Recommending Action More than Inaction When Either Decision Fails: Which Norm Underlies This Process?

International audienc

Distinguishing the effects of beliefs and preconditions: the folk psychology of goals and actions

Two studies examined lay people's understanding of goals and intentional actions, which are key concepts in folk psychology. The studies show how predictions of goals and actions are affected by actors' beliefs about their abilities and their actual possession of the preconditions required for the actions. In some conditions, the beliefs and the preconditions were contradictory Actors' beliefs about their abilities shaped observers' goal ascriptions, whereas actual preconditions dominated predictions about action accomplishment. Participants judged the relationship between goals and actions to be stronger when preconditions were present. Participants judged that neither beliefs nor preconditions were necessary for the actor to have action fantasies. These studies clarify how folk psychological concepts of desires, beliefs, and preconditions relate to each other and how they relate to attributions of goals and actions

Judgments of voluntary and physical causes in causal chains: Probabilistic and social functionalist criteria for attributions

Four experiments investigated judgments about voluntary human actions and physical causes that were embedded in causal chains ending in negative outcomes (e.g., a forest fire). Causes were judged for their explanatory quality, their effect on the probability of the outcome, and the extent to which they could be socially controlled. Results supported legal theorists' claim that voluntary actions are judged better explanations than physical causes. Indices derived from theories of probability change generally failed to predict the preference for voluntary actions. In contrast, this preference was mediated by the perceived extent to which voluntary versus physical causes may be brought under social control. These results suggest that causal explanation, at least within causal chains, is not driven solely by changes in the probability of an outcome when a cause is added, and that observers recognize the potential social function of explanations in drawing attention to socially controllable causes