Effects of purified perforin and granzyme A from cytotoxic T lymphocytes on guinea pig ventricular myocytes

Objective: Involvement of cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTL) in heart transplant rejection as well as in viral myocarditis is well established, but the precise mechanisms whereby infiltrating CTL damage the myocardium are unknown. The aim of the study was to investigate how CTL derived perforin, the serine protease granzyme A, and the combination of both, damage guinea pig ventricular myocytes. Methods: Action potentials and membrane currents were recorded by means of the whole cell configuration from guinea pig ventricular myocytes. Results: Resembling the effects of CTL derived lytic granules, perforin caused gradual myocyte shortening and contracture, leading to complete loss of the rod shaped morphology and to cell destruction. These changes were preceded by shortening of action potential duration and reduction of resting potential and action potential amplitude, followed by complete inexcitability. Granzyme A alone was ineffective, but accelerated the deleterious effects of perforin on the morphological and electrophysiological properties of myocytes. The effects of perforin were further evaluated by measuring membrane currents by means of the whole cell voltage clamp. Perforin induced discrete changes in membrane current, reminiscent of single ion channels, with large conductance and open time of up to several seconds. Linear regression analysis of the channel I-V relations resulted in a conductance of 890 pS and a reversal potential of −7.6 mV. These results suggest that perforin induces large non-selective channels, which can account for most of the observed adverse effects. Conclusions: As CTL participate in the immunological rejection of the transplanted heart, it is conceivable, but remains to be shown, that part of this damage is inflicted by perforin containing lytic granules. Cardiovascular Research 1994;28:643-64

Mary's Powers of Imagination

One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experience is like simply consists in the possession of these abilities. Criticisms of the ability hypothesis tend to focus on this last claim. Such critics tend to accept that Mary gains these abilities when she leaves the room, but they deny that such abilities constitute knowledge of what an experience is like. To my mind, however, this critical strategy grants too much. Focusing specifically on imaginative ability, I argue that Mary does not gain this ability when she leaves the room for she already had the ability to imagine red while she was inside it. Moreover, despite what some have thought, the ability hypothesis cannot be easily rescued by recasting it in terms of a more restrictive imaginative ability. My purpose here is not to take sides in the debate about physicalism, i.e., my criticism of the ability hypothesis is not offered in an attempt to defend the anti-physicalist conclusion of the knowledge argument. Rather, my purpose is to redeem the imagination from the misleading picture of it that discussion of the knowledge argument has fostered

Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism

Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind that is inconsistent with physicalism. In this paper I will explore two attempts to block the inference from an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap – the first from the phenomenal concept strategy, the second from Russellian monism – and suggest how the proponent of the knowledge argument might respond to each of these challenges. In doing so, I will draw on recent discussions of grounding and essence in the metaphysics literature