Legal Considerations for Possible Noise Ordinances for Newport Harbor

In this report prepared for the Newport Waterfront Commission by the Marine Affairs Institute at the Roger Williams University School of Law, current and prospective noise ordinances in the city of Newport, RI are examined, and the legal precedents and management tools to create harbor-specific noise ordinances are discussed

Impaired biotin status in anticonvulsant therapy

In 264 epileptics undergoing long-term therapy with anticonvulsants, significantly reduced plasma biotin levels were found compared with a normal control group: 74% of the epileptics had biotin levels for those treated with sodium valproate were higher than for those treated with phenytion, primidone, or carbamazepine. The observed reduction in biotin levels might be a factor influencing the efficacy of these three antionvulsants

Riggs on strong justification

In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified beliefs be truth conducive (likely to be true) is not always compatible with the requirement that they be epistemically responsible (arrived at in an epistemically responsible manner)1. He supports this claim by criticising Alvin Goldman's view that if a belief is strongly justified, it is also epistemically responsible. In light of this, Riggs recommends that we develop two independent conceptions of justification, one that insists upon the requirement that beliefs be truth conducive and another that insists that they be epistemically responsible. It will then, on his view, be possible to properly evaluate beliefs with regard to each conception of justification. Riggs, however, is mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are independent. If a belief is responsibly arrived at, it is therefore likely to be true. He is thus also mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are incompatible. This mistake arises because Riggs assumes that justification is possible or, at least, that it involves standards that are akin to our own. Moreover, once this assumption is made explicit, we can see why a notion of justification that connects epistemic practice with likely truth is significant

Comment on ``Absence of abelian Higgs hair for extremal black holes''

We examine the claim of Chamblin et. al. that extreme black holes cannot support abelian Higgs hair. We provide evidence that contradicts this claim and discuss reasons for this discrepancy.Comment: 1 page 2 figures, revised titl