8,522 research outputs found
Categoricity and Possibility. A Note on Williamson's Modal Monism
The paper sketches an argument against modal monism, more specifically against the reduction of physical possibility to metaphysical possibility. The argument is based on the non-categoricity of quantum logic
Priority Monism Beyond Spacetime
I will defend two claims. First, Schaffer's priority monism is in tension with many research programs in quantum gravity. Second, priority monism can be modified into a view more amenable to this physics. The first claim is grounded in the fact that promising approaches to quantum gravity such as loop quantum gravity or string theory deny the fundamental reality of spacetime. Since fundamental spacetime plays an important role in Schaffer's priority monism by being identified with the fundamental structure, namely the cosmos, the disappearance of spacetime in these views might undermine classical priority monism. My second claim is that priority monism can avoid this issue with two moves: first, in dropping one of its core assumptions, namely that the fundamental structure is spatio-temporal, second, by identifying the connection between the non-spatio-temporal structure and the derivative spatio-temporal structure with mereological composition
Epistemological vs. Ontological Relationalism in Quantum Mechanics: Relativism or Realism?
In this paper we investigate the history of relationalism and its present use
in some interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the first part of this article
we will provide a conceptual analysis of the relation between substantivalism,
relationalism and relativism in the history of both physics and philosophy. In
the second part, we will address some relational interpretations of quantum
mechanics, namely, Bohr's relational approach, the modal interpretation by
Kochen, the perspectival modal version by Bene and Dieks and the relational
interpretation by Rovelli. We will argue that all these interpretations ground
their understanding of relations in epistemological terms. By taking into
account the analysis on the first part of our work, we intend to highlight the
fact that there is a different possibility for understanding quantum mechanics
in relational terms which has not been yet considered within the foundational
literature. This possibility is to consider relations in (non-relativist)
ontological terms. We will argue that such an understanding might be capable of
providing a novel approach to the problem of representing what quantum
mechanics is really talking about.Comment: Welcome
An Objection to Naturalism and Atheism from Logic
I proffer a success argument for classical logical consequence. I articulate in what sense that notion of consequence should be regarded as the privileged notion for metaphysical inquiry aimed at uncovering the fundamental nature of the world. Classical logic breeds necessitism. I use necessitism to produce problems for both ontological naturalism and atheism
A Pragmatic Interpretation of Quantum Logic
Scholars have wondered for a long time whether the language of quantum
mechanics introduces a quantum notion of truth which is formalized by quantum
logic (QL) and is incompatible with the classical (Tarskian) notion. We show
that QL can be interpreted as a pragmatic language of assertive formulas which
formalize statements about physical systems that are empirically justified or
unjustified in the framework of quantum mechanics. According to this
interpretation, QL formalizes properties of the metalinguistic notion of
empirical justification within quantum mechanics rather than properties of a
quantum notion of truth. This conclusion agrees with a general integrationist
perspective that interprets nonstandard logics as theories of metalinguistic
notions different from truth, thus avoiding incompatibility with classical
notions and preserving the globality of logic. By the way, some elucidations of
the standard notion of quantum truth are also obtained.
Key words: pragmatics, quantum logic, quantum mechanics, justifiability,
global pluralism.Comment: Third version: 20 pages. Sects. 1, 2, and 4 rewritten and improved.
Explanations adde
Everettian quantum mechanics without branching time
In this paper I assess the prospects for combining contemporary Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) with branching-time semantics in the tradition of Kripke, Prior, Thomason and Belnap. I begin by outlining the salient features of ‘decoherence-based’ EQM, and of the ’consistent histories’ formalism that is particularly apt for conceptual discussions in EQM. This formalism permits of both ‘branching worlds’and ‘parallel worlds’ interpretations; the metaphysics of EQM is in this sense underdetermined by the physics. A prominent argument due to David Lewis [1986] supports the non-branching interpretation. Belnap et al. [2001] refer to Lewis’ argument as the ’Assertion problem’, and propose a pragmatic response to it. I argue that their response is unattractively ad hoc and complex, and that it prevents an Everettian who adopts branching-time semantics from making clear sense of objective probability. The upshot is that Everettians are better off without branching-time semantics. I conclude by discussing and rejecting an alternative possible motivation for branching time
Fifty Million Elvis Fans Can’t be Wrong
This essay revisits some classic problems in the philosophy of space and time concerning the counting of possibilities. I argue that we should think that two Newtonian worlds can differ only as to when or where things happen and that general relativistic worlds can differ in something like the same way—the first of these theses being quaintly heterodox, the second baldly heretical, according to the mores of contemporary philosophy of physics
David Lewis's Place in the History of Late Analytic Philosophy: His Conservative and Liberal Methodology
In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the methods of science and mathematics. A century later, have Russell’s hopes become reality? David Lewis is often celebrated as a great systematic metaphysician, his influence proof that we live in a heyday of systematic philosophy. But, we argue, this common belief is misguided: Lewis was not a systematic philosopher, and he didn’t want to be. Although some aspects of his philosophy are systematic, mainly his pluriverse of possible worlds and its many applications, that systematicity was due to the influence of his teacher Quine, who really was an heir to Russell. Drawing upon Lewis’s posthumous papers and his correspondence as well as the published record, we show that Lewis’s non- Quinean influences, including G.E. Moore and D.M. Armstrong, led Lewis to an anti- systematic methodology which leaves each philosopher’s views and starting points to his or her own personal conscience
Immanent Powers versus Causal Powers (Propensities, Latencies and Dispositions) in Quantum Mechanics
In this paper we compare two different notions of 'power', both of which
attempt to provide a realist understanding of quantum mechanics grounded on the
potential mode of existence. For this propose we will begin by introducing two
different notions of potentiality present already within Aristotelian
metaphysics, namely, irrational potentiality and rational potentiality. After
discussing the role played by potentiality within classical and quantum
mechanics, we will address the notion of causal power which is directly related
to irrational potentiality and has been adopted by many interpretations of QM.
We will then present the notion of immanent power which relates to rational
potentiality and argue that this new concept presents important advantages
regarding the possibilities it provides for understanding in a novel manner the
theory of quanta. We end our paper with a comparison between both notions of
'power', stressing some radical differences between them.Comment: Forthcoming in: Probing the Meaning and Structure of Quantum
Mechanics, D. Aerts, M.L. Dalla Chiara, C. de Ronde and D. Krause (Eds.),
World Scientific, Singapore. arXiv admin note: text overlap with
arXiv:1310.453
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