Under stochastic dominance Choquet-expected utility and anticipated utility are identical

The aim of this paper is to convince the reader that Choquet-expected utility, as initiated by Schmeidler (1982, 1989) for decision making under uncertainty, when formulated for decision making under risk naturally leads to anticipated utility, as initiated by Quiggin/Yaari. Thus the two generalizations of expected utility in fact are one

Prospect relativity: how choice options influence decision under risk.

In many theories of decision under risk (e.g., expected utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory, and prospect theory), the utility of a prospect is independent of other options in the choice set. The experiments presented here show a large effect of the available options, suggesting instead that prospects are valued relative to one another. The judged certainty equivalent for a prospect is strongly influenced by the options available. Similarly, the selection of a preferred prospect is strongly influenced by the prospects available. Alternative theories of decision under risk (e.g., the stochastic difference model, multialternative decision field theory, and range frequency theory), where prospects are valued relative to one another, can provide an account of these context effects

Reasons and Means to Model Preferences as Incomplete

Literature involving preferences of artificial agents or human beings often assume their preferences can be represented using a complete transitive binary relation. Much has been written however on different models of preferences. We review some of the reasons that have been put forward to justify more complex modeling, and review some of the techniques that have been proposed to obtain models of such preferences

Priority for the Worse Off and the Social Cost of Carbon

The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a monetary measure of the harms from carbon emission. Specifically, it is the reduction in current consumption that produces a loss in social welfare equivalent to that caused by the emission of a ton of CO2. The standard approach is to calculate the SCC using a discounted-utilitarian social welfare function (SWF)—one that simply adds up the well-being numbers (utilities) of individuals, as discounted by a weighting factor that decreases with time. The discounted-utilitarian SWF has been criticized both for ignoring the distribution of well-being, and for including an arbitrary preference for earlier generations. Here, we use a prioritarian SWF, with no time-discount factor, to calculate the SCC in the integrated assessment model RICE. Prioritarianism is a well-developed concept in ethics and theoretical welfare economics, but has been, thus far, little used in climate scholarship. The core idea is to give greater weight to well-being changes affecting worse off individuals. We find substantial differences between the discounted-utilitarian and non-discounted prioritarian SCC

The Affective Impact of Financial Skewness on Neural Activity and Choice

Few finance theories consider the influence of “skewness” (or large and asymmetric but unlikely outcomes) on financial choice. We investigated the impact of skewed gambles on subjects' neural activity, self-reported affective responses, and subsequent preferences using functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI). Neurally, skewed gambles elicited more anterior insula activation than symmetric gambles equated for expected value and variance, and positively skewed gambles also specifically elicited more nucleus accumbens (NAcc) activation than negatively skewed gambles. Affectively, positively skewed gambles elicited more positive arousal and negatively skewed gambles elicited more negative arousal than symmetric gambles equated for expected value and variance. Subjects also preferred positively skewed gambles more, but negatively skewed gambles less than symmetric gambles of equal expected value. Individual differences in both NAcc activity and positive arousal predicted preferences for positively skewed gambles. These findings support an anticipatory affect account in which statistical properties of gambles—including skewness—can influence neural activity, affective responses, and ultimately, choice

Operator theory and function theory in Drury-Arveson space and its quotients

The Drury-Arveson space $H^2_d$, also known as symmetric Fock space or the $d$-shift space, is a Hilbert function space that has a natural $d$-tuple of operators acting on it, which gives it the structure of a Hilbert module. This survey aims to introduce the Drury-Arveson space, to give a panoramic view of the main operator theoretic and function theoretic aspects of this space, and to describe the universal role that it plays in multivariable operator theory and in Pick interpolation theory.Comment: Final version (to appear in Handbook of Operator Theory); 42 page

Comonotonic Independence: The Critical Test between Classical and Rank-Dependent Utility Theories

This article compares classical expected utility (EU) with the more general rank-dependent utility (RDU) models. The difference between the independence condition for preferences of EU and its comonotonic generalization in RDU provides the exact demarcation between EU and rank-dependent models. Other axiomatic differences are not essential. An experimental design is described that tests this difference between independence and comonotonic independence in its most basic form and is robust against violations of other assumptions that may confound the results, in particular the reduction principle and transitivity. It is well known that in the classical counterexamples to EU, comonotonic independence performs better than full-force independence. For our more general choice pairs, however, we find that comonotonic independence does not perform better. This is contrary to our prior expectation and suggests that rank-dependent models, in full generality, do not provide a descriptive improvement over EU. For rank-dependent models to have a future, submodels and choice situations need to be identified for which rank-dependence does contribute descriptively

Measuring loss aversion under ambiguity: a method to make prospect theory completely observable

We propose a simple, parameter-free method that, for the first time, makes it possible to completely observe Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory. While methods exist to measure event weighting and the utility for gains and losses separately, there was no method to measure loss aversion under ambiguity. Our method allows this and thereby it can measure prospect theory’s entire utility function. Consequently, we can properly identify properties of utility and perform new tests of prospect theory. We implemented our method in an experiment and obtained support for prospect theory. Utility was concave for gains and convex for losses and there was substantial loss aversion. Both utility and loss aversion were the same for risk and ambiguity, as assumed by prospect theory, and sign-comonotonic trade-off consistency, the central condition of prospect theory, held