Molecular mechanisms of cell death: recommendations of the Nomenclature Committee on Cell Death 2018.

Over the past decade, the Nomenclature Committee on Cell Death (NCCD) has formulated guidelines for the definition and interpretation of cell death from morphological, biochemical, and functional perspectives. Since the field continues to expand and novel mechanisms that orchestrate multiple cell death pathways are unveiled, we propose an updated classification of cell death subroutines focusing on mechanistic and essential (as opposed to correlative and dispensable) aspects of the process. As we provide molecularly oriented definitions of terms including intrinsic apoptosis, extrinsic apoptosis, mitochondrial permeability transition (MPT)-driven necrosis, necroptosis, ferroptosis, pyroptosis, parthanatos, entotic cell death, NETotic cell death, lysosome-dependent cell death, autophagy-dependent cell death, immunogenic cell death, cellular senescence, and mitotic catastrophe, we discuss the utility of neologisms that refer to highly specialized instances of these processes. The mission of the NCCD is to provide a widely accepted nomenclature on cell death in support of the continued development of the field

Limited Commitment in Multi-agent Contracting

Abstract: The analysis in this paper extends the single-agent/multi-task LEN model in Feltham/Xie (1994) to a multi-agent/multi-task context. A key feature of the paper is that we consider both full- and limited-commitment contracts. The former apply to settings in which the principal can specify the contracts for each agent and is assured that those contracts will be implemented. The latter apply to settings in which the agents can collude to effectively change the terms of their contracts. Equivalently, limited contracting occurs if the principal can set the terms of the aggregate compensation pool, but must let the agents choose how the pool is allocated among the agents. From the principal’s perspective, full-commitment contracts dominate limited commitment contracts. There are two basic frictions that result in a reduced payoff with limited commitment. One is inefficient risk sharing which occurs because the agents will choose to share their incentive risk and this results in reduced induced effort. The other is inefficient allocation of effort, which occurs because when the agents allocate the aggregate incentives they ignore the principal’s payoff and focus on inducing actions that maximize their compensation

Dynamic incentives and dual-purpose accounting

Ongoing employment relationships often give rise to implicit, dynamic incentives. We describe the implications of implicit incentives when firms use information about both an employee's past performance and his future productivity in a two-period agency model. We show that when an accounting system serves these dual objectives, an employee's implicit incentives may be beneficial or detrimental to the firm. As a consequence, firms may prefer an accounting system that reports a single metric that combines information about past performance and future productivity, over one that reports two distinct metrics, one for each purpose

Accounting and Valuation: How Helpful Are Recent Accounting Rule Changes?

The longstanding debate over the proper definition of "earnings"-whether investors when setting stock prices focus primarily on GAAP earnings or other measures like operating cash flow-is both misguided and theoretically unresolvable. The biggest problem faced by investors in evaluating earnings reports is not their inability to understand the effects of the different accounting methods companies use when aggregating accounting line items into reported net income. More challenging, and more critical to the investment process, is getting complete and reliable information about the line items themselves. The authors' underlying premise is that investors, when provided sufficient information about these "components" of earnings, can combine or reconfigure them in whatever way they find most useful. But without sufficient and reliable information about the individual line items, investors will find it difficult to understand how earnings are generated and thus to produce the forecast of future earnings necessary to value a company. 2006 Morgan Stanley.