97 research outputs found
Foundations of Collective Cultural Rights in International Human Rights Law
Although collective cultural rights are included in international human rights law, their precise place and their nature and significance are not well-explored or understood. This paper aims to show where collective cultural rights can be found in international human rights law and explore how these rights fit in the general body and framework of international human rights law. The starting point in this chapter is international human rights law, which implies that the analysis of collective cultural rights is framed by positive law and international legal instruments, such as treaties and conventions, as well as by soft law instruments, such as declarations, recommendations and resolutions. In this paper, the two categories of collective rights and cultural rights are defined, drawing a distinction between a) different types of collective rights, including rights for collectivities as such, rights for individuals as members of collectivities, and rights with a collective interest or object; and b) between different types of cultural rights, including rights that explicitly refer to ‘culture’ and rights that relate to culture or have a cultural dimension. This paper furthermore analyses various contentious issues surrounding collective rights and cultural rights in international human rights law, including the lack of clarity on the object and subject of these rights. The paper then outlines the different forms of collective cultural rights in international human rights law, by providing examples of legal provisions in international human rights law that can be classified as collective cultural rights. Finally, the paper elaborates on how collective subjects and collective cultural interests are integrated in international human rights law and analyses how and to what extent collective cultural rights provisions provide answers to the above-noted issues
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Do soldiers' lives matter? A view from proportionality
A military operation is about to take place during an ongoing international armed conflict; it can be carried
out either by aerial attack, which is expected to cause the deaths of enemy civilians, or by using ground troops, which is expected to cause the deaths of fewer enemy civilians but is expected to result in more deaths of compatriot soldiers. Does the principle of proportionality in international humanitarian law impose a duty on an attacker to expose its soldiers to life-threatening risks in order to minimise or avert risks of incidental damage to enemy civilians? If such a duty exists, is it absolute or qualified? And if it is a qualified duty, what considerations may be taken into account in determining its character and scope?
This article presents an analytic framework under the current international humanitarian law (IHL) legal
structure, following a proportionality analysis. The proposed framework identifies five main positions for
addressing the above queries. The five positions are arranged along two ‘axes’: a value ‘axis’, which identifies
the value assigned to the lives of compatriot soldiers in relation to lives of enemy civilians; and a justification
‘axis’, which outlines the justificatory bases for assigning certain values to lives of compatriot
soldiers and enemy civilians: intrinsic, instrumental or a combination thereof. The article critically assesses
these positions, and favours a position which attributes a value to compatriot soldiers’ lives, premised on a
justificatory basis which marries intrinsic considerations with circumscribed instrumental considerations,
avoiding the indeterminacy and normative questionability entailed by more expansive instrumental considerations
On the possibility of critiquing Israel: <i>The Times’</i> engagement with Israel’s deployment of white phosphorous during the first Gaza war
This article comprises a discourse analysis of The Times’ (the British daily newspaper) coverage of Israeli deployment of white phosphorous during the first Gaza war. It argues that this issue is of special theoretical importance as it demonstrates a rare instance of a medium that is considered supportive of an agent (i.e. the state of Israel) offering apparently substantial criticism of that particular agent. The article progresses by uncovering layers of the newspaper’s coverage. It starts by introducing some quantitative characteristics, then moves on to analysis proper – explicit arguments and implicit meaning in editorials. In doing this, the author argues that an understanding of the discourse around criticism and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict needs to account not just for overt arguments but implicit meanings which, consciously or not, are sustaining those arguments
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