Extremal divisors on moduli spaces of rational curves with marked points

We study effective divisors on $\overline{M}_{0,n}$, focusing on hypertree divisors introduced by Castravet and Tevelev and the proper transforms of divisors on $\overline{M}_{1,n-2}$ introduced by Chen and Coskun. Results include a database of hypertree divisor classes and closed formulas for Chen--Coskun divisor classes. We relate these two types of divisors, and from this construct extremal divisors on $\overline{M}_{0,n}$ for $n \geq 7$ that furnish counterexamples to the conjectural description of the effective cone of $\overline{M}_{0,n}$ given by Castravet and Tevelev.Comment: Gap in proof of Lemma 6.2 corrected; thanks to Angelo Felice Lopez for bringing this to my attentio

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways

A Defence of Cartesian Materialism

One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in "Consciousness Explained" is to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett's assault. We do this by showing that Dennett's argument against this position is founded on an implicit assumption (about the relationship between phenomenal experience and information coding in the brain), which while valid in the context of classical cognitive science, is not forced on connectionism

Is Sustainable Agriculture Possible in the Arid West?: The Example of the Ogallala Aquifer

16 pages. Contains 2 pages of references

Heparin and heparin-induced thrombocytopenia

No Abstract

Attachment stability and change in early childhood and associated moderators

This thesis examined attachment stability and change in parent-child relationships in the first child-specific meta-analysis and the first measurement in an Australian sample. Employing novel statistical methods, this thesis demonstrated the existence of publication bias, a low degree of attachment stability, and the importance of parental sensitivity on developmentally significant attachment transition