You call it ‘Self-Exuberance,’ I call it ‘Bragging.’ Miscalibrated Predictions of Emotional Responses to Self-Promotion

People engage in self-promotional behavior because they want others to hold favorable images of them. Self-promotion, however, entails a tradeoff between conveying one’s positive attributes and being seen as bragging. We propose that people get this tradeoff wrong because they erroneously project their own feelings onto their interaction partners. As a consequence, people overestimate the extent to which recipients of their self-promotion will feel proud of and happy for them, and underestimate the extent to which recipients will feel annoyed (Experiment 1 and 2). Because people tend to self-promote excessively when trying to make a favorable impression on others, such efforts often backfire, causing targets of the self-promotion to view the self-promoter as less likeable and as a braggart (Experiment 3)

Appraisal patterns of envy and related emotions

Envy is a frustrating emotion that arises from upward social comparison. Two studies investigated the appraisals that distinguish benign envy (aimed at improving one’s own situation) from malicious envy (aimed at pulling down the superior other). Study 1 found that appraisals of deservingness and control potential differentiated both types of envy. We manipulated these appraisals in Study 2 and found that while both did not influence the intensity of envy, they did determine the type of envy that resulted. The more a situation was appraised as undeserved, the more participants experienced malicious envy. Benign envy was experienced more when the situation was not undeserved, and the most when the situation was appraised as both deserved and controllable. The current research also clarifies how the types of envy differ from the related emotions admiration and resentment

Opportunities for organoids as new models of aging.

The biology of aging is challenging to study, particularly in humans. As a result, model organisms are used to approximate the physiological context of aging in humans. However, the best model organisms remain expensive and time-consuming to use. More importantly, they may not reflect directly on the process of aging in people. Human cell culture provides an alternative, but many functional signs of aging occur at the level of tissues rather than cells and are therefore not readily apparent in traditional cell culture models. Organoids have the potential to effectively balance between the strengths and weaknesses of traditional models of aging. They have sufficient complexity to capture relevant signs of aging at the molecular, cellular, and tissue levels, while presenting an experimentally tractable alternative to animal studies. Organoid systems have been developed to model many human tissues and diseases. Here we provide a perspective on the potential for organoids to serve as models for aging and describe how current organoid techniques could be applied to aging research

Emotion and ethics: an inter-(en)active approach

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn this paper we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, affectively inter-connected in interpersonal encounters. In the second part, we discuss the ethical character of this affective interconnectedness, as well as the implications that taking an ‘inter-(en)active approach’ has for ethical theory itself

Intuition: Myth or a Decision-making Tool?

Faced with today’s ill-structured business environment of fast-paced change and rising uncertainty, organizations have been searching for management tools that will perform satisfactorily under such ambiguous conditions. In the arena of managerial decision making, one of the approaches being assessed is the use of intuition. Based on our definition of intuition as a non-sequential information-processing mode, which comprises both cognitive and affective elements and results in direct knowing without any use of conscious reasoning, we develop a testable model of integrated analytical and intuitive decision making and propose ways to measure the use of intuition

Is my memory an extended notebook?

Clark and Chalmers' conception of spatially extended memory is under- pinned by an objectified conception of biological memory. To the extent that this can be identified with a ‘storage’ approach to memory, criticisms of it are well known and an alternative approach, perhaps more suited to an enactive account of cognition, might be one which focuses on remembering as a type of action. In the Otto story the objectification of memory is apparent not only in C&C’s characterization of the notebook but also in the notion that Inga’s memory is notebook-like. Insofar as Inga’s practices, or conceptions, of remembering might be notebook-like this should not be taken as evidence of the existence of an internal store, but could instead be the result of prior interaction with notebook-like artifacts

In Search for the Rationality of Moods

What it is about mood, as a specific type of affect, that makes it not easily amenable to standard models of rationality? It is commonly assumed that the cognitive rationality of an affective state is somehow depended upon how that state is related to what the state is about, its so called intentional object; but, given that moods do not seem to bear an intentional relation to an object, it is hard to see how they can be in the offing for rational assessment. In the first part of the paper I outline three ways of attributing intentionality to moods, raising for each one of them a series of problems, thus casting doubt on the viability of an intentionalist grounding for the rationality of moods. I then move to an examination of the view of moods as background feelings, which are intimately related to how we perceive the world; however, in my view, that approach fails to provide standards of assessment that would permit appraising the mood itself as rational or irrational. Finally, I look at an account of moods as mechanisms whose function is to monitor the balance between environmental demands and one’s physical or psychological resources. That is a promising way to proceed in our exploration of mood states; it faces though some formidable phenomenological challenges. All in all, defending the rationality of moods calls for a rethinking of the assumptions that are prevalent in the current literature over the representational dimension of affective states

Passive fear

“Passive fear” denotes a certain type of response to a perceived threat; what is distinctive about the state of passive fear is that its behavioral outlook appears to qualify the emotional experience. I distinguish between two cases of passive fear: one is that of freezing in fear; the other is that of fear-involved tonic immobility. I reconstruct the explanatory strategy that is commonly employed in the field of emotion science, and argue that it leaves certain questions about the nature of passive fear unanswered. I subsequently propose an account of passive fear that builds upon a phenomenological theory of emotions, placing emphasis on the interpretation of current research into human tonic immobility. © 2014, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht