Agents for educational games and simulations

This book consists mainly of revised papers that were presented at the Agents for Educational Games and Simulation (AEGS) workshop held on May 2, 2011, as part of the Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS) conference in Taipei, Taiwan. The 12 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from various submissions. The papers are organized topical sections on middleware applications, dialogues and learning, adaption and convergence, and agent applications

Representation recovers information

Early agreement within cognitive science on the topic of representation has now given way to a combination of positions. Some question the significance of representation in cognition. Others continue to argue in favor, but the case has not been demonstrated in any formal way. The present paper sets out a framework in which the value of representation-use can be mathematically measured, albeit in a broadly sensory context rather than a specifically cognitive one. Key to the approach is the use of Bayesian networks for modeling the distal dimension of sensory processes. More relevant to cognitive science is the theoretical result obtained, which is that a certain type of representational architecture is *necessary* for achievement of sensory efficiency. While exhibiting few of the characteristics of traditional, symbolic encoding, this architecture corresponds quite closely to the forms of embedded representation now being explored in some embedded/embodied approaches. It becomes meaningful to view that type of representation-use as a form of information recovery. A formal basis then exists for viewing representation not so much as the substrate of reasoning and thought, but rather as a general medium for efficient, interpretive processing

FORMALITY AND REPRESENTATIONAL RELATIVISM: A CRITICAL PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION INTO KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION AS ONE TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

This paper provides a philosophical discussion of Knowledge Representation [KR], which has become an influential interdisciplinary and technology friendly research field through Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science. While KR appears an increasingly fashionable and subsequently blurred term, it originally emerged out of genuine meta-theoretical considerations. Subsequently, the reconstruction of KR's formal, structural and functional foundations should call for further philosophical evaluation of KR's interdisciplinary and practical potential. The focus is put on KR's logical and semiotical roots, both methodologically and historically, whose exposure prove necessary for a proper understanding and possible criticism of KR's [technological] applicability. The stipulation of analytical symbol theory is new in this context, but nevertheless necessary, as only a more principal semiotic focus may allow an appropriate evaluation of symbolic intelligence, which has to be considered KR's essence

Applying the Free-Energy Principle to Complex Adaptive Systems

The free energy principle is a mathematical theory of the behaviour of self-organising systems that originally gained prominence as a unified model of the brain. Since then, the theory has been applied to a plethora of biological phenomena, extending from single-celled and multicellular organisms through to niche construction and human culture, and even the emergence of life itself. The free energy principle tells us that perception and action operate synergistically to minimize an organism’s exposure to surprising biological states, which are more likely to lead to decay. A key corollary of this hypothesis is active inference—the idea that all behavior involves the selective sampling of sensory data so that we experience what we expect to (in order to avoid surprises). Simply put, we act upon the world to fulfill our expectations. It is now widely recognized that the implications of the free energy principle for our understanding of the human mind and behavior are far-reaching and profound. To date, however, its capacity to extend beyond our brain—to more generally explain living and other complex adaptive systems—has only just begun to be explored. The aim of this collection is to showcase the breadth of the free energy principle as a unified theory of complex adaptive systems—conscious, social, living, or not

Aristotle on natural slavery

Aristotle's claim that natural slaves do not possess autonomous rationality (Pol. 1.5, 1254b20-23) cannot plausibly be interpreted in an unrestricted sense, since this would conflict with what Aristotle knew about non-Greek societies. Aristotle's argument requires only a lack of autonomous practical rationality. An impairment of the capacity for integrated practical deliberation, resulting from an environmentally induced excess or deficiency in thumos (Pol. 7.7, 1327b18-31), would be sufficient to make natural slaves incapable of eudaimonia without being obtrusively implausible relative to what Aristotle is likely to have believed about non-Greeks. Since Aristotle seems to have believed that the existence of people who can be enslaved without injustice is a hypothetical necessity, if those capable of eudaimonia are to achieve it, the existence of natural slaves has implications for our understanding of Aristotle's natural teleology