Cognitive Debiasing Strategies for the Emergency Department

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/135994/1/aet210010_am.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/135994/2/aet210010.pd

Teaching clinical reasoning to medical students

BACKGROUND: Keele Medical School's new curriculum includes a 5-week course to extend medical students' consultation skills beyond those historically required for competent inductive diagnosis. CONTEXT: Clinical reasoning is a core skill for the practice of medicine, and is known to have implications for patient safety, yet historically it has not been explicitly taught. Rather, it has been assumed that these skills will be learned by accumulating a body of knowledge and by observing expert clinicians. This course aims to assist students to develop their own clinical reasoning skills and promote their greater understanding of, and potential to benefit from, the clinical reasoning skills of others. The course takes place in the fourth or penultimate year, and is integrated with students' clinical placements, giving them opportunities to practise and quickly embed their learning. INNOVATION: This course emphasises that clinical reasoning extends beyond initial diagnosis into all other aspects of clinical practice, particularly clinical management. It offers students a variety of challenging and interesting opportunities to engage with clinical reasoning across a wide range of clinical practice. It addresses bias through metacognition and increased self-awareness, considers some of the complexities of prescribing and non-pharmacological interventions, and promotes pragmatic evidence-based practice, information management within the consultation and the maximising of patient adherence. This article describes clinical reasoning-based classroom and community teaching. IMPLICATIONS: Early evaluation suggests that students value the course and benefit from it

Cognitive debiasing 1: Origins of bias and theory of debiasing

Numerous studies have shown that diagnostic failure depends upon a variety of factors. Psychological factors are fundamental in influencing the cognitive performance of the decision maker. In this first of two papers, we discuss the basics of reasoning and the Dual Process Theory (DPT) of decision making. The general properties of the DPT model, as it applies to diagnostic reasoning, are reviewed. A variety of cognitive and affective biases are known to compromise the decision-making process. They mostly appear to originate in the fast intuitive processes of Type 1 that dominate (or drive) decision making. Type 1 processes work well most of the time but they may open the door for biases. Removing or at least mitigating these biases would appear to be an important goal. We will also review the origins of biases. The consensus is that there are two major sources: innate, hard-wired biases that developed in our evolutionary past, and acquired biases established in the course of development and within our working environments. Both are associated with abbreviated decision making in the form of heuristics. Other work suggests that ambient and contextual factors may create high risk situations that dispose decision makers to particular biases. Fatigue, sleep deprivation and cognitive overload appear to be important determinants. The theoretical basis of several approaches towards debiasing is then discussed. All share a common feature that involves a deliberate decoupling from Type 1 intuitive processing and moving to Type 2 analytical processing so that eventually unexamined intuitive judgments can be submitted to verification. This decoupling step appears to be the critical feature of cognitive and affective debiasing

Deliberate clinical inertia: Using meta-cognition to improve decision-making

Deliberate clinical inertia is the art of doing nothing as a positive response. To be able to apply this concept, individual clinicians need to specifically focus on their clinical decision-making. The skill of solving problems and making optimal clinical decisions requires more attention in medical training and should play a more prominent part of the medical curriculum. This paper provides suggestions on how this may be achieved. Strategies to mitigate common biases are outlined, with an emphasis on reversing a 'more is better' culture towards more temperate, critical thinking. To incorporate such an approach in medical curricula and in clinical practice, institutional endorsement and support is required

Cognitive debiasing 2: Impediments to and strategies for change

In a companion paper, we proposed that cognitive debiasing is a skill essential in developing sound clinical reasoning to mitigate the incidence of diagnostic failure. We reviewed the origins of cognitive biases and some proposed mechanisms for how debiasing processes might work. In this paper, we first outline a general schema of how cognitive change occurs and the constraints that may apply. We review a variety of individual factors, many of them biases themselves, which may be impediments to change. We then examine the major strategies that have been developed in the social sciences and in medicine to achieve cognitive and affective debiasing, including the important concept of forcing functions. The abundance and rich variety of approaches that exist in the literature and in individual clinical domains illustrate the difficulties inherent in achieving cognitive change, and also the need for such interventions. Ongoing cognitive debiasing is arguably the most important feature of the critical thinker and the well-calibrated mind. We outline three groups of suggested interventions going forward: educational strategies, workplace strategies and forcing functions. We stress the importance of ambient and contextual influences on the quality of individual decision making and the need to address factors known to impair calibration of the decision maker. We also emphasise the importance of introducing these concepts and corollary development of training in critical thinking in the undergraduate level in medical education

Paramedic clinical decision making during high acuity emergency calls: design and methodology of a Delphi study

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The scope of practice of paramedics in Canada has steadily evolved to include increasingly complex interventions in the prehospital setting, which likely have repercussions on clinical outcome and patient safety. Clinical decision making has been evaluated in several health professions, but there is a paucity of work in this area on paramedics. This study will utilize the Delphi technique to establish consensus on the most important instances of paramedic clinical decision making during high acuity emergency calls, as they relate to clinical outcome and patient safety.</p> <p>Methods and design</p> <p>Participants in this multi-round survey study will be paramedic leaders and emergency medical services medical directors/physicians from across Canada. In the first round, participants will identify instances of clinical decision making they feel are important for patient outcome and safety. On the second round, the panel will rank each instance of clinical decision making in terms of its importance. On the third and potentially fourth round, participants will have the opportunity to revise the ranking they assigned to each instance of clinical decision making. Consensus will be considered achieved for the most important instances if 80% of the panel ranks it as important or extremely important. The most important instances of clinical decision making will be plotted on a process analysis map.</p> <p>Discussion</p> <p>The process analysis map that results from this Delphi study will enable the gaps in research, knowledge and practice to be identified.</p

Implementation science: a role for parallel dual processing models of reasoning?

BACKGROUND: A better theoretical base for understanding professional behaviour change is needed to support evidence-based changes in medical practice. Traditionally strategies to encourage changes in clinical practices have been guided empirically, without explicit consideration of underlying theoretical rationales for such strategies. This paper considers a theoretical framework for reasoning from within psychology for identifying individual differences in cognitive processing between doctors that could moderate the decision to incorporate new evidence into their clinical decision-making. DISCUSSION: Parallel dual processing models of reasoning posit two cognitive modes of information processing that are in constant operation as humans reason. One mode has been described as experiential, fast and heuristic; the other as rational, conscious and rule based. Within such models, the uptake of new research evidence can be represented by the latter mode; it is reflective, explicit and intentional. On the other hand, well practiced clinical judgments can be positioned in the experiential mode, being automatic, reflexive and swift. Research suggests that individual differences between people in both cognitive capacity (e.g., intelligence) and cognitive processing (e.g., thinking styles) influence how both reasoning modes interact. This being so, it is proposed that these same differences between doctors may moderate the uptake of new research evidence. Such dispositional characteristics have largely been ignored in research investigating effective strategies in implementing research evidence. Whilst medical decision-making occurs in a complex social environment with multiple influences and decision makers, it remains true that an individual doctor's judgment still retains a key position in terms of diagnostic and treatment decisions for individual patients. This paper argues therefore, that individual differences between doctors in terms of reasoning are important considerations in any discussion relating to changing clinical practice. SUMMARY: It is imperative that change strategies in healthcare consider relevant theoretical frameworks from other disciplines such as psychology. Generic dual processing models of reasoning are proposed as potentially useful in identifying factors within doctors that may moderate their individual uptake of evidence into clinical decision-making. Such factors can then inform strategies to change practice

A cognitive forcing tool to mitigate cognitive bias:A randomised control trial

Abstract Background Cognitive bias is an important source of diagnostic error yet is a challenging area to understand and teach. Our aim was to determine whether a cognitive forcing tool can reduce the rates of error in clinical decision making. A secondary objective was to understand the process by which this effect might occur. Methods We hypothesised that using a cognitive forcing tool would reduce diagnostic error rates. To test this hypothesis, a novel online case-based approach was used to conduct a single blinded randomized clinical trial conducted from January 2017 to September 2018. In addition, a qualitative series of “think aloud” interviews were conducted with 20 doctors from a UK teaching hospital in 2018. The primary outcome was the diagnostic error rate when solving bias inducing clinical vignettes. A volunteer sample of medical professionals from across the UK, Republic of Ireland and North America. They ranged in seniority from medical student to Attending Physician. Results Seventy six participants were included in the study. The data showed doctors of all grades routinely made errors related to cognitive bias. There was no difference in error rates between groups (mean 2.8 cases correct in intervention vs 3.1 in control group, 95% CI -0.94 – 0.45 P = 0.49). The qualitative protocol revealed that the cognitive forcing strategy was well received and a produced a subjectively positive impact on doctors’ accuracy and thoughtfulness in clinical cases. Conclusions The quantitative data failed to show an improvement in accuracy despite a positive qualitative experience. There is insufficient evidence to recommend this tool in clinical practice, however the qualitative data suggests such an approach has some merit and face validity to users

Comparison of veterinary drugs and veterinary homeopathy: part 1

For many years after its invention around 1796, homeopathy was widely used in people and later in animals. Over the intervening period (1796-2016) pharmacology emerged as a science from Materia Medica (medicinal materials) to become the mainstay of veterinary therapeutics. There remains today a much smaller, but significant, use of homeopathy by veterinary surgeons. Homeopathic products are sometimes administered when conventional drug therapies have not succeeded, but are also used as alternatives to scientifically based therapies and licensed products. The principles underlying the veterinary use of drug-based and homeopathic products are polar opposites; this provides the basis for comparison between them. This two-part review compares and contrasts the two treatment forms in respect of history, constituents, methods of preparation, known or postulated mechanisms underlying responses, the legal basis for use and scientific credibility in the 21st century. Part 1 begins with a consideration of why therapeutic products actually work or appear to do so