404 research outputs found

    Situating emotional experience

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    Psychological construction approaches to emotion suggest that emotional experience is situated and dynamic. Fear, for example, is typically studied in a physical danger context (e.g., threatening snake), but in the real world, it often occurs in social contexts, especially those involving social evaluation (e.g., public speaking). Understanding situated emotional experience is critical because adaptive responding is guided by situational context (e.g., inferring the intention of another in a social evaluation situation vs. monitoring the environment in a physical danger situation). In an fMRI study, we assessed situated emotional experience using a newly developed paradigm in which participants vividly imagine different scenarios from a first-person perspective, in this case scenarios involving either social evaluation or physical danger. We hypothesized that distributed neural patterns would underlie immersion in social evaluation and physical danger situations, with shared activity patterns across both situations in multiple sensory modalities and in circuitry involved in integrating salient sensory information, and with unique activity patterns for each situation type in coordinated large-scale networks that reflect situated responding. More specifically, we predicted that networks underlying the social inference and mentalizing involved in responding to a social threat (in regions that make up the “default mode” network) would be reliably more active during social evaluation situations. In contrast, networks underlying the visuospatial attention and action planning involved in responding to a physical threat would be reliably more active during physical danger situations. The results supported these hypotheses. In line with emerging psychological construction approaches, the findings suggest that coordinated brain networks offer a systematic way to interpret the distributed patterns that underlie the diverse situational contexts characterizing emotional life

    Primary interoceptive cortex activity during simulated experiences of the body

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    Studies of the classic exteroceptive sensory systems (e.g., vision, touch) consistently demonstrate that vividly imagining a sensory experience of the world – simulating it – is associated with increased activity in the corresponding primary sensory cortex. We hypothesized, analogously, that simulating internal bodily sensations would be associated with increased neural activity in primary interoceptive cortex. An immersive, language-based mental imagery paradigm was used to test this hypothesis (e.g., imagine your heart pounding during a roller coaster ride, your face drenched in sweat during a workout). During two neuroimaging experiments, participants listened to vividly described situations and imagined “being there” in each scenario. In Study 1, we observed significantly heightened activity in primary interoceptive cortex (of dorsal posterior insula) during imagined experiences involving vivid internal sensations. This effect was specific to interoceptive simulation: it was not observed during a separate affect focus condition in Study 1, nor during an independent Study 2 that did not involve detailed simulation of internal sensations (instead involving simulation of other sensory experiences). These findings underscore the large-scale predictive architecture of the brain and reveal that words can be powerful drivers of bodily experiences

    Abstract Concepts and Pictures of Real-World Situations Activate One Another.

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    concepts typically are defined in terms of lacking physical or perceptual referents. We argue instead that they are not devoid of perceptual information because knowledge of real-world situations is an important component of learning and using many abstract concepts. Although the relationship between perceptual information and abstract concepts is less straightforward than for concrete concepts, situation-based perceptual knowledge is part of many abstract concepts. In Experiment 1, participants made lexical decisions to abstract words that were preceded by related and unrelated pictures of situations. For example, share was preceded by a picture of two girls sharing a cob of corn. When pictures were presented for 500 ms, latencies did not differ. However, when pictures were presented for 1,000 ms, decision latencies were significantly shorter for abstract words preceded by related versus unrelated pictures. Because the abstract concepts corresponded to the pictured situation as a whole, rather than a single concrete object or entity, the necessary relational processing takes time. In Experiment 2, on each trial, an abstract word was presented for 250 ms, immediately followed by a picture. Participants indicated whether or not the picture showed a normal situation. Decision latencies were significantly shorter for pictures preceded by related versus unrelated abstract words. Our experiments provide evidence that knowledge of events and situations is important for learning and using at least some types of abstract concepts. That is, abstract concepts are grounded in situations, but in a more complex manner than for concrete concepts. Although people\u27s understanding of abstract concepts certainly includes knowledge gained from language describing situations and events for which those concepts are relevant, sensory and motor information experienced during real-life events is important as well

    Learning situated emotions

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    From the perspective of constructivist theories, emotion results from learning assemblies of relevant perceptual, cognitive, interoceptive, and motor processes in specific situations. Across emotional experiences over time, learned assemblies of processes accumulate in memory that later underlie emotional experiences in similar situations. A neuroimaging experiment guided participants to experience (and thus learn) situated forms of emotion, and then assessed whether participants tended to experience situated forms of the emotion later. During the initial learning phase, some participants immersed themselves in vividly imagined fear and anger experiences involving physical harm, whereas other participants immersed themselves in vividly imagined fear and anger experiences involving negative social evaluation. In the subsequent testing phase, both learning groups experienced fear and anger while their neural activity was assessed with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). A variety of results indicated that the physical and social learning groups incidentally learned different situated forms of a given emotion. Consistent with constructivist theories, these findings suggest that learning plays a central role in emotion, with emotion adapted to the situations in which it is experienced

    The Natural History of Coiled Cerebral Aneurysms Stratified by Modified Raymond-Roy Occlusion Classification

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    Objective The natural history and long-term durability of Guglielmi detachable coil (GDC) embolization is still unknown. We hypothesize a stepwise decrease in durability of embolized cerebral aneurysms as stratified by the Modified Raymond-Roy Classification (MRRC). Methods First-time GDC-embolized cerebral aneurysms were retrospectively reviewed from 2004 to 2015. Loss of durability (LOD) was defined by change in aneurysm size or patency seen on serial radiographic follow-up. Kaplan-Meier survival analysis was performed to evaluate embolization durability. Multivariate Cox regression modeling was used to assess baseline aneurysm and patient characteristics for their effect on LOD. Results A total of 427 patients with 443 aneurysms met the inclusion criteria. Overall, 89 (21%) aneurysms met LOD criteria. Grade 1 aneurysms had statistically significantly greater durability than did all other MRRC grades. Grade 3b aneurysms had significantly worse durability than did all other aneurysm grades. There was no difference in durability between grade 2 and 3a aneurysms. Of aneurysms with LOD, 26 (29%) experienced worsening of MRRC grade. Thirty-five (24%) initial MRRC grade 2, 72 (45%) initial MRRC grade 3a, and 6 (22%) initial MRRC grade 3b aneurysms progressed to MRRC grade 1 without retreatment. In our multivariate analysis, only initial MRRC grade was statistically significantly associated with treatment durability (P < 0.001). Conclusions MRRC grade is independently associated with first-time GDC-embolized cerebral aneurysm durability. Achieving MRRC grade 1 occlusion outcome is significantly associated with greater long-term GDC durability. Although few aneurysms experience further growth and/or recanalization, most incompletely obliterated aneurysms tend to remain stable over time or even progress to occlusion. Grading scales such as the MRRC are useful for characterizing aneurysm occlusion but may lack sensitivity and specificity for characterizing changes in aneurysm morphology over time

    Institutional review of the management of type II odontoid fractures: associations and outcomes with fibrous union

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    OBJECTIVE Type II odontoid fractures may be managed operatively or nonoperatively. If managed with bracing, bony union may never occur despite stability. This phenomenon is termed fibrous union. The authors aimed to determine associations with stable fibrous union and compare the morbidity of patients managed operatively and nonoperatively. METHODS The authors performed a retrospective review of their spine trauma database for adults with type II odontoid fractures between 2015 and 2019. Two-sample t-tests and Fisher’s exact tests identified associations with follow-up stability and were used to compare operative and nonoperative outcomes. Sensitivity, specificity, and predictive values were calculated to validate initial stable upright cervical radiographs related to follow-up stability. RESULTS Among 88 patients, 10% received upfront surgical fixation, and 90% were managed nonoperatively, of whom 22% had fracture instability on follow-up. Associations with instability after nonoperative management include myelopathy (OR 0.04, 95% CI 0.0–0.92), cerebrovascular disease (OR 0.23, 95% CI 0.06–1.0), and dens displacement ≥ 2 mm (OR 0.29, 95% CI 0.07–1.0). Advanced age was not associated with follow-up instability. Initial stability on upright radiographs was associated with stability on follow-up (OR 4.29, 95% CI 1.0–18) with excellent sensitivity and positive predictive value (sensitivity 89%, specificity 35%, positive predictive value 83%, and negative predictive value 46%). The overall complication rate and respiratory failure requiring ventilation on individual complication analysis were more common in operatively managed patients (33% vs 3%, respectively; p = 0.007), even though they were generally younger and healthier than those managed nonoperatively. Operative or nonoperative management conferred no difference in length of hospital or ICU stay, discharge disposition, or mortality. CONCLUSIONS The authors delineate the validity of upright cervical radiographs on presentation in association with follow-up stability in type II odontoid fractures. In their experience, factors associated with instability included cervical myelopathy, cerebrovascular disease, and fracture displacement but not increased age. Operatively managed patients had higher complication rates than those managed without surgery. Fibrous union, which can occur with nonoperative management, provided adequate stability

    On staying grounded and avoiding Quixotic dead ends

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    The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing

    Practice preferences of primary medical care and traditional internal medicine house officers

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    In an academic medical centre between 1980 and 1985, the attitudes, preferences and career goals of house officers in a primary medical care residency training programme were assessed at entry and at the end of each house officer year. Primary care trainees who went on to practise in a general medicine setting were compared to primary care trainees who subsequently received subspecialty training and also to traditional internal medicine trainees. House officers in the primary care programme generally maintained attitudes and preferences central to the practice of primary care, and scored significantly higher than traditional track house officers on attitudes and preferences compatible with the practice of medicine in a primary care setting. However, primary care house officers who later went into subspecialty training received scores similar to those of traditional track house officers on practice preferences relating to specialty care. There were no significant differences between primary care and traditional track house officers on standard measures of knowledge and clinical skill.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73580/1/j.1365-2923.1987.tb00393.x.pd

    Using affective knowledge to generate and validate a set of emotion-related, action words

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    Emotion concepts are built through situated experience. Abstract word meaning is grounded in this affective knowledge, giving words the potential to evoke emotional feelings and reactions (e.g., Vigliocco et al., 2009). In the present work we explore whether words differ in the extent to which they evoke ‘specific’ emotional knowledge. Using a categorical approach, in which an affective ‘context’ is created, it is possible to assess whether words proportionally activate knowledge relevant to different emotional states (e.g., ‘sadness’, ‘anger’, Stevenson, Mikels & James, 2007a). We argue that this method may be particularly effective when assessing the emotional meaning of action words (e.g., Schacht & Sommer, 2009). In study 1 we use a constrained feature generation task to derive a set of action words that participants associated with six, basic emotional states (see full list in Appendix S1). Generation frequencies were taken to indicate the likelihood that the word would evoke emotional knowledge relevant to the state to which it had been paired. In study 2 a rating task was used to assess the strength of association between the six most frequently generated, or ‘typical’, action words and corresponding emotion labels. Participants were presented with a series of sentences, in which action words (typical and atypical) and labels were paired e.g., “If you are feeling ‘sad’ how likely would you be to act in the following way?” … ‘cry.’ Findings suggest that typical associations were robust. Participants always gave higher ratings to typical vs. atypical action word and label pairings, even when (a) rating direction was manipulated (the label or verb appeared first in the sentence), and (b) the typical behaviours were to be performed by the rater themselves, or others. Our findings suggest that emotion-related action words vary in the extent to which they evoke knowledge relevant for different emotional states. When measuring affective grounding, it may then be appropriate to use categorical ratings in conjunction with unimodal measures, which assess the ‘magnitude’ to which words evoke feelings (e.g., Newcombe et al., 2012). Towards this aim we provide a set of emotion-related action words, accompanied by generation frequency and rating data, which show how strongly each word evokes knowledge relevant to basic emotional states
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