Normative Conditional Reasoning as a Fragment of HOL

We report some results regarding the mechanization of normative (preference-based) conditional reasoning. Our focus is on Aqvist's system E for conditional obligation (and its extensions). Our mechanization is achieved via a shallow semantical embedding in Isabelle/HOL. We consider two possible uses of the framework. The first one is as a tool for meta-reasoning about the considered logic. We employ it for the automated verification of deontic correspondences (broadly conceived) and related matters, analogous to what has been previously achieved for the modal logic cube. The second use is as a tool for assessing ethical arguments. We provide a computer encoding of a well-known paradox in population ethics, Parfit's repugnant conclusion. Whether the presented encoding increases or decreases the attractiveness and persuasiveness of the repugnant conclusion is a question we would like to pass on to philosophy and ethics.Comment: 22 pages, 28 figures, 3 table

Logic Programming and Machine Ethics

Transparency is a key requirement for ethical machines. Verified ethical behavior is not enough to establish justified trust in autonomous intelligent agents: it needs to be supported by the ability to explain decisions. Logic Programming (LP) has a great potential for developing such perspective ethical systems, as in fact logic rules are easily comprehensible by humans. Furthermore, LP is able to model causality, which is crucial for ethical decision making.Comment: In Proceedings ICLP 2020, arXiv:2009.09158. Invited paper for the ICLP2020 Panel on "Machine Ethics". arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1909.0825

Constraint rule-based programming of norms for electronic institutions

Peer reviewedPostprin

Proceedings of the Joint Automated Reasoning Workshop and Deduktionstreffen: As part of the Vienna Summer of Logic – IJCAR 23-24 July 2014

Preface For many years the British and the German automated reasoning communities have successfully run independent series of workshops for anybody working in the area of automated reasoning. Although open to the general public they addressed in the past primarily the British and the German communities, respectively. At the occasion of the Vienna Summer of Logic the two series have a joint event in Vienna as an IJCAR workshop. In the spirit of the two series there will be only informal proceedings with abstracts of the works presented. These are collected in this document. We have tried to maintain the informal open atmosphere of the two series and have welcomed in particular research students to present their work. We have solicited for all work related to automated reasoning and its applications with a particular interest in work-in-progress and the presentation of half-baked ideas. As in the previous years, we have aimed to bring together researchers from all areas of automated reasoning in order to foster links among researchers from various disciplines; among theoreticians, implementers and users alike, and among international communities, this year not just the British and German communities

Weighted logics for artificial intelligence : an introductory discussion

International audienceBefore presenting the contents of the special issue, we propose a structured introductory overview of a landscape of the weighted logics (in a general sense) that can be found in the Artificial Intelligence literature, highlighting their fundamental differences and their application areas

Can human and artificial agents share an autonomy, categorical imperative-based ethics and “moral” selfhood?

AI designers endeavour to improve ‘autonomy’ in artificial intelligent devices, as recent developments show. This chapter firstly argues against attributing metaphysical attitudes to AI and, simultaneously, in favor of improving autonomous AI which has been enabled to respect autonomy in human agents. This seems to be the only responsible way of making further advances in the field of autonomous social AI. Let us examine what is meant by claims such as designing our artificial alter egos and sharing moral selves with artificial humanoid devices as well as providing autonomous AI with an ethical framework modelled upon the core aspects of moral selfhood, e.g., making decisions which are based on autonomous law-giving, in Kantian terms

Mere Christianity and the Moral Argument for the Existence of God

C. S. Lewis’s moral argument for the existence of God from Mere Christianity has been called the “most widely-convincing apologetic argument of the twentieth century.” It is concise and commonsensical. But Lewis’s argument has come under heavy fire in past decades, most notably from John Beversluis and Erik Wielenberg. This article offers an alternative reading on which the moral argument from the opening chapters of Mere Christianity is not only valid but also original and defensible. Unlike other moral arguments, Lewis deals in neither metaethics nor moral pragmatics. So he avoids prickly objections related to Divine Command Theory and accusations of wishful thinking. In Mere Christianity and other works, Lewis offers considerable justification for each of the argument’s premises and mounts an impressive case for God’s existence, one that warrants full and careful consideration