Outcome contingency selectively affects the neural coding of outcomes but not of tasks

Value-based decision-making is ubiquitous in every-day life, and critically depends on the contingency between choices and their outcomes. Only if outcomes are contingent on our choices can we make meaningful value-based decisions. Here, we investigate the effect of outcome contingency on the neural coding of rewards and tasks. Participants performed a reversal-learning paradigm in which reward outcomes were contingent on trial-by-trial choices, and performed a ‘free choice’ paradigm in which rewards were random and not contingent on choices. We hypothesized that contingent outcomes enhance the neural coding of rewards and tasks, which was tested using multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data. Reward outcomes were encoded in a large network including the striatum, dmPFC and parietal cortex, and these representations were indeed amplified for contingent rewards. Tasks were encoded in the dmPFC at the time of decision-making, and in parietal cortex in a subsequent maintenance phase. We found no evidence for contingency-dependent modulations of task signals, demonstrating highly similar coding across contingency conditions. Our findings suggest selective effects of contingency on reward coding only, and further highlight the role of dmPFC and parietal cortex in value-based decision-making, as these were the only regions strongly involved in both reward and task coding

Decoding social intentions in human prehensile actions: Insights from a combined kinematics-fMRI study

Consistent evidence suggests that the way we reach and grasp an object is modulated not only by object properties (e.g., size, shape, texture, fragility and weight), but also by the types of intention driving the action, among which the intention to interact with another agent (i.e., social intention). Action observation studies ascribe the neural substrate of this `intentional' component to the putative mirror neuron (pMNS) and the mentalizing (MS) systems. How social intentions are translated into executed actions, however, has yet to be addressed. We conducted a kinematic and a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study considering a reach-to-grasp movement performed towards the same object positioned at the same location but with different intentions: passing it to another person (social condition) or putting it on a concave base (individual condition). Kinematics showed that individual and social intentions are characterized by different profiles, with a slower movement at the level of both the reaching (i.e., arm movement) and the grasping (i.e., hand aperture) components. fMRI results showed that: (i) distinct voxel pattern activity for the social and the individual condition are present within the pMNS and the MS during action execution; (ii) decoding accuracies of regions belonging to the pMNS and the MS are correlated, suggesting that these two systems could interact for the generation of appropriate motor commands. Results are discussed in terms of motor simulation and inferential processes as part of a hierarchical generative model for action intention understanding and generation of appropriate motor commands

The cognitive neuroscience of visual working memory

Visual working memory allows us to temporarily maintain and manipulate visual information in order to solve a task. The study of the brain mechanisms underlying this function began more than half a century ago, with Scoville and Milner’s (1957) seminal discoveries with amnesic patients. This timely collection of papers brings together diverse perspectives on the cognitive neuroscience of visual working memory from multiple fields that have traditionally been fairly disjointed: human neuroimaging, electrophysiological, behavioural and animal lesion studies, investigating both the developing and the adult brain

Neural codes for one’s own position and direction in a real-world “vista” environment

Humans, like animals, rely on an accurate knowledge of one’s spatial position and facing direction to keep orientated in the surrounding space. Although previous neuroimaging studies demonstrated that scene-selective regions (the parahippocampal place area or PPA, the occipital place area or OPA and the retrosplenial complex or RSC), and the hippocampus (HC) are implicated in coding position and facing direction within small-(room-sized) and large-scale navigational environments, little is known about how these regions represent these spatial quantities in a large open-field environment. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans to explore the neural codes of these navigationally-relevant information while participants viewed images which varied for position and facing direction within a familiar, real-world circular square. We observed neural adaptation for repeated directions in the HC, even if no navigational task was required. Further, we found that the amount of knowledge of the environment interacts with the PPA selectivity in encoding positions: individuals who needed more time to memorize positions in the square during a preliminary training task showed less neural attenuation in this scene-selective region. We also observed adaptation effects, which reflect the real distances between consecutive positions, in scene-selective regions but not in the HC. When examining the multi-voxel patterns of activity we observed that scene-responsive regions and the HC encoded both spatial information and that the RSC classification accuracy for positions was higher in individuals scoring higher to a self-reported questionnaire of spatial abilities. Our findings provide new insight into how the human brain represents a real, large-scale “vista” space, demonstrating the presence of neural codes for position and direction in both scene-selective and hippocampal regions, and revealing the existence, in the former regions, of a map-like spatial representation reflecting real-world distance between consecutive positions

Representational organization of novel task sets during proactive encoding

Recent multivariate analyses of brain data have boosted our understanding of the organizational principles that shape neural coding. However, most of this progress has focused on perceptual visual regions (Connolly et al., 2012), whereas far less is known about the organization of more abstract, action-oriented representations. In this study, we focused on humans{\textquoteright} remarkable ability to turn novel instructions into actions. While previous research shows that instruction encoding is tightly linked to proactive activations in fronto-parietal brain regions, little is known about the structure that orchestrates such anticipatory representation. We collected fMRI data while participants (both males and females) followed novel complex verbal rules that varied across control-related variables (integrating within/across stimuli dimensions, response complexity, target category) and reward expectations. Using Representational Similarity Analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008) we explored where in the brain these variables explained the organization of novel task encoding, and whether motivation modulated these representational spaces. Instruction representations in the lateral prefrontal cortex were structured by the three control-related variables, while intraparietal sulcus encoded response complexity and the fusiform gyrus and precuneus organized its activity according to the relevant stimulus category. Reward exerted a general effect, increasing the representational similarity among different instructions, which was robustly correlated with behavioral improvements. Overall, our results highlight the flexibility of proactive task encoding, governed by distinct representational organizations in specific brain regions. They also stress the variability of motivation-control interactions, which appear to be highly dependent on task attributes such as complexity or novelty.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTIn comparison with other primates, humans display a remarkable success in novel task contexts thanks to our ability to transform instructions into effective actions. This skill is associated with proactive task-set reconfigurations in fronto-parietal cortices. It remains yet unknown, however, how the brain encodes in anticipation the flexible, rich repertoire of novel tasks that we can achieve. Here we explored cognitive control and motivation-related variables that might orchestrate the representational space for novel instructions. Our results showed that different dimensions become relevant for task prospective encoding depending on the brain region, and that the lateral prefrontal cortex simultaneously organized task representations following different control-related variables. Motivation exerted a general modulation upon this process, diminishing rather than increasing distances among instruction representations

Machine Learning for Neuroimaging with Scikit-Learn

Statistical machine learning methods are increasingly used for neuroimaging data analysis. Their main virtue is their ability to model high-dimensional datasets, e.g. multivariate analysis of activation images or resting-state time series. Supervised learning is typically used in decoding or encoding settings to relate brain images to behavioral or clinical observations, while unsupervised learning can uncover hidden structures in sets of images (e.g. resting state functional MRI) or find sub-populations in large cohorts. By considering different functional neuroimaging applications, we illustrate how scikit-learn, a Python machine learning library, can be used to perform some key analysis steps. Scikit-learn contains a very large set of statistical learning algorithms, both supervised and unsupervised, and its application to neuroimaging data provides a versatile tool to study the brain.Comment: Frontiers in neuroscience, Frontiers Research Foundation, 2013, pp.1

Using fMRI in experimental philosophy: Exploring the prospects

This chapter analyses the prospects of using neuroimaging methods, in particular functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for philosophical purposes. To do so, it will use two case studies from the field of emotion research: Greene et al. (2001) used fMRI to uncover the mental processes underlying moral intuitions, while Lindquist et al. (2012) used fMRI to inform the debate around the nature of a specific mental process, namely, emotion. These studies illustrate two main approaches in cognitive neuroscience: Reverse inference and ontology testing, respectively. With regards to Greene et al.’s study, the use of Neurosynth (Yarkoni 2011) will show that the available formulations of reverse inference, although viable a priori, seem to be of limited use in practice. On the other hand, the discussion of Lindquist et al.’s study will present the so far neglected potential of ontology-testing approaches to inform philosophical questions