Address by Professor David B. Wilkins, Washington and Lee University School of Law Commencement Exercises, May 5, 2018

Professor David B. Wilkins of Harvard Law School delivered an invited address to the Washington and Lee Law Class of 2018 at their commencement ceremony. Following the conclusion of the ceremony, Dean Brant Hellwig secured Professor Wilkins\u27 gracious permission to publish the address in the Washington and Lee Law Review, and provides a written introduction to Professor Wilkins\u27 speech here. Professor Wilkins undertook considerable research in crafting a commencement address that incorporated several prominent figures from the history W&L Law and the University. His speech highlighted not only the contributions of George Washington and Robert E. Lee, for whom the University is named, but also two of the Law School’s most prominent alumni: John W. Davis, former Solicitor General of the United States, President of the American Bar Association, and founder of the Davis Polk law firm; and Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr

Field-test of a robust, portable, frequency-stable laser

We operate a frequency-stable laser in a non-laboratory environment where the test platform is a passenger vehicle. We measure the acceleration experienced by the laser and actively correct for it to achieve a system acceleration sensitivity of $\Delta f / f$ = $11(2) \times 10^{-12}$/g, $6(2) \times 10^{-12}$/g, and $4(1) \times 10^{-12}$/g for accelerations in three orthogonal directions at 1 Hz. The acceleration spectrum and laser performance are evaluated with the vehicle both stationary and moving. The laser linewidth in the stationary vehicle with engine idling is 1.7(1) Hz

Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes towards strategic uncertainty in coordination games are related to risk aversion, experience seeking, gender and age. From the distribution of certainty equivalents among participating students we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of coordination games. For many games success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response of a risk neutral player is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Data indicate that subjects have probabilistic beliefs about success or failure of coordination rather than beliefs about individual behavior of other players

Tribute to Professor Samuel W. Calhoun

A tribute to Professor Samuel W. Calhoun, who served on the faculty of the Washington and Lee University School of Law from 1978 to 2020. Calhoun became Professor of Law, Emeritus in 2020