Competition, Efficiency, and Soundness in Banking: An Industrial Organization Perspective

How can competition enhance bank soundness? Does competition improve soundness via the efficiency channel? Do banks heterogeneously respond to competition? To answer these questions, we exploit an innovative measure of competition [Boone, J., A new way to measure competition, EconJnl, Vol. 118, pp. 1245-1261] that captures the reallocation of profits from inefficient banks to their efficient counterparts. Based on two complementary datasets for Europe and the U.S., we first establish that the new competition indicator captures a broad variety of other characteristics of competition in a consistent manner. Second, we verify that competition increases efficiency. Third, we present novel evidence that efficiency is the conduit through which competition contributes to bank soundness. In a final examination of banks’ heterogeneous responses to competition, we find that smaller banks’ soundness measures respond more strongly to competition than larger banks’ soundness measures, and two-stage quantile regressions indicate that the soundness-enhancing effect of competition is larger in magnitude for sound banks than for fragile banks.bank competition;efficiency;soundness;Boone indicator;quantile regression

Accessory muscle in the forearm: a clinical and embryological approach

Muscular variations of the flexor compartment of forearm are usual and can result in multiple clinical conditions limiting the functions of forearm and hand. The variations of the muscles, especially accessory muscles may simulate soft tissue tumors and can result in nerve compressions. During a routine dissection of the anterior region of the forearm and hand, an unusual muscle was observed on the left side of a 65-year-old male cadaver. The anomalous muscle belly arose from the medial epicondyle approxiamately 1 cm posterolateral to origin of normal flexor carpi ulnaris muscle (FCU), and from proximal part of the flexor digitorum superficialis muscle. It inserted to the triquetral, hamate bones and flexor retinaculum. Passive traction on the tendon of accessory muscle resulted in flexion of radiocarpal junction. The FCU which had one head, inserted to the pisiform bone hook of hamate and palmar aponeurosis. Its contiguous muscles displayed normal morphology. Knowledge of the existence of muscle anomalies as well as the location of compression is useful in determining the pathology and appropriate treatment for compressive neuropathies. In this study, a rare accessory muscle has been described

Competition, efficiency and soundness in European life insurance markets

This paper provides cross-country evidence on the association between soundness and competition in the life insurance industry, where competition is measured by the Boone indicator. We analyze 10 European Union (EU) life insurance markets over the post-deregulation period 1999-2011. The results indicate that competition increases the soundness of the EU life insurance markets. Since the Boone indicator measures competition based on the reallocation of profits from inefficient insurers to efficient ones, our results suggest that efficiency is the mechanism through which competition contributes to insurer solvency. The soundness-enhancing effect of competition is greater for weak insurers than for healthy ones

The interplay between quantitative easing, risk and competition: The case of Japanese banking

The Japanese economy is infamous for the magnitude of bank nonperforming loans that have originated back in the 1990s, whereas they are still causing controversies. Japan is also known for an extended quantitative easing programme of unprecedented scale. Yet the links between risk-taking activities, quantitative easing and bank competition are largely unexplored. This paper employs, for the first time, the Boone indicator to measure bank competition in Japan to examine these underlying linkages. Given the scale of nonperforming loans, we explicitly measure bank risk-taking based on a new data set of bankrupt and restructured loans. The dynamic panel threshold and panel Vector Autoregression analyses show that enhancing quantitative easing and competition would reduce bankrupt and restructured loans, but it would negatively affect financial stability. Given the recent adoption of negative rates in January 2016 by the Bank of Japan, our study provides new insights as clearly there is a trade-off between quantitative easing and financial stability beyond a certain threshold. Caution, therefore, regarding further scaling up quantitative easing is warranted

The Inter-temporal relationship between Risk, Capital and Efficiency: The case of Islamic and conventional banks

The paper investigates the relationship between risk, capital and efficiency for Islamic and conventional banks using a dataset spanning 14 countries over the 2000-2012 period. We use the z-score as a proxy for insolvency risk, cost efficiency is estimated via a stochastic frontier approach and capitalisation is reflected on the equity to assets ratio. An array of bank-specific, macroeconomic and market structure variables are used in a system of three equations, estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique. We find that the capitalisation response to increases in insolvency risk is more pronounced for Islamic banks but has an approximately five-times smaller effect on risk mitigation compared to conventional banks. Higher cost efficiency is related to lower risk for conventional banks, but the opposite is true for Islamic banks. The link between cost efficiency and capitalisation attests to a substitutional effect for the case of conventional banks, but a complementary effect for Islamic banks. Our findings give new insights on the use of efficiency to gauge capital requirements for financial institutions and are particularly relevant for regulators and policy makers in countries where both bank types operate

Competition, Efficiency, and Soundness in Banking: An Industrial Organization Perspective

How can competition enhance bank soundness? Does competition improve soundness via the efficiency channel? Do banks heterogeneously respond to competition? To answer these questions, we exploit an innovative measure of competition [Boone, J., A new way to measure competition, EconJnl, Vol. 118, pp. 1245-1261] that captures the reallocation of profits from inefficient banks to their efficient counterparts. Based on two complementary datasets for Europe and the U.S., we first establish that the new competition indicator captures a broad variety of other characteristics of competition in a consistent manner. Second, we verify that competition increases efficiency. Third, we present novel evidence that efficiency is the conduit through which competition contributes to bank soundness. In a final examination of banks’ heterogeneous responses to competition, we find that smaller banks’ soundness measures respond more strongly to competition than larger banks’ soundness measures, and two-stage quantile regressions indicate that the soundness-enhancing effect of competition is larger in magnitude for sound banks than for fragile banks

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non-deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk-taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios

How well do aggregate prudential ratios identify banking system problems?

Aggregate prudential ratios have become a mainstay of financial stability analysis. But how reliable are these indicators when it comes to distinguishing between strong and weak banking systems? We address this issue by analyzing the performance of aggregate prudential ratios in systemic banking crises, drawing upon a large cross-country dataset. We caution against sole reliance on these indicators, and advocate supplementing them with other tools and techniques. Nonetheless, our findings offer evidence that some of the ratios can help identify systemic banking problems.Financial soundness indicators Banking crises Macroprudential analysis