“Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich’s Third Way”

In the third and final part of his A Theory of Determinism (TD) Ted Honderich addresses the fundamental question concerning “the consequences of determinism.” The critical question he aims to answer is what follows if determinism is true? This question is, of course, intimately bound up with the problem of free will and, in particular, with the question of whether or not the truth of determinism is compatible or incompatible with the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility. It is Honderich’s aim to provide a solution to “the problem of the consequences of determinism” and a key element of this is his articulation and defence of an alternative response to the implications of determinism that collapses the familiar Compatibilist/Incompatibilist dichotomy. Honderich offers us a third way – the response of “Affirmation” (HFY 125-6). Although his account of Affirmation has application and relevance to issues and features beyond freedom and responsibility, my primary concern in this essay will be to examine Honderich’s theory of “Affirmation” as it concerns the free will problem

The composition of larval food and the significance of exocrine secretions in the bumblebee Bombus terrestris

This paper describes a study on the relation between the composition of larval food and the development of female castes in bumblebees. The first aim was to evaluate the significance of glandular secretions in the larval diet as a possible factor involved in larval feeding and caste differentiation. Small amounts of proteinaceous secretions were found to be added during the ingestion of sucrose but not while discharging food to the larvae. It is discussed that these secretions are digestive in function rather than food additives that would possibly play a role in the process of caste differentiation. Secondly, a comparative analysis was made of the general composition of food samples obtained from larvae of different castes and ages and from various periods in the social development of the colony. No significant differences in the total amount of pollen, sucrose and protein were detected between the castes or different age groups. Unlike honeybee workers, individual bumblebee workers did not change the composition of the diet they supplied to the brood in relation to their own age, nor to the social development of the colony. These findings suggest that all larvae receive the same nourishment during their total development and indicate that differences in development between queen larvae and worker larvae are neither caused by variations nor by a qualitative modification of their food with respect to the amount of pollen, protein and carbohydrates

Structuralism, Anti-Structuralism and Objectivity

Structuralist theories describe the entities in their domains solely in terms of relations, while also claiming to be complete theories of the entities in question. Leibniz and Kant insist that no structuralist theory can be a complete theory. Kant believes that the knowledge afforded by structuralist theories is sufficient. However, Jacques Derrida is skeptical of the sufficiency of structuralist theories for stable knowledge of any kind

La mort de Dieu dans la philosophie moderne

En 1887, Nietzsche écrivait: >. Ceux qui regardent le monde avec attention, avec une certaine suspicion même, remarquent que le soleil s'est couché, que la confiance de jadis s'est transformée en doute, que notre monde quotidien est devenu plus sombre, plus étrange, >. Cependant cet evenement ne s'est pas encore annonce publiquement, continue Nietzsche, et on ne mesure pas encore les implications de la mort de Dieu: une longue suite de démolitions, de destructions, de déclins, de renversements. II y aura une >, comme on ne l'aura pas encore vu sur la surface de la terr

Meaning in Life without Free Will

Even if determinism precludes responsibility and accountability, it does not eliminate everything that we deem valuable. This paper argues that life can be meaningful even if we do not have free will

Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life

As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some maintain or would it rather have a humanizing effect on our practices and policies, freeing us from the negative effects of belief in free will? In this chapter we consider the practical implications of free will skepticism and argue that life without free will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many people believe. We argue that prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for example, would not be threatened. On treatment of criminals, we argue that although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, preventive detention and rehabilitation programs would still be justified. While we will touch on all these issues below, our focus will be primarily on this last issue. We begin in section I by considering two different routes to free will skepticism. The first denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will and receives its contemporary impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and John-Dylan Haynes. The second, which is more common in the philosophical literature, does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that whether this causal efficacy is deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will by the standards of the historical debate. We argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route—e.g., Al Mele (2009), Eddy Nahmias (2002, 2011), and Neil Levy (2005)—the second route to free will skepticism remains intact. In section II we argue that free will skepticism allows for a workable morality, and, rather than negatively impacting our personal relationships and meaning in life, may well improve our well-being and our relationships to others since it would tend to eradicate an often destructive form of moral anger. In section III we argue that free will skepticism allows for adequate ways of responding to criminal behavior—in particular, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alternation of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justified and sufficient for good social policy. We present and defend our own preferred model for dealing with dangerous criminals, an incapacitation account built on the right to self-protection analogous to the justification for quarantine (see Pereboom 2001, 2013, 2014a; Caruso 2016a), and we respond to recent objections to it by Michael Corrado and John Lemos