The swing voter's curse in social networks

We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We show theoretically and empirically that communication can undermine efficiency of the vote and hence reduce welfare in a common interest setting. Both efficiency and existence of fully informative equilibria in which vote recommendations are always truthfully given and followed hinge on the structure of the communication network. If some voters have distinctly larger audiences than others, their neighbors should not follow their vote recommendation; however, they may do so in equilibrium. We test the model in a lab experiment and find strong support for the comparative-statics and, more generally, for the importance of the network structure for voting behavior

Burden of Climate Change on Malaria Mortality

In 2015, an estimated 429,000 deaths and 212 million cases of malaria occurred worldwide, while 70% of the deaths occurred in children under five years old. Changes in climatic exposure such as temperature and precipitation makes malaria one of the most climate sensitive outcomes. Using a global malaria mortality dataset for 105 countries between 1980 and 2010, we estimate that the global optimal temperature maximizing all-age malaria mortality is 20.6, lower than previously predicted in the literature. While in the case of child mortality, a significantly lower optimum temperature of 19.3° is estimated. Our results also suggest that in Africa and Asia, the continents where malaria is most prevalent malaria, mortality is maximized at 28.4 and 26.3, respectively. Furthermore, we estimate that child mortality (ages 0-4) is likely to increase by up to 20 percent in some areas due to climate change by the end of the 21st century

Persuading Sincere and Strategic Voters

A sender wants to persuade multiple homogeneous receivers to vote in favor of a proposal. Before the vote sender commits to a signal which sends private, potentially correlated, messages to receivers that are contingent on the true state of the world. The best equilibrium for sender in the resulting incomplete information game is unappealing: all receivers vote in favor of sender's preferred outcome, irrespective of their message. We therefore focus on the equilibrium where receivers vote sincerely, that is they vote in favor of the outcome that is optimal given their posterior. We characterize the optimal public and the optimal private signal, both for the case where receivers are behavioral and vote sincerely as well as the case where such behavior is a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE). For the optimal public signal, sincere voting is a BNE, but the optimal private signal is subject to the swing voter's curse. Imposing the constraint that sincere voting be a BNE leads to an optimal signal where receivers are never pivotal