Dynamic consequence and public announcement

Junta de Andalucía P08-HUM- 04159European Research Council EPS 313360

Refinement Modal Logic

In this paper we present {\em refinement modal logic}. A refinement is like a bisimulation, except that from the three relational requirements only `atoms' and `back' need to be satisfied. Our logic contains a new operator 'all' in addition to the standard modalities 'box' for each agent. The operator 'all' acts as a quantifier over the set of all refinements of a given model. As a variation on a bisimulation quantifier, this refinement operator or refinement quantifier 'all' can be seen as quantifying over a variable not occurring in the formula bound by it. The logic combines the simplicity of multi-agent modal logic with some powers of monadic second-order quantification. We present a sound and complete axiomatization of multi-agent refinement modal logic. We also present an extension of the logic to the modal mu-calculus, and an axiomatization for the single-agent version of this logic. Examples and applications are also discussed: to software verification and design (the set of agents can also be seen as a set of actions), and to dynamic epistemic logic. We further give detailed results on the complexity of satisfiability, and on succinctness

To Be Announced

In this survey we review dynamic epistemic logics with modalities for quantification over information change. Of such logics we present complete axiomatizations, focussing on axioms involving the interaction between knowledge and such quantifiers, we report on their relative expressivity, on decidability and on the complexity of model checking and satisfiability, and on applications. We focus on open problems and new directions for research

A dynamic epistemic framework for reasoning about conformant probabilistic plans

In this paper, we introduce a probabilistic dynamic epistemic logical framework that can be applied for reasoning and verifying conformant probabilistic plans in a single agent setting. In conformant probabilistic planning (CPP), we are looking for a linear plan such that the probability of achieving the goal after executing the plan is no less than a given threshold probability δ. Our logical framework can trace the change of the belief state of the agent during the execution of the plan and verify the conformant plans. Moreover, with this logic, we can enrich the CPP framework by formulating the goal as a formula in our language with action modalities and probabilistic beliefs. As for the main technical results, we provide a complete axiomatization of the logic and show the decidability of its validity problem

Logic and Commonsense Reasoning: Lecture Notes

MasterThese are the lecture notes of a course on logic and commonsense reasoning given to master students in philosophy of the University of Rennes 1. N.B.: Some parts of these lectures notes are sometimes largely based on or copied verbatim from publications of other authors. When this is the case, these parts are mentioned at the end of each chapter in the section “Further reading”

The Philosophical Foundations of PLEN: A Protocol-theoretic Logic of Epistemic Norms

In this dissertation, I defend the protocol-theoretic account of epistemic norms. The protocol-theoretic account amounts to three theses: (i) There are norms of epistemic rationality that are procedural; epistemic rationality is at least partially defined by rules that restrict the possible ways in which epistemic actions and processes can be sequenced, combined, or chosen among under varying conditions. (ii) Epistemic rationality is ineliminably defined by procedural norms; procedural restrictions provide an irreducible unifying structure for even apparently non-procedural prescriptions and normative expressions, and they are practically indispensable in our cognitive lives. (iii) These procedural epistemic norms are best analyzed in terms of the protocol (or program) constructions of dynamic logic. I defend (i) and (ii) at length and in multi-faceted ways, and I argue that they entail a set of criteria of adequacy for models of epistemic dynamics and abstract accounts of epistemic norms. I then define PLEN, the protocol-theoretic logic of epistemic norms. PLEN is a dynamic logic that analyzes epistemic rationality norms with protocol constructions interpreted over multi-graph based models of epistemic dynamics. The kernel of the overall argument of the dissertation is showing that PLEN uniquely satisfies the criteria defended; none of the familiar, rival frameworks for modeling epistemic dynamics or normative concepts are capable of satisfying these criteria to the same degree as PLEN. The overarching argument of the dissertation is thus a theory-preference argument for PLEN

Knowing what to do:A logical approach to planning and knowing how

In dit proefschrift wordt vanuit logisch perspectief het maken van plannen en procedurele kennis (weten hoe) onderzocht. Conformant planning is het proberen te vinden van een plan om een doel te bereiken. Doelgerichte procedurele kennis betekent dat je weet wat je moet doen om een doel te bereiken. In dit proefschrift wordt een logisch raamwerk gepresenteerd waarin de veranderende kennis van een agent gevangen kan worden. Met dit logische raamwerk, kunnen de doelen opgevat worden als logische formules. In dit proefschrift worden ook doelgerichte procedurele kennis gemodelleert. Geïnspireerd door het idee van planning, worden in dit proefschrift verschillende soorten procedurele kennis onderscheiden, zoals in termen van conformant plans en in termen van strategieën. Met behulp van logische systemen voor deze noties, worden elementaire eigenschappen voor iedere soort procedurele kennis onderzocht. Het helpt ons ook om te zien welke eigenschappen de verschillende noties van procedurele kennis gemeen hebben en welke eigenschappen uniek zijn voor iedere notie van procedurele kennis