Social Situatedness: Vygotsky and Beyond

The concept of ‘social situatedness’, i.e. the idea that the development of individual intelligence requires a social (and cultural) embedding, has recently received much attention in cognitive science and artificial intelligence research. The work of Lev Vygotsky who put forward this view already in the 1920s has influenced the discussion to some degree, but still remains far from well known. This paper therefore aims to give an overview of his cognitive development theory and discuss its relation to more recent work in primatology and socially situated artificial intelligence, in particular humanoid robotics

Finding a Mate With No Social Skills

Sexual reproductive behavior has a necessary social coordination component as willing and capable partners must both be in the right place at the right time. While there are many known social behavioral adaptations to support solutions to this problem, we explore the possibility and likelihood of solutions that rely only on non-social mechanisms. We find three kinds of social organization that help solve this social coordination problem (herding, assortative mating, and natal philopatry) emerge in populations of simulated agents with no social mechanisms available to support these organizations. We conclude that the non-social origins of these social organizations around sexual reproduction may provide the environment for the development of social solutions to the same and different problems.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures, GECCO'1

Imitation, mirror neurons and autism

Various deficits in the cognitive functioning of people with autism have been documented in recent years but these provide only partial explanations for the condition. We focus instead on an imitative disturbance involving difficulties both in copying actions and in inhibiting more stereotyped mimicking, such as echolalia. A candidate for the neural basis of this disturbance may be found in a recently discovered class of neurons in frontal cortex, 'mirror neurons' (MNs). These neurons show activity in relation both to specific actions performed by self and matching actions performed by others, providing a potential bridge between minds. MN systems exist in primates without imitative and ‘theory of mind’ abilities and we suggest that in order for them to have become utilized to perform social cognitive functions, sophisticated cortical neuronal systems have evolved in which MNs function as key elements. Early developmental failures of MN systems are likely to result in a consequent cascade of developmental impairments characterised by the clinical syndrome of autism

Imitation and Cooperation in Different Helping Games

The relation between imitation and cooperation in evolutionary settings presents complex aspects. From one hand, in any environment where egoists are favored over cooperators by selection processes, imitation should lead to a further spreading of the former ones due to the combined processes of individual selection and replication of successful behaviors. On the other hand, if cooperators succeed in forming clusters of mutual helping individuals, imitation may have a positive effect on cooperation by further reproducing this locally dominant behavior. This paper explores the relationship between imitation and cooperation by mean of a simulation model based on two different Helping games. Our model shows that different imitation mechanisms can favor the spreading of cooperation under a wide range of conditions. Moreover, the interplay of imitation and other factors — e.g. the possibility of performing “conditional associations” strategies — can further foster the success of cooperative agents.Imitation, Evolution of Cooperation, Helping Game, Indirect Reciprocity

Whom Will an Intrinsically Motivated Robot Learner Choose to Imitate from?

This paper studies an interactive learning system that couples internally guided learning and social interaction in the case it can interact with several teachers. Socially Guided Intrinsic Motivation with Interactive learning at the Meta level (SGIMIM) is an algorithm for robot learning of motor skills in highdimensional, continuous and non-preset environments, with two levels of active learning: SGIM-IM actively decides at a metalevel when and to whom to ask for help; and an active choice of goals in autonomous exploration. We illustrate through an air hockey game that SGIM-IM efficiently chooses the best strategy

Computational Architecture of a Robot Coach for Physical Exercises in Kinesthetic Rehabilitation

International audienceThe rising number of the elderly incurs growing concern about healthcare, and in particular rehabilitation healthcare. Assistive technology and and assistive robotics in particular may help to improve this process. We develop a robot coach capable of demonstrating rehabilitation exercises to patients, watch a patient carry out the exercises and give him feedback so as to improve his performance and encourage him. We propose a general software architecture for our robot coach, which is based on imitation learning techniques using Gaussian Mixture Models. Our system is thus easily programmable by medical experts without specific robotics knowledge, as well as capable of personalised audio feedback to patients indicating useful information to improve on their physical rehabilitation exercise

Great Ape Mindreading: What’s at Stake?

Humans and other great apes are similar in so many ways. We share an extended immaturity and intense infant-caregiver relationships, group living situations, cultural transmission of technology, and many emotions and cognitive capacities. Yet the communities of nonhuman apes are also very different from human communities. Humans build lasting tools, and store them to use later. We build permanent sleeping and living structures. We cook our food. We have courts of law and prisons and ethics books. There are vast technological differences between humans and nonhuman great apes. What is it that accounts for such a difference? On one account, one central difference between humans and other apes is that only humans develop the ability to mindread, the ability to see that others have beliefs that could be true or false which permits joint attention and shared intentions. For example, Michael Tomasello takes mindreading (along with cooperation and having shared goals) that permits the development of cumulative culture, so that technological advances can spread through a society and future generations can continuously improve upon those advances (Tomasello 2008). And, Kim Sterelny suggests that our hominin ancestors thrived in an apprenticeship culture where naïve individuals were given the opportunity to learn from a master, and the master knew how to offer the apprentice the appropriate projects, tools, and materials as her skill sets improved—which of course was facilitated by a developing mindreading capacity (Sterelny, 2012)