Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortion regardless of game parametrization, myopic updating gives rise to the coexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect is sufficiently large or if the degree distribution of the interaction network is heterogeneous. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome emerges as a result of an unexpected chain of strategy invasions. Firstly, defectors emerge and coarsen spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly, extortioners and players adopting tit-for-tat emerge and spread via neutral drift among the emerged defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners, cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary invasions yield a five-strategy phase that is stable irrespective of the system size and the structure of the interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpected mechanism that stabilizes extortion and cooperation in an evolutionary setting.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Reports [related work available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.8294

Metastability and anomalous fixation in evolutionary games on scale-free networks

We study the influence of complex graphs on the metastability and fixation properties of a set of evolutionary processes. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, where the fitness and selection are frequency-dependent and vary with the population composition, we analyze the dynamics of snowdrift games (characterized by a metastable coexistence state) on scale-free networks. Using an effective diffusion theory in the weak selection limit, we demonstrate how the scale-free structure affects the system's metastable state and leads to anomalous fixation. In particular, we analytically and numerically show that the probability and mean time of fixation are characterized by stretched exponential behaviors with exponents depending on the network's degree distribution.Comment: 5 pages, 4 figures, to appear in Physical Review Letter

Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure

Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a biological population affects which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations is difficult. Precise results have been absent for a long time, but have recently emerged for special structures where all individuals have the same number of neighbors. But the problem of determining which trait is favored by selection in the natural case where the number of neighbors can vary, has remained open. For arbitrary selection intensity, the problem is in a computational complexity class which suggests there is no efficient algorithm. Whether there exists a simple solution for weak selection was unanswered. Here we provide, surprisingly, a general formula for weak selection that applies to any graph or social network. Our method uses coalescent theory and relies on calculating the meeting times of random walks. We can now evaluate large numbers of diverse and heterogeneous population structures for their propensity to favor cooperation. We can also study how small changes in population structure---graph surgery---affect evolutionary outcomes. We find that cooperation flourishes most in societies that are based on strong pairwise ties.Comment: 68 pages, 10 figure

How mutation alters fitness of cooperation in networked evolutionary games

Cooperation is ubiquitous in every level of living organisms. It is known that spatial (network) structure is a viable mechanism for cooperation to evolve. Until recently, it has been difficult to predict whether cooperation can evolve at a network (population) level. To address this problem, Pinheiro et al. proposed a numerical metric, called Average Gradient of Selection (AGoS) in 2012. AGoS can characterize and forecast the evolutionary fate of cooperation at a population level. However, stochastic mutation of strategies was not considered in the analysis of AGoS. Here we analyzed the evolution of cooperation using AGoS where mutation may occur to strategies of individuals in networks. Our analyses revealed that mutation always has a negative effect on the evolution of cooperation regardless of the fraction of cooperators and network structures. Moreover, we found that mutation affects the fitness of cooperation differently on different social network structures.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure

European wildcat populations are subdivided into five main biogeographic groups: consequences of Pleistocene climate changes or recent anthropogenic fragmentation?

Extant populations of the European wildcat are fragmented across the continent, the likely consequence of recent extirpations due to habitat loss and over-hunting. However, their underlying phylogeographic history has never been reconstructed. For testing the hypothesis that the European wildcat survived the Ice Age fragmented in Mediterranean refuges, we assayed the genetic variation at 31 microsatellites in 668 presumptive European wildcats sampled in 15 European countries. Moreover, to evaluate the extent of subspecies/population divergence and identify eventual wild × domestic cat hybrids, we genotyped 26 African wildcats from Sardinia and North Africa and 294 random-bred domestic cats. Results of multivariate analyses and Bayesian clustering confirmed that the European wild and the domestic cats (plus the African wildcats) belong to two well-differentiated clusters (average Ф ST = 0.159, r st = 0.392, P > 0.001; Analysis of molecular variance [AMOVA]). We identified from c. 5% to 10% cryptic hybrids in southern and central European populations. In contrast, wild-living cats in Hungary and Scotland showed deep signatures of genetic admixture and introgression with domestic cats. The European wildcats are subdivided into five main genetic clusters (average Ф ST = 0.103, r st = 0.143, P > 0.001; AMOVA) corresponding to five biogeographic groups, respectively, distributed in the Iberian Peninsula, central Europe, central Germany, Italian Peninsula and the island of Sicily, and in north-eastern Italy and northern Balkan regions (Dinaric Alps). Approximate Bayesian Computation simulations supported late Pleistocene-early Holocene population splittings (from c. 60 k to 10 k years ago), contemporary to the last Ice Age climatic changes. These results provide evidences for wildcat Mediterranean refuges in southwestern Europe, but the evolution history of eastern wildcat populations remains to be clarified. Historical genetic subdivisions suggest conservation strategies aimed at enhancing gene flow through the restoration of ecological corridors within each biogeographic units. Concomitantly, the risk of hybridization with free-ranging domestic cats along corridor edges should be carefully monitored

An evolutionary game model for behavioral gambit of loyalists: Global awareness and risk-aversion

We study the phase diagram of a minority game where three classes of agents are present. Two types of agents play a risk-loving game that we model by the standard Snowdrift Game. The behaviour of the third type of agents is coded by {\em indifference} w.r.t. the game at all: their dynamics is designed to account for risk-aversion as an innovative behavioral gambit. From this point of view, the choice of this solitary strategy is enhanced when innovation starts, while is depressed when it becomes the majority option. This implies that the payoff matrix of the game becomes dependent on the global awareness of the agents measured by the relevance of the population of the indifferent players. The resulting dynamics is non-trivial with different kinds of phase transition depending on a few model parameters. The phase diagram is studied on regular as well as complex networks

Coevolutionary games - a mini review

Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.Comment: 24 two-column pages, 10 figures; accepted for publication in BioSystem

Biophysical Fitness Landscapes for Transcription Factor Binding Sites

Evolutionary trajectories and phenotypic states available to cell populations are ultimately dictated by intermolecular interactions between DNA, RNA, proteins, and other molecular species. Here we study how evolution of gene regulation in a single-cell eukaryote S. cerevisiae is affected by the interactions between transcription factors (TFs) and their cognate genomic sites. Our study is informed by high-throughput in vitro measurements of TF-DNA binding interactions and by a comprehensive collection of genomic binding sites. Using an evolutionary model for monomorphic populations evolving on a fitness landscape, we infer fitness as a function of TF-DNA binding energy for a collection of 12 yeast TFs, and show that the shape of the predicted fitness functions is in broad agreement with a simple thermodynamic model of two-state TF-DNA binding. However, the effective temperature of the model is not always equal to the physical temperature, indicating selection pressures in addition to biophysical constraints caused by TF-DNA interactions. We find little statistical support for the fitness landscape in which each position in the binding site evolves independently, showing that epistasis is common in evolution of gene regulation. Finally, by correlating TF-DNA binding energies with biological properties of the sites or the genes they regulate, we are able to rule out several scenarios of site-specific selection, under which binding sites of the same TF would experience a spectrum of selection pressures depending on their position in the genome. These findings argue for the existence of universal fitness landscapes which shape evolution of all sites for a given TF, and whose properties are determined in part by the physics of protein-DNA interactions