SECURE AND LIGHTWEIGHT HARDWARE AUTHENTICATION USING ISOLATED PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION

As embedded computers become ubiquitous, mobile and more integrated in connectivity, user dependence on integrated circuits (ICs) increases massively for handling security sensitive tasks as well as processing sensitive information. During this process, hardware authentication is important to prevent unauthorized users or devices from gaining access to secret information. An effective method for hardware authentication is by using physical unclonable function (PUF), which is a hardware design that leverages intrinsic unique physical characteristics of an IC, such as propagation delay, for security authentication in real time. However, PUF is vulnerable to modeling attacks, as one can design an algorithm to imitate PUF functionality at the software level given a sufficient set of challenge-response pairs (CRPs). To address the problem, we employ hardware isolation primitives (e.g., ARM TrustZone) to protect PUF. The key idea is to physically isolate the system resources that handle security-sensitive information from the regular ones. This technique can be implemented by isolating and strictly controlling any connection between the secure and normal resources. We design and implement a ring oscillator (RO)-based PUF with hardware isolation protection using ARM TrustZone. Our PUF design heavily limits the number of CRPs a potential attacker has access to. Therefore, the modeling attack cannot be performed accurately enough to guess the response of the PUF to a challenge. Furthermore, we develop and demonstrate a brand new application for the designed PUF, namely multimedia authentication, which is an integral part of multimedia signal processing in many real-time and security sensitive applications. We show that the PUF-based hardware security approach is capable of accomplishing the authentication for both the hardware device and the multimedia stream while introducing minimum overhead. Finally, we evaluate the hardware-isolated PUF design using a prototype implementation on a Xilinx system on chip (SoC). Particularly, we conduct functional evaluation (i.e., randomness, uniqueness, and correctness), security analysis against modeling attacks, as well as performance and overhead evaluation (i.e., response time and resource usages). Our experimental results on the real hardware demonstrate the high security and low overhead of the PUF in real time authentication. Advisor: Sheng We

SECURE AND LIGHTWEIGHT HARDWARE AUTHENTICATION USING ISOLATED PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION

As embedded computers become ubiquitous, mobile and more integrated in connectivity, user dependence on integrated circuits (ICs) increases massively for handling security sensitive tasks as well as processing sensitive information. During this process, hardware authentication is important to prevent unauthorized users or devices from gaining access to secret information. An effective method for hardware authentication is by using physical unclonable function (PUF), which is a hardware design that leverages intrinsic unique physical characteristics of an IC, such as propagation delay, for security authentication in real time. However, PUF is vulnerable to modeling attacks, as one can design an algorithm to imitate PUF functionality at the software level given a sufficient set of challenge-response pairs (CRPs). To address the problem, we employ hardware isolation primitives (e.g., ARM TrustZone) to protect PUF. The key idea is to physically isolate the system resources that handle security-sensitive information from the regular ones. This technique can be implemented by isolating and strictly controlling any connection between the secure and normal resources. We design and implement a ring oscillator (RO)-based PUF with hardware isolation protection using ARM TrustZone. Our PUF design heavily limits the number of CRPs a potential attacker has access to. Therefore, the modeling attack cannot be performed accurately enough to guess the response of the PUF to a challenge. Furthermore, we develop and demonstrate a brand new application for the designed PUF, namely multimedia authentication, which is an integral part of multimedia signal processing in many real-time and security sensitive applications. We show that the PUF-based hardware security approach is capable of accomplishing the authentication for both the hardware device and the multimedia stream while introducing minimum overhead. Finally, we evaluate the hardware-isolated PUF design using a prototype implementation on a Xilinx system on chip (SoC). Particularly, we conduct functional evaluation (i.e., randomness, uniqueness, and correctness), security analysis against modeling attacks, as well as performance and overhead evaluation (i.e., response time and resource usages). Our experimental results on the real hardware demonstrate the high security and low overhead of the PUF in real time authentication. Advisor: Sheng We

Sustained monomorphic left ventricular outflow tract tachycardia early after aortic valve replacement

Sustained monomorphic ventricular tachycardia (VT) after valve surgery is uncommon. Cases of focal VT or bundle-branch re-entry after aortic valve surgery have been reported. We present the case of a 60 year-old patient with an incessant outflow tract VT early after aortic valve replacement. We suggest the disease process affecting the valve and adjacent area, and/or the surgical procedure, might somehow relate to VT substrate adjacent to the aortic annulus

Venice Chart International Consensus Document on Atrial Fibrillation Ablation: 2011 Update

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/93647/1/j.1540-8167.2012.02381.x.pd

Transseptal puncture for catheter ablation of atrial fibrillation after device closure of patent foramen ovale

The technique of transseptal puncture for catheter ablation of atrial fibrillation after percutaneous closure of a foramen ovale with the Amplatzer Occluder is demonstrated based on 2 representative cases

Transseptal puncture for catheter ablation of atrial fibrillation after device closure of patent foramen ovale

The technique of transseptal puncture for catheter ablation of atrial fibrillation after percutaneous closure of a foramen ovale with the Amplatzer Occluder is demonstrated based on 2 representative cases

Can computer tomography help predict feasibility of transseptal puncture after percutaneous closure of an interatrial septal communication?

BACKGROUND: Transseptal puncture (TSP) is the first step in pulmonary vein isolation and catheter ablation, as well as in left atrial appendage closure in atrial fibrillation. Although TSP has been reported to be successful in patients with device closure of interatrial septal communications, questions pertinent to its feasibility in patients with large devices still remain. We sought to determine whether a "safe zone" for TSP could be visualised by computer tomography (CT), especially if larger device sizes for interatrial septal communication closure (IASC-C) had been used. METHODS: Retrospective observational study of 20 patients who underwent CT for de novo chest pain occurring after IASC-C or as a diagnostic test for suspected or proven coronary artery disease (CAD). Clinical follow-up was for 20.5 ± 17.6 (6-84) months. CT was done18 ± 10 (2-28) weeks after IASC-C. Device size and dimensions of both atria in the long and short axes were measured, as was the minimal distance of the device edge to the inferior and inferoposterior atrial floor. RESULTS: The calculated minimal distance from the device edge to the inferior aspect (at 6 o'clock) of the (right or left) atrial floor was 7.2 ± 6.5 (0-27) mm while that to the inferoposterior aspect (at 07:30 o'clock) was 5.3 ± 4.2 (0-15) mm. In both locations, a distance of >6 mm was documented in ten patients (50%) while in nine patients (45%) a space of <6 mm was shown in both locations. There was no correlation between atrial dimensions or device size and minimal device distance to either wall. CONCLUSION: With the exception of cases with the smallest devices (18 and 20 mm), neither device size nor atrial dimensions allow us to predict the feasibility of TSP in patients with a clamshell-type interatrial septal device in place, so that CT may be of help in determining whether a safe puncture space does exist in these patients