161 research outputs found

    The sound of silence: equilibrium filtering and optimalcensoring in financial markets

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    Following the approach of standard filtering theory, we analyse investor-valuation of firms, when these are modelled as geometric-Brownian state processes that are privately and partially observed, at random (Poisson) times, by agents. Tasked with disclosing forecast values, agents are able purposefully to withhold their observations; explicit filtering formulas are derived for downgrading the valuations in the absence of disclosures. The analysis is conducted for both a solitary firm and m co-dependent firms

    Why managers with low forecast precision select high disclosure intensity: an equilibrium analysis

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    Abstract Shin (2006) has argued that in order to understand the equilibrium patterns of corporate disclosure, it is necessary for researchers to work within an asset pricing framework in which corporate disclosures are endogenously determined. Echoing this sentiment, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) have argued that earlier empirical results claiming to 
nd a negative relationship between disclosure and cost of capital may su€er fatally from endogeneity issues which, once addressed by a formal structural model, may reverse the sign of the relationship. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a general equilibrium model following the Black-Scholes paradigm with endogeneous disclosure in which 
rms select uniquely determined optimal probabilities of early equity-value discovery in a noisy environment. As 
rms may di€er also in the uncertainty (precision) with which management can forecast the future, managers strategically increase the intensity of their (voluntary) disclosures to provide partial compensation for this perceived di€erential risk. A positive relationship then results between disclosure and the cost of capital

    The effect of audit committee characteristics on intellectual capital disclosure

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    This paper, using data from 100 UK listed firms, investigates the relationship between audit committee characteristics and intellectual capital (IC) disclosure. We find that IC disclosure is positively associated with audit committee characteristics of size and frequency of meetings, and negatively associated with audit committee directors’ shareholding. We find no significant relationship between IC disclosure and audit committee independence and financial expertise. We also observe variations in the association between audit committee characteristics and IC disclosure at its component level, which suggest that the underlying factors that drive various forms of IC disclosure, i.e. human capital, structural capital and relational capital, are different. These results have important implications for policy-makers who have a responsibility to ensure that shareholders are protected by prescribing appropriate corporate governance structures and accounting regulations/guidelines
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