Distinct illusory own-body perceptions caused by damage to posterior insula and extrastriate cortex

Recent research in cognitive neuroscience using virtual reality, robotic technology and brain imaging has linked self-consciousness to the processing and integration of multisensory bodily signals. This work on bodily self-consciousness has implicated the temporo-parietal, premotor and extrastriate cortex and partly originated in work on neurological patients with different disorders of bodily self-consciousness. One class of such disorders is autoscopic phenomena, which are defined as illusory own-body perceptions, during which patients experience the visual illusory reduplication of their own body in extrapersonal space. Three main forms of autoscopic phenomena have been defined. During autoscopic hallucinations, a second own body is seen without any changes in bodily self-consciousness. During out-of-body experiences, the second own body is seen from an elevated perspective and location associated with disembodiment. During heautoscopy, subjects report strong self-identification with the second own body, often associated with the experience of existing at and perceiving the world from two places at the same time. Although it has been proposed that each autoscopic phenomenon is associated with different impairments of bodily self-consciousness, past research on neurological patients and the development of experimental paradigms for the study of bodily self-consciousness has focused on out-of-body experiences and the association with temporo-parietal cortex. Here, we performed quantitative lesion analysis in the—to date—largest group of patients with autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy and compared the location of brain damage with those of control patients suffering from complex visual hallucinations. We found that heautoscopy was associated with lesions to the left posterior insula, and that autoscopic hallucinations were associated with damage to the right occipital cortex. Autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy were further associated with distinct symptoms and deficits. The present data suggest that the autoscopic hallucination is a visuo-somatosensory deficit implicating extrastriate cortex and is, despite the visual hallucination of the own body, not associated with major deficits in bodily self-consciousness. Based on the symptoms and deficits in patients with heautoscopy and the implication of the left posterior insula, we suggest that abnormal bodily self-consciousness during heautoscopy is caused by a breakdown of self-other discrimination regarding affective somatosensory experience due to a disintegration of visuo-somatosensory signals with emotional (and/or interoceptive) bodily signals. These brain mechanisms are distinct from those described for out-of-body experiences. The present data extend previous models of autoscopic phenomena and provide clinical evidence for the importance of emotional and interoceptive signal processing in the posterior insula in relation to bodily self-consciousnes

Distinct illusory own-body perceptions caused by damage to posterior insula and extrastriate cortex

Recent research in cognitive neuroscience using virtual reality, robotic technology and brain imaging has linked self-consciousness to the processing and integration of multisensory bodily signals. This work on bodily self-consciousness has implicated the temporo-parietal, premotor and extrastriate cortex and partly originated in work on neurological patients with different disorders of bodily self-consciousness. One class of such disorders is autoscopic phenomena, which are defined as illusory own-body perceptions, during which patients experience the visual illusory reduplication of their own body in extrapersonal space. Three main forms of autoscopic phenomena have been defined. During autoscopic hallucinations, a second own body is seen without any changes in bodily self-consciousness. During out-of-body experiences, the second own body is seen from an elevated perspective and location associated with disembodiment. During heautoscopy, subjects report strong self-identification with the second own body, often associated with the experience of existing at and perceiving the world from two places at the same time. Although it has been proposed that each autoscopic phenomenon is associated with different impairments of bodily self-consciousness, past research on neurological patients and the development of experimental paradigms for the study of bodily self-consciousness has focused on out-of-body experiences and the association with temporo-parietal cortex. Here, we performed quantitative lesion analysis in the-to date-largest group of patients with autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy and compared the location of brain damage with those of control patients suffering from complex visual hallucinations. We found that heautoscopy was associated with lesions to the left posterior insula, and that autoscopic hallucinations were associated with damage to the right occipital cortex. Autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy were further associated with distinct symptoms and deficits. The present data suggest that the autoscopic hallucination is a visuo-somatosensory deficit implicating extrastriate cortex and is, despite the visual hallucination of the own body, not associated with major deficits in bodily self-consciousness. Based on the symptoms and deficits in patients with heautoscopy and the implication of the left posterior insula, we suggest that abnormal bodily self-consciousness during heautoscopy is caused by a breakdown of self-other discrimination regarding affective somatosensory experience due to a disintegration of visuo-somatosensory signals with emotional (and/or interoceptive) bodily signals. These brain mechanisms are distinct from those described for out-of-body experiences. The present data extend previous models of autoscopic phenomena and provide clinical evidence for the importance of emotional and interoceptive signal processing in the posterior insula in relation to bodily self-consciousness

Mein Körper und Ich

Wenn Menschen berichten, sie könnten den eigenen Körper verlassen und sich selbst von außen betrachten, klingt das nach Esoterik. Doch solche »Out-of-Body«-Erlebnisse treten bei bestimmten Hirnerkrankungen in der Tat auf und lassen sich sogar künstlich im Labor herbeiführen. Schweizer Forscher um den Neurologen Olaf Blanke wollen mit derlei Experimenten ergründen, wie Ich-Bewusstsein im subjektiven Erleben des Körpers verankert is

Turning body and self inside out: visualized heartbeats alter bodily self-consciousness and tactile perception

Prominent theories highlight the importance of bodily perception for self-consciousness, but it is currently not known whether bodily perception is based on interoceptive or exteroceptive signals or on integrated signals from these anatomically distinct systems. In the research reported here, we combined both types of signals by surreptitiously providing participants with visual exteroceptive information about their heartbeat: A real-time video image of a periodically illuminated silhouette outlined participants' (projected, "virtual") bodies and flashed in synchrony with their heartbeats. We investigated whether these "cardio-visual" signals could modulate bodily self-consciousness and tactile perception. We report two main findings. First, synchronous cardio-visual signals increased self-identification with and self-location toward the virtual body, and second, they altered the perception of tactile stimuli applied to participants' backs so that touch was mislocalized toward the virtual body. We argue that the integration of signals from the inside and the outside of the human body is a fundamental neurobiological process underlying self-consciousness

REM sleep and muscle atonia in brainstem stroke: A quantitative polysomnographic and lesion analysis study.

Important brainstem regions are involved in the regulation of rapid eye movement sleep. We hypothesized that brainstem stroke is associated with dysregulated rapid eye movement sleep and related muscle activity. We compared quantitative/qualitative polysomnography features of rapid eye movement sleep and muscle activity (any, phasic, tonic) between 15 patients with brainstem stroke (N = 46 rapid eye movement periods), 16 patients with lacunar/non-brainstem stroke (N = 40 rapid eye movement periods), 15 healthy controls (N = 62 rapid eye movement periods), and patients with Parkinson's disease and polysomnography-confirmed rapid eye movement sleep behaviour disorder. Further, in the brainstem group, we performed a magnetic resonance imaging-based lesion overlap analysis. The mean ratio of muscle activity to rapid eye movement sleep epoch in the brainstem group ("any" muscle activity 0.09 ± 0.15; phasic muscle activity 0.08 ± 0.14) was significantly lower than in the lacunar group ("any" muscle activity 0.17 ± 0.2, p < 0.05; phasic muscle activity 0.16 ± 0.19, p < 0.05), and also lower than in the control group ("any" muscle activity 0.15 ± 0.17, p < 0.05). Magnetic resonance imaging-based lesion analysis indicated an area of maximum overlap in the medioventral pontine region for patients with reduced phasic muscle activity index. For all groups, mean values of muscle activity were significantly lower than in the patients with Parkinson's disease and polysomnography-confirmed REM sleep behaviour disorder group ("any" activity 0.51 ± 0.26, p < 0.0001 for all groups; phasic muscle activity 0.42 ± 0.21, p < 0.0001 for all groups). For the tonic muscle activity in the mentalis muscle, no significant differences were found between the groups. In the brainstem group, contrary to the lacunar and the control groups, "any" muscle activity index during rapid eye movement sleep was significantly reduced after the third rapid eye movement sleep phase. This study reports on the impact of brainstem stroke on rapid eye movement atonia features in a human cohort. Our findings highlight the important role of the human brainstem, in particular the medioventral pontine regions, in the regulation of phasic muscle activity during rapid eye movement sleep and the ultradian distribution of rapid eye movement-related muscle activity