Dependent choice, properness, and generic absoluteness

We show that Dependent Choice is a sufficient choice principle for developing the basic theory of proper forcing, and for deriving generic absoluteness for the Chang model in the presence of large cardinals, even with respect to -preserving symmetric submodels of forcing extensions. Hence, not only provides the right framework for developing classical analysis, but is also the right base theory over which to safeguard truth in analysis from the independence phenomenon in the presence of large cardinals. We also investigate some basic consequences of the Proper Forcing Axiom in, and formulate a natural question about the generic absoluteness of the Proper Forcing Axiom in and. Our results confirm as a natural foundation for a significant portion of classical mathematics and provide support to the idea of this theory being also a natural foundation for a large part of set theory

Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 82-3

This paper contains a close analysis of Frege's proofs of the axioms of arithmetic §§70-83 of Die Grundlagen, with special attention to the proof of the existence of successors in §§82-83. Reluctantly and hesitantly, we come to the conclusion that Frege was at least somewhat confused in those two sections and that he cannot be said to have outlined, or even to have intended, any correct proof there. The proof he sketches is in many ways similar to that given in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, but fidelity to what Frege wrote in Die Grundlagen and in Grundgesetze requires us to reject the charitable suggestion that it was this (beautiful) proof that he had in mind in §§82-83

Fourier, Gauss, Fraunhofer, Porod and the Shape from Moments Problem

We show how the Fourier transform of a shape in any number of dimensions can be simplified using Gauss's law and evaluated explicitly for polygons in two dimensions, polyhedra three dimensions, etc. We also show how this combination of Fourier and Gauss can be related to numerous classical problems in physics and mathematics. Examples include Fraunhofer diffraction patterns, Porods law, Hopfs Umlaufsatz, the isoperimetric inequality and Didos problem. We also use this approach to provide an alternative derivation of Davis's extension of the Motzkin-Schoenberg formula to polygons in the complex plane.Comment: 21 pages, no figure

Comparative concept similarity over Minspaces: Axiomatisation and Tableaux Calculus

We study the logic of comparative concept similarity \CSL introduced by Sheremet, Tishkovsky, Wolter and Zakharyaschev to capture a form of qualitative similarity comparison. In this logic we can formulate assertions of the form " objects A are more similar to B than to C". The semantics of this logic is defined by structures equipped by distance functions evaluating the similarity degree of objects. We consider here the particular case of the semantics induced by \emph{minspaces}, the latter being distance spaces where the minimum of a set of distances always exists. It turns out that the semantics over arbitrary minspaces can be equivalently specified in terms of preferential structures, typical of conditional logics. We first give a direct axiomatisation of this logic over Minspaces. We next define a decision procedure in the form of a tableaux calculus. Both the calculus and the axiomatisation take advantage of the reformulation of the semantics in terms of preferential structures.Comment: 25 page

Integrating a Global Induction Mechanism into a Sequent Calculus

Most interesting proofs in mathematics contain an inductive argument which requires an extension of the LK-calculus to formalize. The most commonly used calculi for induction contain a separate rule or axiom which reduces the valid proof theoretic properties of the calculus. To the best of our knowledge, there are no such calculi which allow cut-elimination to a normal form with the subformula property, i.e. every formula occurring in the proof is a subformula of the end sequent. Proof schemata are a variant of LK-proofs able to simulate induction by linking proofs together. There exists a schematic normal form which has comparable proof theoretic behaviour to normal forms with the subformula property. However, a calculus for the construction of proof schemata does not exist. In this paper, we introduce a calculus for proof schemata and prove soundness and completeness with respect to a fragment of the inductive arguments formalizable in Peano arithmetic.Comment: 16 page

Grounding the Unreal

The scientific successes of the last 400 years strongly suggest a picture on which our scientific theories exhibit a layered structure of dependence and determination. Economics is dependent on and determined by psychology; psychology in its turn is, plausibly, dependent on and determined by biology; and so it goes. It is tempting to explain this layered structure of dependence and determination among our theories by appeal to a corresponding layered structure of dependence and determination among the entities putatively treated by those theories. In this paper, I argue that we can resist this temptation: we can explain the sense in which, e.g., the biological truths are dependent on and determined by chemical truths without appealing to properly biological or chemical entities. This opens the door to a view on which, though there are more truths than just the purely physical truths, there are no entities, states, or properties other than the purely physical entities, states, and properties. I argue that some familiar strategies to explicate the idea of a layered structure of theories by appeal to reduction, ground, and truthmaking encounter difficulties. I then show how these difficulties point the way to a more satisfactory treatment which appeals to something very close to the notion of ground. Finally, I show how this treatment provides a theoretical setting in which we might fruitfully frame debates about which entities there really are

Computation in Physical Systems: A Normative Mapping Account

The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical systems are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, the criteria of utility and success vary according to our diverse purposes and pragmatic goals. Hence there is no independent or uniform fact to the matter, and I advance the ‘anti-realist’ conclusion that computational descriptions of physical systems are not founded upon deep ontological distinctions, but rather upon interest-relative human conventions. Hence physical computation is a ‘conventional’ rather than a ‘natural’ kind

The diagonalization method in quantum recursion theory

As quantum parallelism allows the effective co-representation of classical mutually exclusive states, the diagonalization method of classical recursion theory has to be modified. Quantum diagonalization involves unitary operators whose eigenvalues are different from one.Comment: 15 pages, completely rewritte

The good, the bad and the ugly

This paper discusses the neo-logicist approach to the foundations of mathematics by highlighting an issue that arises from looking at the Bad Company objection from an epistemological perspective. For the most part, our issue is independent of the details of any resolution of the Bad Company objection and, as we will show, it concerns other foundational approaches in the philosophy of mathematics. In the first two sections, we give a brief overview of the "Scottish" neo-logicist school, present a generic form of the Bad Company objection and introduce an epistemic issue connected to this general problem that will be the focus of the rest of the paper. In the third section, we present an alternative approach within philosophy of mathematics, a view that emerges from Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899, Leipzig: Teubner; Foundations of geometry (trans.: Townsend, E.). La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1959.). We will argue that Bad Company-style worries, and our concomitant epistemic issue, also affects this conception and other foundationalist approaches. In the following sections, we then offer various ways to address our epistemic concern, arguing, in the end, that none resolves the issue. The final section offers our own resolution which, however, runs against the foundationalist spirit of the Scottish neo-logicist program