4,356 research outputs found
Coevolution of Cooperation and Partner Rewiring Range in Spatial Social Networks
In recent years, there has been growing interest in the study of
coevolutionary games on networks. Despite much progress, little attention has
been paid to spatially embedded networks, where the underlying geographic
distance, rather than the graph distance, is an important and relevant aspect
of the partner rewiring process. It thus remains largely unclear how individual
partner rewiring range preference, local vs. global, emerges and affects
cooperation. Here we explicitly address this issue using a coevolutionary model
of cooperation and partner rewiring range preference in spatially embedded
social networks. In contrast to local rewiring, global rewiring has no distance
restriction but incurs a one-time cost upon establishing any long range link.
We find that under a wide range of model parameters, global partner switching
preference can coevolve with cooperation. Moreover, the resulting partner
network is highly degree-heterogeneous with small average shortest path length
while maintaining high clustering, thereby possessing small-world properties.
We also discover an optimum availability of reputation information for the
emergence of global cooperators, who form distant partnerships at a cost to
themselves. From the coevolutionary perspective, our work may help explain the
ubiquity of small-world topologies arising alongside cooperation in the real
world
Coevolutionary games - a mini review
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in
that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring
players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges
faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory
provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of
cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent
advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be
insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior.
Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been
recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend
the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the
understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to
evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another
property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary
rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of
players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on
evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a
didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with
the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research
that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects
of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely
open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.Comment: 24 two-column pages, 10 figures; accepted for publication in
BioSystem
A "Social Bitcoin" could sustain a democratic digital world
A multidimensional financial system could provide benefits for individuals,
companies, and states. Instead of top-down control, which is destined to
eventually fail in a hyperconnected world, a bottom-up creation of value can
unleash creative potential and drive innovations. Multiple currency dimensions
can represent different externalities and thus enable the design of incentives
and feedback mechanisms that foster the ability of complex dynamical systems to
self-organize and lead to a more resilient society and sustainable economy.
Modern information and communication technologies play a crucial role in this
process, as Web 2.0 and online social networks promote cooperation and
collaboration on unprecedented scales. Within this contribution, we discuss how
one dimension of a multidimensional currency system could represent
socio-digital capital (Social Bitcoins) that can be generated in a bottom-up
way by individuals who perform search and navigation tasks in a future version
of the digital world. The incentive to mine Social Bitcoins could sustain
digital diversity, which mitigates the risk of totalitarian control by powerful
monopolies of information and can create new business opportunities needed in
times where a large fraction of current jobs is estimated to disappear due to
computerisation.Comment: Contribution to EPJ-ST special issue on 'Can economics be a Physical
Science?', edited by S. Sinha, A. S. Chakrabarti & M. Mitr
Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often
challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this
problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across
groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social
or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since
behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as
non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another.
To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within
and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple
populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to
different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other
factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For
example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two
interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly
punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does
cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even
revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements
between groups with conflicting interests?
Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting
results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have
implications for the evolution of language and culture as well
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The effect of network topology on optimal exploration strategies and the evolution of cooperation in a mobile population
We model a mobile population interacting over an underlying spatial structure using a Markov movement model. Interactions take the form of public goods games, and can feature an arbitrary group size. Individuals choose strategically to remain at their current location or to move to a neighbouring location, depending upon their exploration strategy and the current composition of their group. This builds upon previous work where the underlying structure was a complete graph (i.e. there was effectively no structure). Here, we consider alternative network structures and a wider variety of, mainly larger, populations. Previously, we had found when cooperation could evolve, depending upon the values of a range of population parameters. In our current work, we see that the complete graph considered before promotes stability, with populations of cooperators or defectors being relatively hard to replace. By contrast, the star graph promotes instability, and often neither type of population can resist replacement. We discuss potential reasons for this in terms of network topology
Correlation of Positive and Negative Reciprocity Fails to Confer an Evolutionary Advantage: Phase Transitions to Elementary Strategies
Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavior is therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments
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