Patterns of co-morbidity with anxiety disorders in Chinese women with recurrent major depression

BACKGROUND: Studies conducted in Europe and the USA have shown that co-morbidity between major depressive disorder (MDD) and anxiety disorders is associated with various MDD-related features, including clinical symptoms, degree of familial aggregation and socio-economic status. However, few studies have investigated whether these patterns of association vary across different co-morbid anxiety disorders. Here, using a large cohort of Chinese women with recurrent MDD, we examine the prevalence and associated clinical features of co-morbid anxiety disorders. METHOD: A total of 1970 female Chinese MDD patients with or without seven co-morbid anxiety disorders [including generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), panic disorder, and five phobia subtypes] were ascertained in the CONVERGE study. Generalized linear models were used to model association between co-morbid anxiety disorders and various MDD features. RESULTS: The lifetime prevalence rate for any type of co-morbid anxiety disorder is 60.2%. Panic and social phobia significantly predict an increased family history of MDD. GAD and animal phobia predict an earlier onset of MDD and a higher number of MDD episodes, respectively. Panic and GAD predict a higher number of DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. GAD and blood-injury phobia are both significantly associated with suicidal attempt with opposite effects. All seven co-morbid anxiety disorders predict higher neuroticism. CONCLUSIONS: Patterns of co-morbidity between MDD and anxiety are consistent with findings from the US and European studies; the seven co-morbid anxiety disorders are heterogeneous when tested for association with various MDD features

Lawful Power

This is the edited text of the 2016 Robin Cooke Lecture, delivered at Victoria University of Wellington on 15 December 2016. It is a popular idea that public agencies (or perhaps only executive agencies) cannot lawfully do anything unless it is positively authorised by law. Through a discussion of the prerogatives of the Crown, of Parliament and of the courts in the United Kingdom, I argue to the contrary. Public bodies may legitimately do anything that serves the purposes for which they exist, unless it is prohibited by law. Such actions are exercises of lawful power, insofar as they are not unlawful. The Lecture discusses the English High Court's ruling in the case of R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. An epilogue explains the Supreme Court decision in Mrs Miller's case and its bearing on the topic of the Lecture.</p

Why proportionality is not a general ground of judicial review

Proportionality is a relation between two things held, metaphorically, in either side of a balance. Proportionality is a ground of judicial review of executive decisions when and only when the law requires judges to hold the scales, and to weigh one set of interests against another. That can be a just and convenient way for the law to give special protection for interests that call for that protection (as the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law do, and the common law does in some circumstances). Proportionality should not be a ground of judicial review (1) if a claimant can assert no interest that ought to be protected by proportionality reasoning, or (2) if the weighing ought not to be done by a court. As a result, proportionality can never be a general ground of judicial review of administrative action. The grounds of judicial review are various and depend on the nature of an administrative decision. In fact, there is no general common law ground of judicial review of the substance of administrative decisions. Not even Wednesbury unreasonableness. I will explain this view by pointing out the good sense in the famous, albeit flawed, 1948 decision of the Court of Appeal in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation

Herbert Hart and the semantic sting

Even to disagree, we need to understand each other. If I reject what you say without understanding you, we will only have the illusion of a disagreement. You will be asserting one thing and I will be denying another. Even to disagree, we need some agreement

Was Entick v Carrington a landmark?

Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils KB 275 was a landmark not only in the development of the law of the constitution, but also in the development of a distinctively English mixture of judicial restraint and judicial creativity. Lord Camden’s decision was a model of the common law method of devising new ways of controlling public powers, while disclaiming any power to legislate and, in fact, claiming to abide by the ‘ancient venerable edifice’ of the constitution. The result was a practical reform that protected civil liberties, on the basis of a very conservative understanding of the constitution, according to which public authorities are limited by law, but have powers that are not specified by law. I defend that understanding against the twenty-first-century idea that public authorities may do nothing except what the law expressly or impliedly authorises

Lawful Power

This is the edited text of the 2016 Robin Cooke Lecture, delivered at Victoria University of Wellington on 15 December 2016. It is a popular idea that public agencies (or perhaps only executive agencies) cannot lawfully do anything unless it is positively authorised by law. Through a discussion of the prerogatives of the Crown, of Parliament and of the courts in the United Kingdom, I argue to the contrary. Public bodies may legitimately do anything that serves the purposes for which they exist, unless it is prohibited by law. Such actions are exercises of lawful power, insofar as they are not unlawful. The Lecture discusses the English High Court's ruling in the case of R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. An epilogue explains the Supreme Court decision in Mrs Miller's case and its bearing on the topic of the Lecture.</p