Monetary Policy Committees: meetings and outcomes

Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on pre- prepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the FOMC under Chairman Bernanke. JEL Classification: E58, D71, D78Bank of England, Federal Open Market Committee, monetary policy committee, voting

The role of regional information in the optimal composition of a committee

In this paper we present a model for the optimal composition of a federal or supra-national committee. The involvement of regional (national) entities in federal committees is typically motivated by their knowledge of regional information about the state of the economy. Using this argument we show that if the uncertainties regarding the state of the economy are not evenly distributed across the currency area, the optimal representation of regions in the federal committee increases with the overall uncertainty about their economic performance. Second, if certain parts of the economic area behave in a relatively synchronized way, it may not be necessary that all these regions are equally represented in the federal committee.Composition of a committee, currency union, optimal representation, information uncertainty

The Effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome

Large-scale association analysis identifies new lung cancer susceptibility loci and heterogeneity in genetic susceptibility across histological subtypes.

Although several lung cancer susceptibility loci have been identified, much of the heritability for lung cancer remains unexplained. Here 14,803 cases and 12,262 controls of European descent were genotyped on the OncoArray and combined with existing data for an aggregated genome-wide association study (GWAS) analysis of lung cancer in 29,266 cases and 56,450 controls. We identified 18 susceptibility loci achieving genome-wide significance, including 10 new loci. The new loci highlight the striking heterogeneity in genetic susceptibility across the histological subtypes of lung cancer, with four loci associated with lung cancer overall and six loci associated with lung adenocarcinoma. Gene expression quantitative trait locus (eQTL) analysis in 1,425 normal lung tissue samples highlights RNASET2, SECISBP2L and NRG1 as candidate genes. Other loci include genes such as a cholinergic nicotinic receptor, CHRNA2, and the telomere-related genes OFBC1 and RTEL1. Further exploration of the target genes will continue to provide new insights into the etiology of lung cancer

Shared genetic risk between eating disorder- and substance-use-related phenotypes:Evidence from genome-wide association studies

First published: 16 February 202

Committee structure and its implications for Monetary policy decision-making

We investigate the implications for he setting of interest rates when monetary policy decisions are taken by a committee, in which a subset of members may meet prior to the voting in the commitee and therefore has the possibility to reach consensus ex ante to vote unanimously ex post. We allow for different committee sizes, various voting rules and differences in skills among committee members. We find that the size of the committee is much less important in determining the degree of interest rate inertia than the skills of committee members. Moreover, prior interaction of a subgroup only has a minor effect on the setting of interest rates by the committee, provided that members on average are equally skilled and voting takes place using a simple majority rule. If either of those assumptions are relaxed, prior interaction has substantial effects on the setting of interest rates. In addition, prior interaction increases the optimal size of the Committee, ceteris paribus.monetary policy; interest rates; voting

The Effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome.Monetary policy; interest rates; learning

Committee Structure and its Implications for Monetary Policy Decision-making

We investigate the implications for the setting of interest rateswhen monetary policy decisions are taken by a committee, in whicha subset of members may meet prior to the voting in the committeeand therefore has the possibility to reach consensus ex ante to voteunanimously ex post. We allow for different committee sizes, variousvoting rules and differences in skills among committee members. Wefind that the size of the committee is much less important in deter-mining the degree of interest rate inertia than the skills of committeemembers. Moreover, prior interaction of a subgroup only has a minoreffect on the setting of interest rates by the committee, provided thatmembers on average are equally skilled and voting takes place using asimple majority rule. If either of those assumptions are relaxed, priorinteraction has substantial effects on the setting of interest rates. Inaddition, prior interaction increases the optimal size of the Committee,ceteris paribus.monetary policy; interest rates; voting.