883 research outputs found
Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively
explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of
individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting
parties and social ties between them only serve as the indicator of the
existence of interactions. This assumption neglects important information
carried by inter-personal social ties such as genetic similarity, geographic
proximity, and social closeness, which may crucially affect the outcome of
interactions. To model these situations, we present a framework of evolutionary
multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity, where different types of edges
describe diverse social ties. Strategic behaviors together with social ties
determine the resulting payoffs of interactants. Under weak selection, we
provide a general formula to predict the success of one behavior over the
other. We apply this formula to various examples which cannot be dealt with
using previous models, including the division of labor and relationship- or
edge-dependent games. We find that labor division facilitates collective
cooperation by decomposing a many-player game into several games of smaller
sizes. The evolutionary process based on relationship-dependent games can be
approximated by interactions under a transformed and unified game. Our work
stresses the importance of social ties and provides effective methods to reduce
the calculating complexity in analyzing the evolution of realistic systems.Comment: 50 pages, 7 figure
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Chris Cannings: A Life in Games
Chris Cannings was one of the pioneers of evolutionary game theory. His early work was inspired by the formulations of John Maynard Smith, Geoff Parker and Geoff Price; Chris recognized the need for a strong mathematical foundation both to validate stated results and to give a basis for extensions of the models. He was responsible for fundamental results on matrix games, as well as much of the theory of the important war of attrition game, patterns of evolutionarily stable strategies, multiplayer games and games on networks. In this paper we describe his work, key insights and their influence on research by others in this increasingly important field. Chris made substantial contributions to other areas such as population genetics and segregation analysis, but it was to games that he always returned. This review is written by three of his students from different stages of his career
Evolutionary Multiplayer Games
Evolutionary game theory has become one of the most diverse and far reaching
theories in biology. Applications of this theory range from cell dynamics to
social evolution. However, many applications make it clear that inherent
non-linearities of natural systems need to be taken into account. One way of
introducing such non-linearities into evolutionary games is by the inclusion of
multiple players. An example is of social dilemmas, where group benefits could
e.g.\ increase less than linear with the number of cooperators. Such
multiplayer games can be introduced in all the fields where evolutionary game
theory is already well established. However, the inclusion of non-linearities
can help to advance the analysis of systems which are known to be complex, e.g.
in the case of non-Mendelian inheritance. We review the diachronic theory and
applications of multiplayer evolutionary games and present the current state of
the field. Our aim is a summary of the theoretical results from well-mixed
populations in infinite as well as finite populations. We also discuss examples
from three fields where the theory has been successfully applied, ecology,
social sciences and population genetics. In closing, we probe certain future
directions which can be explored using the complexity of multiplayer games
while preserving the promise of simplicity of evolutionary games.Comment: 14 pages, 2 figures, review pape
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The effect of network topology on optimal exploration strategies and the evolution of cooperation in a mobile population
We model a mobile population interacting over an underlying spatial structure using a Markov movement model. Interactions take the form of public goods games, and can feature an arbitrary group size. Individuals choose strategically to remain at their current location or to move to a neighbouring location, depending upon their exploration strategy and the current composition of their group. This builds upon previous work where the underlying structure was a complete graph (i.e. there was effectively no structure). Here, we consider alternative network structures and a wider variety of, mainly larger, populations. Previously, we had found when cooperation could evolve, depending upon the values of a range of population parameters. In our current work, we see that the complete graph considered before promotes stability, with populations of cooperators or defectors being relatively hard to replace. By contrast, the star graph promotes instability, and often neither type of population can resist replacement. We discuss potential reasons for this in terms of network topology
Threshold games and cooperation on multiplayer graphs
Objective: The study investigates the effect on cooperation in multiplayer
games, when the population from which all individuals are drawn is structured -
i.e. when a given individual is only competing with a small subset of the
entire population.
Method: To optimize the focus on multiplayer effects, a class of games were
chosen for which the payoff depends nonlinearly on the number of cooperators -
this ensures that the game cannot be represented as a sum of pair-wise
interactions, and increases the likelihood of observing behaviour different
from that seen in two-player games. The chosen class of games are named
"threshold games", and are defined by a threshold, , which describes the
minimal number of cooperators in a given match required for all the
participants to receive a benefit. The model was studied primarily through
numerical simulations of large populations of individuals, each with
interaction neighbourhoods described by various classes of networks.
Results: When comparing the level of cooperation in a structured population
to the mean-field model, we find that most types of structure lead to a
decrease in cooperation. This is both interesting and novel, simply due to the
generality and breadth of relevance of the model - it is likely that any model
with similar payoff structure exhibits related behaviour.
More importantly, we find that the details of the behaviour depends to a
large extent on the size of the immediate neighbourhoods of the individuals, as
dictated by the network structure. In effect, the players behave as if they are
part of a much smaller, fully mixed, population, which we suggest an expression
for.Comment: in PLOS ONE, 4th Feb 201
On the coexistence of cooperators, defectors and conditional cooperators in the multiplayer iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Recent experimental evidence [Gruji\'c et al., PLoS ONE 5, e13749 (2010)] on
the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that players choosing to cooperate or
not on the basis of their previous action and the actions of their neighbors
coexist with steady defectors and cooperators. We here study the coexistence of
these three strategies in the multiplayer iterated Prisoner's Dilemma by means
of the replicator dynamics. We consider groups with n = 2, 3, 4 and 5 players
and compute the payoffs to every type of player as the limit of a Markov chain
where the transition probabilities between actions are found from the
corresponding strategies. We show that for group sizes up to n = 4 there exists
an interior point in which the three strategies coexist, the corresponding
basin of attraction decreasing with increasing number of players, whereas we
have not been able to locate such a point for n = 5. We analytically show that
in the infinite n limit no interior points can arise. We conclude by discussing
the implications of this theoretical approach on the behavior observed in
experiments.Comment: 12 pages, 10 figures, uses elsart.cl
Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on
repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use
conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be
feasible in one-shot social dilemmas. Direct reciprocity requires that
individuals keep track of their past interactions and find the right response.
However, there are natural bounds on strategic complexity: Humans find it
difficult to remember past interactions accurately, especially over long
timespans. Given these limitations, it is natural to ask how complex strategies
need to be for cooperation to evolve. Here, we study stochastic evolutionary
game dynamics in finite populations to systematically compare the evolutionary
performance of reactive strategies, which only respond to the co-player's
previous move, and memory-one strategies, which take into account the own and
the co-player's previous move. In both cases, we compare deterministic strategy
and stochastic strategy spaces. For reactive strategies and small costs, we
find that stochasticity benefits cooperation, because it allows for
generous-tit-for-tat. For memory one strategies and small costs, we find that
stochasticity does not increase the propensity for cooperation, because the
deterministic rule of win-stay, lose-shift works best. For memory one
strategies and large costs, however, stochasticity can augment cooperation.Comment: 18 pages, 7 figure
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Modelling Evolution in Structured Populations Involving Multiplayer Interactions
We consider models of evolution in structured populations involving multiplayer games. Whilst also discussing other models, we focus on the modelling framework developed by Broom and Rychtář (J Theor Biol 302:70–80, 2012) onwards. This includes key progress so far, the main gaps and limitations, the relationship and synergies with other models and a discussion of the direction of future work. In this regard as well as discussing existing work, there is some new research on the applicability and robustness of current models with respect to using them to model real populations. This is an important potential advance, as previously all of the work has been entirely theoretical. In particular, the most complex models will have many parameters, and we concentrate on considering simpler versions with a small number of parameters which still possess the key features which would make them applicable. We find that these models are generally robust, in particular issues that can arise related to small payoff changes at critical values and removal of pivotal vertices would have similar effects on other modelling system including evolutionary graph theory. These often occur where it can be argued that there is a lack of robustness in the real system that the model faithfully picks up, and so is not a problematic feature
Dynamics of growth factor production in monolayers of cancer cells and evolution of resistance to anticancer therapies
Tumor heterogeneity is well documented for many characters, including the production of growth factors, which improve tumor proliferation and promote resistance against apoptosis and against immune reaction. What maintains heterogeneity remains an open question that has implications for diagnosis and treatment. While it has been suggested that therapies targeting growth factors are robust against evolved resistance, current therapies against growth factors, like antiangiogenic drugs, are not effective in the long term, as resistant mutants can evolve and lead to relapse. We use evolutionary game theory to study the dynamics of the production of growth factors by monolayers of cancer cells and to understand the effect of therapies that target growth factors. The dynamics depend on the production cost of the growth factor, on its diffusion range and on the type of benefit it confers to the cells. Stable heterogeneity is a typical outcome of the dynamics, while a pure equilibrium of nonproducer cells is possible under certain conditions. Such pure equilibrium can be the goal of new anticancer therapies. We show that current therapies, instead, can be effective only if growth factors are almost completely eliminated and if the reduction is almost immediate
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