Memetic cooperative coevolution of Elman recurrent neural networks

Cooperative coevolution decomposes an optimi- sation problem into subcomponents and collectively solves them using evolutionary algorithms. Memetic algorithms provides enhancement to evolutionary algorithms with local search. Recently, the incorporation of local search into a memetic cooperative coevolution method has shown to be efficient for training feedforward networks on pattern classification problems. This paper applies the memetic cooperative coevolution method for training recurrent neural networks on grammatical inference problems. The results show that the proposed method achieves better performance in terms of optimisation time and robustness

The Impact of Coevolution and Abstention on the Emergence of Cooperation

This paper explores the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner's Dilemma (COPD) game, which is a simple model to coevolve game strategy and link weights of agents playing the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game. We consider a population of agents placed in a lattice grid with boundary conditions. A number of Monte Carlo simulations are performed to investigate the impacts of the COPD game on the emergence of cooperation. Results show that the coevolutionary rules enable cooperators to survive and even dominate, with the presence of abstainers in the population playing a key role in the protection of cooperators against exploitation from defectors. We observe that in adverse conditions such as when the initial population of abstainers is too scarce/abundant, or when the temptation to defect is very high, cooperation has no chance of emerging. However, when the simple coevolutionary rules are applied, cooperators flourish.Comment: To appear at Studies in Computational Intelligence (SCI), Springer, 201

Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation

Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality

Coevolutionary games - a mini review

Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.Comment: 24 two-column pages, 10 figures; accepted for publication in BioSystem

Sustainable Cooperative Coevolution with a Multi-Armed Bandit

This paper proposes a self-adaptation mechanism to manage the resources allocated to the different species comprising a cooperative coevolutionary algorithm. The proposed approach relies on a dynamic extension to the well-known multi-armed bandit framework. At each iteration, the dynamic multi-armed bandit makes a decision on which species to evolve for a generation, using the history of progress made by the different species to guide the decisions. We show experimentally, on a benchmark and a real-world problem, that evolving the different populations at different paces allows not only to identify solutions more rapidly, but also improves the capacity of cooperative coevolution to solve more complex problems.Comment: Accepted at GECCO 201

Towards real-world complexity: an introduction to multiplex networks

Many real-world complex systems are best modeled by multiplex networks of interacting network layers. The multiplex network study is one of the newest and hottest themes in the statistical physics of complex networks. Pioneering studies have proven that the multiplexity has broad impact on the system's structure and function. In this Colloquium paper, we present an organized review of the growing body of current literature on multiplex networks by categorizing existing studies broadly according to the type of layer coupling in the problem. Major recent advances in the field are surveyed and some outstanding open challenges and future perspectives will be proposed.Comment: 20 pages, 10 figure

Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas

The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will not be much lower than average. Herding instincts and crowd behavior in humans and social animals also compel to conformity on their own right. Motivated by these facts, we here study the impact of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that an appropriate fraction of conformists within the population introduces an effective surface tension around cooperative clusters and ensures smooth interfaces between different strategy domains. Payoff-driven players brake the symmetry in favor of cooperation and enable an expansion of clusters past the boundaries imposed by traditional network reciprocity. This mechanism works even under the most testing conditions, and it is robust against variations of the interaction network as long as degree-normalized payoffs are applied. Conformity may thus be beneficial for the resolution of social dilemmas.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Journal of the Royal Society Interfac