Market Discipline, Information Processing, and Corporate Governance

The paper reviews and assesses our understanding of the notion of “market discipline” in corporate governance. It questions the wholesale appeal to this notion in policy discussion, which fails to provide an account of the underlying mechanisms in terms of theory and empirical analysis. Discipline that is provided by the “market” must be compared to discipline that is provided by other institutions, e.g., intermediaries acting as “delegated monitors”. The comparative assessment depends on (i) the information technology, (ii) the role of strategic interactions, and (iii) the disciplinary mechanism itself. Concerning (i), the question is whether the benefits of multiple sources of information exceed the costs. Concerning (ii), strategic interactions concern the free-rider problem in acquiring information that benefits all financiers, as well as distributive externalities involved in exploiting an information advantage to the detriment of other financiers. Concerning (iii), the question is whether investors have explicit intervention rights or whether “discipline” results from managerial acquiescence. As for the acquisition and aggregation of information in organized markets, positive welfare effects arise only if the information is put to productive use, either through improvements in real investment and managerial incentives, or through changes in corporate control. Necessary conditions for such benefits to arise are fairly restrictive, especially if the changes that occur are based on managerial acquiescence rather than the legal intervention rights of investors. The expansion of market-based managerial incentives in the nineties had little to do with these theoretical accounts. The experience of moral hazard that has accompanied this expansion, on the side of gate-keeping institutions as well as corporate management, confirms the predictions of theory about the potential for shortfalls in market discipline and the agency costs of equity finance through the open market

Government and industry interactions in the development of clock technology

It appears likely that everyone in the time and frequency community can agree on goals to be realized through the expenditure of resources. These goals are the same as found in most fields of technology: lower cost, better performance, increased reliability, small size and lower power. Related aspects are examined in the process of clock and frequency standard development. Government and industry are reviewed in a highly interactive role. These interactions include judgements on clock performance, what kind of clock, expenditure of resources, transfer of ideas or hardware concepts from government to industry, and control of production. Successful clock development and production requires a government/industry relationship which is characterized by long-term continuity, multidisciplinary team work, focused funding and a separation of reliability and production oriented tasks from performance improvement/research type efforts

Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large When Outcomes Are Multidimensional

The paper discusses criteria for comparing risk aversion of decision makers when outcomes are multidimensional. A weak concept, �commodity specific greater risk aversion�, is based on the comparison of risk premia paid in a specified commodity. A stronger concept, �uniformly greater risk aversion� is based on the comparison of risk premia regardless of what commodities are used for payment. Neither concept presumes that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are ordinally equivalent. Nonincreasing consumption specific risk aversion is shown to be sufficient to make randomization undesirable in an agency problem with hidden characteristics.

Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. When Outcomes are Multidimensional

The paper discusses criteria for comparing risk aversion of decision makers when outcomes are multidimensional. A weak concept, ”commodity specific greater risk aversion”, is based on the comparison of risk premia paid in a specified commodity. A stronger concept, ”uniformly greater risk aversion” is based on the comparison of risk premia regardless of what commodities are used for payment. Neither concept presumes that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are ordinally equivalent. Nonincreasing consumption specific risk aversion is shown to be sufficient to make randomization undesirable in an agency problem with hidden characteristics.Multidimensional Risks, Risk Aversion, Risk Premia, Randomization in Incentive Schemes

Switzerland and Euroland: European Monetary Union, Monetary Stability and Financial Stability

This contribution to the Festschrift for the Centenary of the Swiss National Bank discusses the prospects for monetary stability and financial stability after the creation of the European Monetary Union. Topics covered include the robustness of institutional arrangements and their implications for monetary stability, the implications for a small, nonparticipating country, and the problem of financial stability in a setting in which banking supervision is national and the lender of the last resort is supranational.European Monetary Union, European Central Bank, Monetary Stability, Banking Supervision, Financial Crisis Management