74 research outputs found

    Brain death, states of impaired consciousness, and physician-assisted death for end-of-life organ donation and transplantation

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    In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irreversible coma and apnea (i.e., brain death) with human death and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating donors. Since then, clinical studies have defined a spectrum of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma, akinetic mutism (locked-in syndrome), minimally conscious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article, we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for equating brain death with human death. (1) Brain death does not disrupt somatic integrative unity and coordinated biological functioning of a living organism. (2) Neurological criteria of human death fail to determine the precise moment of an organism’s death when death is established by circulatory criterion in other states of impaired consciousness for organ procurement with non-heart-beating donation protocols. The criterion of circulatory arrest 75 s to 5 min is too short for irreversible cessation of whole brain functions and respiration controlled by the brain stem. (3) Brain-based criteria for determining death with a beating heart exclude relevant anthropologic, psychosocial, cultural, and religious aspects of death and dying in society. (4) Clinical guidelines for determining brain death are not consistently validated by the presence of irreversible brain stem ischemic injury or necrosis on autopsy; therefore, they do not completely exclude reversible loss of integrated neurological functions in donors. The questionable reliability and varying compliance with these guidelines among institutions amplify the risk of determining reversible states of impaired consciousness as irreversible brain death. (5) The scientific uncertainty of defining and determining states of impaired consciousness including brain death have been neither disclosed to the general public nor broadly debated by the medical community or by legal and religious scholars. Heart-beating or non-heart-beating organ procurement from patients with impaired consciousness is de facto a concealed practice of physician-assisted death, and therefore, violates both criminal law and the central tenet of medicine not to do harm to patients. Society must decide if physician-assisted death is permissible and desirable to resolve the conflict about procuring organs from patients with impaired consciousness within the context of the perceived need to enhance the supply of transplantable organs

    Cardio-renal syndromes: report from the consensus conference of the Acute Dialysis Quality Initiative

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    A consensus conference on cardio-renal syndromes (CRS) was held in Venice Italy, in September 2008 under the auspices of the Acute Dialysis Quality Initiative (ADQI). The following topics were matter of discussion after a systematic literature review and the appraisal of the best available evidence: definition/classification system; epidemiology; diagnostic criteria and biomarkers; prevention/protection strategies; management and therapy. The umbrella term CRS was used to identify a disorder of the heart and kidneys whereby acute or chronic dysfunction in one organ may induce acute or chronic dysfunction in the other organ. Different syndromes were identified and classified into five subtypes. Acute CRS (type 1): acute worsening of heart function (AHF–ACS) leading to kidney injury and/or dysfunction. Chronic cardio-renal syndrome (type 2): chronic abnormalities in heart function (CHF-CHD) leading to kidney injury and/or dysfunction. Acute reno-cardiac syndrome (type 3): acute worsening of kidney function (AKI) leading to heart injury and/or dysfunction. Chronic reno-cardiac syndrome (type 4): chronic kidney disease leading to heart injury, disease, and/or dysfunction. Secondary CRS (type 5): systemic conditions leading to simultaneous injury and/or dysfunction of heart and kidney. Consensus statements concerning epidemiology, diagnosis, prevention, and management strategies are discussed in the paper for each of the syndromes

    Setting limits in intensive care

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    Defining death in non-heart beating organ donors

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    Protocols for retrieving vital organs in consenting patients in cardiovascular arrest (non-heart beating donors, NHBD) rest on the assumptions that irreversible asystole a) identifies the instant of biological death, and b) is clinically assessable at the time when retrieval of vital organs is possible. Unfortunately both assumptions are flawed. We argue that traditional life/death definitions could be actually inadequate to represent the reality of dying under intensive support, and we suggest redefining NHBD protocols on moral, social, and antrhopological criteria, admitting that irreversible (however defined) asystole can only equate a clinically determinable point of no return in the process of dying, where organ retrieval can be morally and socially accepted in previously consenting patients

    Bioethical aspects of end-of-life care

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    Managing end-of-life care can be difficult because of the particular nature of intensive care support, which can separate the biological and the biographical aspects of life. Artificial organ support can temporarily delay death but, at the same time, may fall to restore a quality of life that the patient judges acceptable. For this reason, two concepts must be considered: that the mission of the healthcare system should be to care for patients according to their interests and wishes and that quality of care is related above all to the careful commitment of healthcare workers to the patient's best interests. Keeping these concepts in mind, the rule of the five Cs (competence, collegiality, communication, continuity of care and compassion) might be helpful in the management of end-of-life care. Unfortunately, neither the rule of the five Cs nor the careful use of moral principles in order to promote the patients' dignity can assure a universally acceptable decision. A reasonable level of 'moral certainty', however, might be achieved using a deliberative approach, which provides for the inclusion of all the different subjects involved in the decision-making process (patient, family, doctors, nurses and other carers), in order to reach the best possible decision in a specific situation
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