How Does Science Come to Speak in the Courts? Citations Intertexts, Expert Witnesses, Consequential Facts, and Reasoning

Citations, in their highly conventionalized forms, visibly indicate each texts explicit use of the prior literature that embodies the knowledge and contentions of its field. This relation to prior texts has been called intertextuality in literary and literacy studies. Here, Bazerman discusses the citation practices and intertextuality in science and the law in theoretical and historical perspective, and considers the intersection of science and law by identifying the judicial rules that limit and shape the role of scientific literature in court proceedings. He emphasizes that from the historical and theoretical analysis, it is clear that, in the US, judicial reasoning is an intertextually tight and self-referring system that pays only limited attention to documents outside the laws, precedents, and judicial rules. The window for scientific literature to enter the courts is narrow, focused, and highly filtered. It serves as a warrant for the expert witnesses\u27 expertise, which in turn makes opinion admissible in a way not available to ordinary witnesses

Electrical futures past

Futurist writing about technology emerged in the late 19th century at the same time as new kinds of electrical technology were making utopian futures seem practically attainable. Electrical writers and novelists alike thus borrowed from the popular ‘science’ fiction of Jules Verne, Edward Bellamy and others to try to create self-fulfilling prophecies of a future in which electrical gadgets and machines met all major practical needs of civilization. To the extent that many parts of our world are populated by the hardware that they forecast, they succeeded in their goal

Arbitrator Decision Making: When Are Final Offers Important?

Central to understanding the effect of arbitration schemes on the process of collective bargaining is understanding the process by which arbitrators make decisions. A model of arbitrator behavior inconventional arbitration is developed that allows the arbitration award to be a function of both the offers of the parties and the(exogenous) facts of the case. The weight that the arbitrator puts on the facts relative to the offers is hypothesized to be a function of the quality of the offers as measured by the difference between the offers. Two special cases of this model are derived: 1) the arbitrator bases the award strictly on the offers of the parties(split-the-difference) and 2) the arbitrator bases the award strictly on the facts of the case.The model is implemented empirically using data gathered from practicing arbitrators regarding their decisions in twenty-five hypothetical cases. These data have the advantage that they allow causal inference regarding the effect on the arbitration award of the facts relative to the offers. On the basis of the estimates, both of the special case models are strongly rejected. The arbitration awards are found to be influenced by both the offers of the parties and the facts of the case. In addition, the weight put on the facts of the case relative to the offers is found to vary significantly with the quality of the offers. When the offers are of low quality (far apart)the arbitrator weights the facts more heavily and the offers less heavily.These results suggest that the naive split-the difference view of arbitrator behavior, which is the basis of the critique of conventional arbitration that has led to the adoption of final-offer arbitration, is no correct in its extreme view. On the other hand,the awards are affected by the offers so that the parties can manipulate the outcome to some extent by manipulating their offers. However, the scope for this sort of influence is limited by the finding that the offers are weighted less heavily as their quality deteriorates.

Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes."

One prominent explanation for disagreement in bargaining is that the parties have divergent and relatively optimistic expectations regarding the ultimate outcome if they fail to agree. The fact that settlement rates are much higher where final-offer arbitration is the dispute settlement procedure than where conventional arbitration is the dispute settlement procedure is used as the basis of a test of the role of divergent expectations in causing disagreement in negotiations. Calculations of identical-expectations contract zones using existing estimates of models of arbitrator behavior yield larger identical-expectations contract zones in conventional arbitration than in final-offer arbitration. This evidence clearly suggests that divergent expectations alone are not an adequate explanation of disagreement in labor-management negotiations. A number of alternative explanations for disagreement are suggested and evaluated.

The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration

A general model of arbitrator behavior in conventional and final-offer arbitration is developed that is based on an underlying notion of an appropriate award in a particular case. This appropriate award is defined as a function of the facts of the case independently of the offers of the parties. In conventional arbitration the arbitration award is argued to be a function of both the offers of the parties and the appropriate award. The weight that the arbitrator puts on the appropriate award relative to the offers is hypothesized to be a function of the quality of the offers as measured by the difference between the offers. In final-offer arbitration itis argued that the arbitrator chooses the offer that is closest to the appropriate award.The model is implemented empirically using data gathered from practicing arbitrators regarding their decisions in twenty-five hypothetical cases. The estimates of the general model strongly support the characterizations of arbitrator behavior in the two schemes. No substantial differences were found in the determination of the appropriate award implicit in the conventional arbitration decisions and the determination of the appropriate award implicitin the final-offer decisions.

No harm, no foul: The outcome bias in ethical judgments

We present six studies demonstrating that outcome information biases ethical judgments of others' ethically-questionable behaviors. In particular, we show that the same behaviors produce more ethical condemnation when they happen to produce bad rather than good outcomes, even if the outcomes are determined by chance. Our studies show that individuals judge behaviors as less ethical, more blameworthy, and punish them more harshly, when such behaviors led to undesirable consequences, even if they saw those behaviors as acceptable before they knew its consequences. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that a rational, analytic mindset can override the effects of one's intuitions in ethical judgments. Implications for both research and practice are discussed.outcome bias, unethical behavior, judgment, ethical decision making

Highbrow Films Gather Dust: A Study of Dynamic Inconsistency and Online DVD Rentals

We report on a field study demonstrating systematic differences between the preferences people anticipate they will have over a series of options in the future and their subsequent revealed preferences over those options. Using a novel panel data set, we analyze the film rental and return patterns of a sample of online DVD rental customers over a period of four months. We predict and find that people are more likely to rent DVDs in one order and return them in the reverse order when should DVDs (e.g., documentaries) are rented before want DVDs (e.g., action films). This effect is sizeable in magnitude, with a 2% increase in the probability of a reversal in preferences (from a baseline rate of 12%) ensuing if the first of two sequentially rented movies has more should and fewer want characteristics than the second film. Similarly, we also predict and find that should DVDs are held significantly longer than want DVDs within-customer. Finally, we find that as the same customers gain more experience with online DVD rentals, their "dynamic inconsistency" is attenuated. We interpret our results as evidence that myopia has a meaningful impact on decisions in the field and that people learn about their myopia with experience, allowing them to curb its influence.want/should, intrapersonal conflict, dynamic inconsistency, myopia

How Can Decision Making Be Improved?

The optimal moment to address the question of how to improve human decision making has arrived. Thanks to fifty years of research by judgment and decision making scholars, psychologists have developed a detailed picture of the ways in which human judgment is bounded. This paper argues that the time has come to focus attention on the search for strategies that will improve bounded judgment because decision making errors are costly and are growing more costly, decision makers are receptive, and academic insights are sure to follow from research on improvement. In addition to calling for research on improvement strategies, this paper organizes the existing literature pertaining to improvement strategies, highlighting promising directions for future research.