as well as physical inactivity and sleep dysfunction, may represent important strategies not only to treat depression, but also to improve wider cancer-related outcomes. Herein, we provide a comprehensive review of the intertwined biobehavioural pathways linking depression to cancer progression. In addition, the clinical implications of these findings are critically reviewed

Genealogie frammentarie. Tendenze e linearit\ue0 della storia in Friedrich Schlegel

In this paper the author focuses on the reflections of Friedrich Schlegel (considered the first philosopher of the German Romantics) on the concept of history. The works considered here range from 1798 to 1805 and include Schlegel’s essays, lessons, personal notes and fragments. In those years the reflections on the plurality of stories (Geschichten) and genealogies against the singularity of History (Geschichte) are central. “History” will emerge as a regulatory ideal of the narrative, but also of praxis. This paper will also show the limits of Koselleck’s analysis of Schlegel’s thought

The Vital Habit in Kant's Philosophy

In this article I focus on the concept of habit in Kant’s philosophy. First of all, I concentrate on the criticisms he delineates against Gewohnheit in his epistemological and moral philosophy. In particular, habit is seen as absence of moral freedom. This conclusion is pretty different from Kant’s position expressed in his Anthropology From the Pragmatic Point of View and in the last part of the Conflict of the Faculties. After a deep insight on the different terms referred to the conceptual field of habit, I focus on the relation between Gewohnheit and desire: in fact, Kant recognized that habit is not the mere repetition of an act, but more precisely it is the desire of repetition. That is why it is not strictly bonded to the deterministic world and it does not refer to machines: only the living beings may have habits. This way, it is possible to understand its role within the theme of health: in the reflections on dietetics, habit is particularly useful. The last part of the article is devoted to the new perspective on Kantian political philosophy opened by this positive view on this concept.En este artículo me centro en el concepto de hábito en la filosofía de Kant. En primer lugar, me enfoco en las críticas que él delinea contra Gewohnheit en su filosofía epistemológica y moral. En particular, el hábito es visto como ausencia de libertad moral. Esta conclusión es bastante diferente a la posición expresada por Kant en su Antropología en sentido pragmático y en la última parte de El conflicto de las facultades. Tras profundizar sobre los diferentes términos referidos al campo conceptual del hábito, me concentro en la relación entre Gewohnheit y deseo: de hecho, Kant reconoció que el hábito no es una mera repetición de un acto, sino, más precisamente, es el deseo de repetición. Es por esto que no está estrictamente ligado al mundo determinista y no se refiere a máquinas: solo los seres vivos podrían tener hábitos. De esta forma, es posible comprender su rol en el tema de la salud: en la reflexión sobre dietética, el hábito es particularmente útil. La última parte del artículo está consagrada a la nueva perspectiva en la filosofía política kantiana abierta por esta visión positiva de este concepto