36,339 research outputs found
How could a rational analysis model explain?
Rational analysis is an influential but contested account of how probabilistic modeling can be used to construct non-mechanistic but self-standing explanatory models of the mind. In this paper, I disentangle and assess several possible explanatory contributions which could be attributed to rational analysis. Although existing models suffer from evidential problems that question their explanatory power, I argue that rational analysis modeling can complement mechanistic theorizing by providing models of environmental affordances
Street smarts
A pluralistic approach to folk psychology must countenance the evaluative, regulatory, predictive, and explanatory roles played by attributions of intelligence in social practices across cultures. Building off of the work of the psychologist Robert Sternberg and the philosophers Gilbert Ryle and Daniel Dennett, I argue that a relativistic interpretivism best accounts for the many varieties of intelligence that emerge from folk discourse. To be intelligent is to be comparatively good at solving intellectual problems that an interpreter deems worth solving
The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?
A series of high-profile critiques of Bayesian models of cognition have recently sparked controversy. These critiques question the contribution of rational, normative considerations in the study of cognition. The present article takes central claims from these critiques and evaluates them in light of specific models. Closer consideration of actual examples of Bayesian treatments of different cognitive phenomena allows one to defuse these critiques showing that they cannot be sustained across the diversity of applications of the Bayesian framework for cognitive modeling. More generally, there is nothing in the Bayesian framework that would inherently give rise to the deficits that these critiques perceive, suggesting they have been framed at the wrong level of generality. At the same time, the examples are used to demonstrate the different ways in which consideration of rationality uniquely benefits both theory and practice in the study of cognition
What Normative Facts Should Political Theory Be About? Philosophy of Science meets Political Liberalism
Just as different sciences deal with different facts—say, physics versus biology—so we may
ask a similar question about normative theories. Is normative political theory concerned
with the same normative facts as moral theory or different ones? By developing an analogy
with the sciences, we argue that the normative facts of political theory belong to a higher—
more coarse-grained—level than those of moral theory. The latter are multiply realizable by
the former: competing facts at the moral level can underpin the same facts at the political
one. Consequently, some questions that moral theories answer are indeterminate at the
political level. This proposal offers a novel interpretation of John Rawls’s idea that, in public
reasoning, we should abstract away from comprehensive moral doctrines. We contrast our
distinction between facts at different levels with the distinction between admissible and
inadmissible evidence and discuss some implications for the practice of political theory
Model-based Cognitive Neuroscience: Multifield Mechanistic Integration in Practice
Autonomist accounts of cognitive science suggest that cognitive model building and theory construction (can or should) proceed independently of findings in neuroscience. Common functionalist justifications of autonomy rely on there being relatively few constraints between neural structure and cognitive function (e.g., Weiskopf, 2011). In contrast, an integrative mechanistic perspective stresses the mutual constraining of structure and function (e.g., Piccinini & Craver, 2011; Povich, 2015). In this paper, I show how model-based cognitive neuroscience (MBCN) epitomizes the integrative mechanistic perspective and concentrates the most revolutionary elements of the cognitive neuroscience revolution (Boone & Piccinini, 2016). I also show how the prominent subset account of functional realization supports the integrative mechanistic perspective I take on MBCN and use it to clarify the intralevel and interlevel components of integration
Theory of mind in utterance interpretation: the case from clinical pragmatics
The cognitive basis of utterance interpretation is an area that continues to provoke intense theoretical debate among pragmatists. That utterance interpretation involves some type of mind-reading or theory of mind (ToM) is indisputable. However, theorists are divided on the exact nature of this ToM-based mechanism. In this paper, it is argued that the only type of ToM-based mechanism that can adequately represent the cognitive basis of utterance interpretation is one which reflects the rational, intentional, holistic character of interpretation. Such a ToM-based mechanism is supported on conceptual and empirical grounds. Empirical support for this view derives from the study of children and adults with pragmatic disorders. Specifically, three types of clinical case are considered. In the first case, evidence is advanced which indicates that individuals with pragmatic disorders exhibit deficits in reasoning and the use of inferences. These deficits compromise the ability of children and adults with pragmatic disorders to comply with the rational dimension of utterance interpretation
Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural Mechanisms
A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic:
with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that
the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains
how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the
exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’
approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is
explanatory only to the extent that it reveals the causal structure of the mechanism
underlying the capacity. If they are right, then a cognitive model that resists a transparent
mapping to known neural mechanisms fails to be explanatory. I argue that a functiontheoretic
characterization of a cognitive capacity can be genuinely explanatory even
absent an account of how the capacity is realized in neural hardware
The Social Epistemology of Consensus and Dissent
This paper reviews current debates in social epistemology about the relations between knowledge and consensus. These relations are philosophically interesting on their own, but also have practical consequences, as consensus takes an increasingly significant role in informing public decision making. The paper addresses the following questions. When is a consensus attributable to an epistemic community? Under what conditions may we legitimately infer that a consensual view is knowledge-based or otherwise epistemically justified? Should consensus be the aim of scientific inquiry, and if so, what kind of consensus? How should dissent be handled? It is argued that a legitimate inference that a theory is correct from the fact that there is a scientific consensus on it requires taking into consideration both cognitive properties of the theory as well as social properties of the consensus. The last section of the paper reviews computational models of consensus formation.
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