Immediate action is the best strategy when facing uncertain climate change

Mitigating the detrimental effects of climate change is a collective problem that requires global cooperation. However, achieving cooperation is difficult since benefits are obtained in the future. The so-called collective-risk game, devised to capture dangerous climate change, showed that catastrophic economic losses promote cooperation when individuals know the timing of a single climatic event. In reality, the impact and timing of climate change is not certain; moreover, recurrent events are possible. Thus, we devise a game where the risk of a collective loss can recur across multiple rounds. We find that wait and see behavior is successful only if players know when they need to contribute to avoid danger and if contributions can eliminate the risks. In all other cases, act quickly is more successful, especially under uncertainty and the possibility of repeated losses. Furthermore, we incorporate influential factors such as wealth inequality and heterogeneity in risks. Even under inequality individuals should contribute early, as long as contributions have the potential to decrease risk. Most importantly, we find that catastrophic scenarios are not necessary to induce such immediate collective action

WSES guidelines for management of Clostridium difficile infection in surgical patients

In the last two decades there have been dramatic changes in the epidemiology of Clostridium difficile infection (CDI), with increases in incidence and severity of disease in many countries worldwide. The incidence of CDI has also increased in surgical patients. Optimization of management of C difficile, has therefore become increasingly urgent. An international multidisciplinary panel of experts prepared evidenced-based World Society of Emergency Surgery (WSES) guidelines for management of CDI in surgical patients.Peer reviewe

EcoEvoModel_OnePred

Data for Figure

Data from: Eco-evolutionary feedback promotes Red Queen dynamics and selects for sex in predator populations

Although numerous hypotheses exist to explain the overwhelming presence of sexual reproduction across the tree of life, we still cannot explain its prevalence when considering all inherent costs involved. The Red Queen hypothesis states that sex is maintained because it can create novel genotypes with a selective advantage. This occurs when the interactions between species induce frequent environmental change. Here we investigate whether coevolution and eco-evolutionary feedback dynamics in a predator-prey system allows for indirect selection and maintenance of sexual reproduction in the predator. Combining models and chemostat experiments of a rotifer-algae system we show a continuous feedback between population and trait change along with recurrent shifts from selection by predation and competition for a limited resource. We found that a high propensity for sex was indirectly selected and was maintained in rotifer populations within environments containing these eco-evolutionary dynamics; whereas within environments under constant conditions, predators evolved rapidly to lower levels of sex. Thus, our results indicate that the influence of eco-evolutionary feedback dynamics on the overall evolutionary change has been underestimated

Data from: Eco-evolutionary feedback promotes Red Queen dynamics and selects for sex in predator populations

Although numerous hypotheses exist to explain the overwhelming presence of sexual reproduction across the tree of life, we still cannot explain its prevalence when considering all inherent costs involved. The Red Queen hypothesis states that sex is maintained because it can create novel genotypes with a selective advantage. This occurs when the interactions between species induce frequent environmental change. Here we investigate whether coevolution and eco-evolutionary feedback dynamics in a predator-prey system allows for indirect selection and maintenance of sexual reproduction in the predator. Combining models and chemostat experiments of a rotifer-algae system we show a continuous feedback between population and trait change along with recurrent shifts from selection by predation and competition for a limited resource. We found that a high propensity for sex was indirectly selected and was maintained in rotifer populations within environments containing these eco-evolutionary dynamics; whereas within environments under constant conditions, predators evolved rapidly to lower levels of sex. Thus, our results indicate that the influence of eco-evolutionary feedback dynamics on the overall evolutionary change has been underestimated

Evolutionary Dynamics of Strategic Behavior in a Collective-Risk Dilemma

<div><p>A collective-risk social dilemma arises when a group must cooperate to reach a common target in order to avoid the risk of collective loss while each individual is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. In contrast to the prisoners' dilemma or public goods games, the collective-risk dilemma encompasses the risk that all individuals lose everything. These characteristics have potential relevance for dangerous climate change and other risky social dilemmas. Cooperation is costly to the individual and it only benefits all individuals if the common target is reached. An individual thus invests without guarantee that the investment is worthwhile for anyone. If there are several subsequent stages of investment, it is not clear when individuals should contribute. For example, they could invest early, thereby signaling their willingness to cooperate in the future, constantly invest their fair share, or wait and compensate missing contributions. To investigate the strategic behavior in such situations, we have simulated the evolutionary dynamics of such collective-risk dilemmas in a finite population. Contributions depend individually on the stage of the game and on the sum of contributions made so far. Every individual takes part in many games and successful behaviors spread in the population. It turns out that constant contributors, such as constant fair sharers, quickly lose out against those who initially do not contribute, but compensate this in later stages of the game. In particular for high risks, such late contributors are favored.</p></div

Stability of behaviors in a collective-risk dilemma.

<p>Simulations were conducted with the following five behaviors from a 10 round game: , , , , and . As expected, was most stable for all , indicating that it is difficult to evolve cooperation in this game. For both and were equivalently stable. As increases the stability of the , ‘fair rational’ behavior, improves (Averages from realizations, parameters , , , , , , ).</p

Sample trajectories for the evolutionary dynamics in collective-risk dilemmas.

<p>(a) For small risk probability, , the initially random contributions quickly drop to zero. Consequently, the target is never met and the average payoff is 90% of the initial endowment, as expected. (b) For high risk probability, , strategies investing the target sum are favored. After a few generations, in the majority of games the target is met, leading to an average payoff of almost half of the initial endowment (parameters , , , , , , ).</p