Bank supervision Russian style: Rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives

We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives – individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) during 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately, and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, which suggests a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also found reluctant to with-draw licenses from banks that violate the individual's deposits-to-capital ratio as this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor confidence and systemic stability.bank supervision; bank crisis; Russia

Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives

We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, showing a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that violate the individuals’ deposits to capital ratio, because this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor trust and systemic stability.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40164/3/wp778.pd

Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives

We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, showing a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that violate the individuals’ deposits to capital ratio, because this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor trust and systemic stability.Bank supervision, bank crisis, Russia.

Liquidity matters: Evidence from the Russian interbank market

We suggest an additional transmission channel of contagion on the interbank market - the liquidity channel. Examining the Russian banking sector, we and that the liquidity channel contributes significantly to understanding and predicting interbank market crises. Interbank market stability Granger causes the interbank market structure, while the opposite causality is rejected. This bolsters the view that the interbank market structure is endogenous. The results corroborate the thesis that prudential regulation at the individual bank level is insufficient to prevent systemic crises. We demonstrate that liquidity injections of a classical lender of last resort can effectively mitigate coordination failures on the interbank market both in theory and practice. Apparently, liquidity does matter.interbank market stability; contagion; liquidity channel; lender of last resort; Russia

What drives acquisitions in the EU banking industry? The role of bank regulation and supervision framework, bank specific and market specific factors

We investigate the determinants of commercial bank acquisitions in the former fifteen countries of the European Union by evaluating the impact of bank-specific measures, such as size, growth and efficiency of banks, and external influences reflecting industry level differences in the regulatory and supervision framework, market environment and economic conditions. Our empirical analysis involves multinomial logit estimation at various levels in order to identify those characteristics that most consistently predict targets and acquirers from a sample of over 1400 commercial banks. The overall results indicate that, relative to banks that were not involved in the acquisitions, (i) targets and acquirers were significantly larger, less well capitalized and less cost efficient, (ii) targets were less profitable with lower growth prospects, and acquirers more profitable with higher growth prospects, (iii) external factors have affected targets and acquirers differently, and their effects have not been consistent or robust to sample size changes. © 2011 New York University Salomon Center and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Market power in CEE banking sectors and the impact of the global financial crisis

The aim of this study is to undertake an up-to-date assessment of market power in Central and Eastern European banking markets and explore how the global financial crisis has affected market power and what has been the impact of foreign ownership. Three main results emerge. First, while there is some convergence in country-level market power during the pre-crisis period, the onset of the global crisis has put an end to this process. Second, bank-level market power appears to vary significantly with respect to ownership characteristics. Third, asset quality and capitalization affect differently the margins in the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. While in the pre-crisis period the impacts are similar for all banks regardless of ownership status, in the crisis period non-performing loans have a negative effect and capitalization a positive effect only for domestically-owned banks