Beyond foraging: behavioral science and the future of institutional economics

Institutions affect economic outcomes, but variation in them cannot be directly linked to environmental factors such as geography, climate, or technological availabilities. Game theoretic approaches, based as they typically are on foraging only assumptions, do not provide an adequate foundation for understanding the intervening role of politics and ideology; nor does the view that culture and institutions are entirely socially constructed. Understanding what institutions are and how they influence behavior requires an approach that is in part biological, focusing on cognitive and behavioral adaptations for social interaction favored in the past by group selection. These adaptations, along with their effects on canalizing social learning, help to explain uniformities in political and social order, and are the bedrock upon which we build cultural and institutional variability

Conceptualizing cultures of violence and cultural change

The historiography of violence has undergone a distinct cultural turn as attention has shifted from examining violence as a clearly defined (and countable) social problem to analysing its historically defined 'social meaning'. Nevertheless, the precise nature of the relationship between 'violence' and 'culture' is still being established. How are 'cultures of violence' formed? What impact do they have on violent behaviour? How do they change? This essay examines some of the conceptual aspects of the relationship between culture and violence. It brings together empirical research into nineteenth-century England with recent research results from other European contexts to examine three aspects of the relationship between culture and violence. These are organised under the labels 'seeing violence', 'identifying the violent' and 'changing violence'. Within a particular society, narratives regarding particular kinds of behaviour shape cultural attitudes. The notion 'violence' is thus defined in relation to physically aggressive acts as well as by being connected to other kinds of attitudes and contexts. As a result, the boundaries between physical aggression which is legitimate and that which is illegitimate (and thus 'violence') are set. Once 'violence' is defined, particular cultures form ideas about who is responsible for it: reactions to violence become associated with social arrangements such as class and gender as well as to attitudes toward the self. Finally, cultures of violence make efforts to tame or eradicate illegitimate forms of physical aggression. This process is not only connected to the development of new forms of power (e.g., new policing or punishment strategies) but also to less tangible cultural influences which aim at changing the behaviour defined as violence (in particular among the social groups identified as violent). Even if successful, this three-tiered process of seeing violence, identifying the violent and changing violence continues anew, emphasising the ways that cultures of violence develop through a continuous process of reevaluation and reinvention

AI Researchers, Video Games Are Your Friends!

If you are an artificial intelligence researcher, you should look to video games as ideal testbeds for the work you do. If you are a video game developer, you should look to AI for the technology that makes completely new types of games possible. This chapter lays out the case for both of these propositions. It asks the question "what can video games do for AI", and discusses how in particular general video game playing is the ideal testbed for artificial general intelligence research. It then asks the question "what can AI do for video games", and lays out a vision for what video games might look like if we had significantly more advanced AI at our disposal. The chapter is based on my keynote at IJCCI 2015, and is written in an attempt to be accessible to a broad audience.Comment: in Studies in Computational Intelligence Studies in Computational Intelligence, Volume 669 2017. Springe

Dilepton Enhancement by Thermal Pion Annihilation in the CERES Experiment

We compare the recent CERES data on dielectron production in 200 GeV/u S+Au collisions with the theoretical predictions due to pion annihilation in a thermal hadronization and a string fragmentation scenario. Both models yield similar results for the dilepton mass spectrum. A satisfactory description of the experimental spectrum requires an in-medium reduction of the rho-mass and a freeze-out temperature of about 150 MeV in the thermal model. We emphasize and discuss the influence of experimental acceptance and resolution corrections.Comment: 9 pages, RevTex, 4 eps figures, To appear in Phys. Lett.

Evolutionary biology: a basic science for psychiatry?

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/65529/1/j.1600-0447.1992.tb03234.x.pd

Weapons Make the Man (Larger): Formidability Is Represented as Size and Strength in Humans

In order to determine how to act in situations of potential agonistic conflict, individuals must assess multiple features of a prospective foe that contribute to the foe's resource-holding potential, or formidability. Across diverse species, physical size and strength are key determinants of formidability, and the same is often true for humans. However, in many species, formidability is also influenced by other factors, such as sex, coalitional size, and, in humans, access to weaponry. Decision-making involving assessments of multiple features is enhanced by the use of a single summary variable that encapsulates the contributions of these features. Given both a) the phylogenetic antiquity of the importance of size and strength as determinants of formidability, and b) redundant experiences during development that underscore the contributions of size and strength to formidability, we hypothesize that size and strength constitute the conceptual dimensions of a representation used to summarize multiple diverse determinants of a prospective foe's formidability. Here, we test this hypothesis in humans by examining the effects of a potential foe's access to weaponry on estimations of that individual's size and strength. We demonstrate that knowing that an individual possesses a gun or a large kitchen knife leads observers to conceptualize him as taller, and generally larger and more muscular, than individuals who possess only tools or similarly mundane objects. We also document that such patterns are not explicable in terms of any actual correlation between gun ownership and physical size, nor can they be explained in terms of cultural schemas or other background knowledge linking particular objects to individuals of particular size and strength. These findings pave the way for a fuller understanding of the evolution of the cognitive systems whereby humans – and likely many other social vertebrates – navigate social hierarchies

Arguments for the cognitive social sciences

This article analyses the arguments for the integration between the cognitive and social sciences. We understand interdisciplinary integration as an umbrella term that includes different ways of bringing scientific disciplines together. Our focus is on four arguments based on different ideas about how the cognitive sciences should be integrated with the social sciences: explanatory grounding, theoretical unification, constraint and complementarity. These arguments not only provide different reasons why the cognitive social sciences—i.e. disciplines and research programs that aim to integrate the social sciences with the cognitive sciences—are needed but also subscribe to different visions as to how these sciences might look like. We discuss each argument in three stages: First, we provide a concrete example of the argument. Second, we reconstruct the argument by specifying its premises, inferential structure and conclusion. Third, we evaluate the argument by analyzing its presuppositions, the plausibility of its premises, the soundness of its inferences and potential conceptual ambiguities. In the final discussion, we compare these arguments and identify the most compelling reasons why the cognitive social sciences are needed.Peer reviewe

Culture–gene coevolution of individualism–collectivism and the serotonin transporter gene

Culture–gene coevolutionary theory posits that cultural values have evolved, are adaptive and influence the social and physical environments under which genetic selection operates. Here, we examined the association between cultural values of individualism–collectivism and allelic frequency of the serotonin transporter functional polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) as well as the role this culture–gene association may play in explaining global variability in prevalence of pathogens and affective disorders. We found evidence that collectivistic cultures were significantly more likely to comprise individuals carrying the short (S) allele of the 5-HTTLPR across 29 nations. Results further show that historical pathogen prevalence predicts cultural variability in individualism–collectivism owing to genetic selection of the S allele. Additionally, cultural values and frequency of S allele carriers negatively predict global prevalence of anxiety and mood disorder. Finally, mediation analyses further indicate that increased frequency of S allele carriers predicted decreased anxiety and mood disorder prevalence owing to increased collectivistic cultural values. Taken together, our findings suggest culture–gene coevolution between allelic frequency of 5-HTTLPR and cultural values of individualism–collectivism and support the notion that cultural values buffer genetically susceptible populations from increased prevalence of affective disorders. Implications of the current findings for understanding culture–gene coevolution of human brain and behaviour as well as how this coevolutionary process may contribute to global variation in pathogen prevalence and epidemiology of affective disorders, such as anxiety and depression, are discussed

Differential co-expression framework to quantify goodness of biclusters and compare biclustering algorithms

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Biclustering is an important analysis procedure to understand the biological mechanisms from microarray gene expression data. Several algorithms have been proposed to identify biclusters, but very little effort was made to compare the performance of different algorithms on real datasets and combine the resultant biclusters into one unified ranking.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>In this paper we propose differential co-expression framework and a differential co-expression scoring function to objectively quantify quality or goodness of a bicluster of genes based on the observation that genes in a bicluster are co-expressed in the conditions belonged to the bicluster and not co-expressed in the other conditions. Furthermore, we propose a scoring function to stratify biclusters into three types of co-expression. We used the proposed scoring functions to understand the performance and behavior of the four well established biclustering algorithms on six real datasets from different domains by combining their output into one unified ranking.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Differential co-expression framework is useful to provide quantitative and objective assessment of the goodness of biclusters of co-expressed genes and performance of biclustering algorithms in identifying co-expression biclusters. It also helps to combine the biclusters output by different algorithms into one unified ranking i.e. meta-biclustering.</p