Context-dependent Utilities

Savage's framework of subjective preference among acts provides a paradigmatic derivation of rational subjective probabilities within a more general theory of rational decisions. The system is based on a set of possible states of the world, and on acts, which are functions that assign to each state a consequence. The representation theorem states that the given preference between acts is determined by their expected utilities, based on uniquely determined probabilities (assigned to sets of states), and numeric utilities assigned to consequences. Savage's derivation, however, is based on a highly problematic well-known assumption not included among his postulates: for any consequence of an act in some state, there is a "constant act" which has that consequence in all states. This ability to transfer consequences from state to state is, in many cases, miraculous -- including simple scenarios suggested by Savage as natural cases for applying his theory. We propose a simplification of the system, which yields the representation theorem without the constant act assumption. We need only postulates P1-P6. This is done at the cost of reducing the set of acts included in the setup. The reduction excludes certain theoretical infinitary scenarios, but includes the scenarios that should be handled by a system that models human decisions

Deciding first-order properties of nowhere dense graphs

Nowhere dense graph classes, introduced by Nesetril and Ossona de Mendez, form a large variety of classes of "sparse graphs" including the class of planar graphs, actually all classes with excluded minors, and also bounded degree graphs and graph classes of bounded expansion. We show that deciding properties of graphs definable in first-order logic is fixed-parameter tractable on nowhere dense graph classes. At least for graph classes closed under taking subgraphs, this result is optimal: it was known before that for all classes C of graphs closed under taking subgraphs, if deciding first-order properties of graphs in C is fixed-parameter tractable, then C must be nowhere dense (under a reasonable complexity theoretic assumption). As a by-product, we give an algorithmic construction of sparse neighbourhood covers for nowhere dense graphs. This extends and improves previous constructions of neighbourhood covers for graph classes with excluded minors. At the same time, our construction is considerably simpler than those. Our proofs are based on a new game-theoretic characterisation of nowhere dense graphs that allows for a recursive version of locality-based algorithms on these classes. On the logical side, we prove a "rank-preserving" version of Gaifman's locality theorem.Comment: 30 page

Context-Dependent Utilities A Solution to the Problem of Constant Acts in Savage

Savage’s framework of subjective preference among acts provides a paradigmatic derivation of rational subjective probabilities within a more general theory of rational decisions. The system is based on a set of possible states of the world, and on acts, which are functions that assign to each state a consequence. The representation theorem states that the given preference between acts is determined by their expected utilities, based on uniquely determined probabilities (assigned to sets of states), and numeric utilities assigned to consequences. Savage’s derivation, however, is based on a highly problematic well-known assumption not included among his postulates: for any consequence of an act in some state, there is a “constant act” which has that consequence in all states. This ability to transfer consequences from state to state is, in many cases, miraculous – including simple scenarios suggested by Savage as natural cases for applying his theory. We propose a simplification of the system, which yields the representation theorem without the constant act assumption. We need only postulates P1-P6. This is done at the cost of reducing the set of acts included in the setup. The reduction excludes certain theoretical infinitary scenarios, but includes the scenarios that should be handled by a system that models human decisions

A Simpler and More Realistic Subjective Decision Theory

In his classic Savage (1954/1972) develops a formal system of rational decision making. It is based on (i) a set of possible states of the world, (ii) a set of consequences, (iii) a set of acts, which are functions from states to consequences, and (iv) a preference relation over the acts, which represents the preferences of an idealized rational agent. The goal and the culmination of the enterprise is a representation theorem: Any preference relation that satisfies certain arguably acceptable postulates determines a (finitely additive) probability distribution over the states and a utility assignment to the consequences, such that the preferences among acts are determined by their expected utilities. Additional problematic assumptions are however required in Savage's proofs. First, there is a Boolean algebra of events (sets of states) which determines the richness of the set of acts. The probabilities are assigned to members of this algebra. Savage's proof requires that this be a σ-algebra (i.e., closed under infinite countable unions and intersections), which makes for an extremely rich preference relation. On Savage's view we should not require the probability to be σ-additive. He therefore finds the insistence on a σ-algebra, peculiar and is unhappy with it. But he sees no way of avoiding it. Second, the assignment of utilities requires the constant act assumption: for every consequence there is a constant act, which yields that consequence in every state. This assumption is known to be highly counterintuitive. The present work includes two mathematical results. The first, and more difficult one, shows that the σ-algebra assumption can be dropped. The second states that, as long as utilities are assigned to finite gambles only, the constant act assumption can be replaced by the plausible, much weaker assumption that there are at least two non-equivalent constant acts. The paper discusses the notion of "idealized agent" that underlies Savage's approach, and argues that the simplified system, which is adequate for all the actual purposes for which the system is designed, involves a more realistic notion of an idealized agent

A simpler and more realistic subjective decision theory

In his classic book Savage develops a formal system of rational decision making. It is based on (i) a set of possible states of the world, (ii) a set of consequences, (iii) a set of acts, which are functions from states to consequences, and (iv) a preference relation over the acts, which represents the preferences of an idealized rational agent. The goal and the culmination of the enterprise is a representation theorem: Any preference relation that satisfies certain arguably acceptable postulates determines a (finitely additive) probability distribution over the states and a utility assignment to the consequences, such that the preferences among acts are determined by their expected utilities. Additional problematic assumptions are however required in Savage's proofs. First, there is a Boolean algebra of events (sets of states) which determines the richness of the set of acts. The probabilities are assigned to members of this algebra. Savage's proof requires that this be a $\sigma$-algebra (i.e., closed under infinite countable unions and intersections), which makes for an extremely rich preference relation. On Savage's view we should \textit{not} require subjective probabilities to be $\sigma$-additive. He therefore finds the insistence on a $\sigma$-algebra peculiar and is unhappy with it. But he sees no way of avoiding it. Second, the assignment of utilities requires the \textit{constant act assumption}: for every consequence there is a constant act, which produces that consequence in every state. This assumption is known to be highly counterintuitive. The present work contains two mathematical results. The first, and the more difficult one, shows that the $\sigma$-algebra assumption can be dropped. The second states that, as long as utilities are assigned to finite gambles only, the constant act assumption can be replaced by the more plausible and much weaker assumption that there are at least two non-equivalent constant acts. The second result also employs a novel way of deriving utilities in Savage-style systems -- without appealing to von Neumann-Morgenstern lotteries. The paper discusses the notion of ``idealized agent" that underlies Savage's approach, and argues that the simplified system, which is adequate for all the actual purposes for which the system is designed, involves a more realistic notion of an idealized agent

Chances, counterfactuals and similarity

John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong. I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne’s challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis’s first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewis’s own suggested modification

Eliminating Recursion from Monadic Datalog Programs on Trees

We study the problem of eliminating recursion from monadic datalog programs on trees with an infinite set of labels. We show that the boundedness problem, i.e., determining whether a datalog program is equivalent to some nonrecursive one is undecidable but the decidability is regained if the descendant relation is disallowed. Under similar restrictions we obtain decidability of the problem of equivalence to a given nonrecursive program. We investigate the connection between these two problems in more detail

A derivational model of discontinuous parsing

The notion of latent-variable probabilistic context-free derivation of syntactic structures is enhanced to allow heads and unrestricted discontinuities. The chosen formalization covers both constituent parsing and dependency parsing. The derivational model is accompanied by an equivalent probabilistic automaton model. By the new framework, one obtains a probability distribution over the space of all discontinuous parses. This lends itself to intrinsic evaluation in terms of perplexity, as shown in experiments.Postprin

The Counterpart Principle of Analogical Support by Structural Similarity

We propose and investigate an Analogy Principle in the context of Unary Inductive Logic based on a notion of support by structural similarity which is often employed to motivate scientific conjectures