21 research outputs found

    Neural Correlates of the False Consensus Effect:Evidence for Motivated Projection and Regulatory Restraint

    Get PDF
    The false consensus effect (FCE), the tendency to project our attitudes and opinions on to others, is a pervasive bias in social reasoning with a range of ramifications for individuals and society. Research in social psychology has suggested that numerous factors (anchoring and adjustment, accessibility, motivated projection, etc.) may contribute to the FCE. In this study, we examine the neural correlates of the FCE and provide evidence that motivated projection plays a significant role. Activity in reward regions (ventromedial pFC and bilateral nucleus accumbens) during consensus estimation was positively associated with bias, whereas activity in right ventrolateral pFC (implicated in emotion regulation) was inversely associated with bias. Activity in reward and regulatory regions accounted for half of the total variation in consensus bias across participants (R2 = .503). This research complements models of the FCE in social psychology, providing a glimpse into the neural mechanisms underlying this important phenomenon

    Modulating the neural bases of persuasion: why/how, gain/loss, and users/non-users

    Get PDF
    Designing persuasive content is challenging, in part because people can be poor predictors of their actions. Medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) activation during message exposure reliably predicts downstream behavior, but past work has been largely atheoretical. We replicated past results on this relationship and tested two additional framing effects known to alter message receptivity. First, we examined gain- vs. loss-framed reasons for a health behavior (sunscreen use). Consistent with predictions from prospect theory, we observed greater MPFC activity to gain- vs. loss-framed messages, and this activity was associated with behavior. This relationship was stronger for those who were not previously sunscreen users. Second, building on theories of action planning, we compared neural activity during messages regarding how vs. why to enact the behavior. We observed rostral inferior parietal lobule and posterior inferior frontal gyrus activity during action planning (“how” messages), and this activity was associated with behavior; this is in contrast to the relationship between MPFC activity during the “why” (i.e., gain and loss) messages and behavior. These results reinforce that persuasion occurs in part via self-value integration—seeing value and incorporating persuasive messages into one\u27s self-concept—and extend this work to demonstrate how message framing and action planning may influence this process

    Neural correlates of persuasive message framing effects and their relationship to behavior

    No full text
    Designing health messages that successfully elicit message-consistent behavior continues to be a challenge, in large part because people are often poor predictors of their future actions. Past work that aimed to improve our predictive abilities has suggested that activation in a ventral subregion of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) during receipt of a persuasive message can reliably predict downstream behavior (Falk et al., 2010; Falk et al., 2011; Falk, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2012; Falk et al., 2015; Cooper, Tompson, O’Donnell, & Falk, in press), that gain-framed messages are more effective in promoting prevention behaviors than loss-framed messages (Detweiler, Bedel, Salovey, Pronin, & Rothman, 1999; Rothman et al., 1993; Christophersen & Gyulay, 1981; Robberson & Rogers, 1988; Treiber, 1986), and that persuasive messages that contain action plans are more effective than those that do not (Gollwitzer, 1993; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Hagger & Luszczynska, 2014; Sniehotta, Scholz, & Schwarzer, 2006); however, the psychological mechanisms that support these effects are not fully understood. In the current experiment, we argue that persuasion may occur via self-integration—the incorporation of persuasive messages into one’s self-concept and identity—by connecting these bodies of literature in our study design. Pulling from the topics of framing effects and action planning in health psychology, along with neuroscience work in persuasion and action understanding, we exposed participants to four types of messages about sunscreen use in the fMRI scanner while also tracking their sunscreen use behaviors and intentions: 1) Fact – facts about sunscreen (control), 2) How – how to wear sunscreen, 3) Whygain – why one should wear sunscreen to garner a benefit, and 4) Whyloss – why one should wear sunscreen to avoid a loss. We replicated past findings on the relationship between MPFC activity during message exposure and future behavior controlling for intentions, along with past action understanding work on the role of rostral inferior parietal lobule (rIPL) and posterior inferior frontal gyrus (pIFG) in response to How>Why and conversely MPFC in response to Why>How; however, we also found preliminary support for our theory of persuasion as a self-integration process by focusing on different message types individually. We found greater MPFC activity during gain-framed messages relative to loss-framed messages, raising the possibility that gain frames tend to be more effective than loss frames for prevention behaviors because they lead individuals to consider the personal positive value of the behavior, which may support the integration of the behavior into one’s self-concept. We also found stronger correlations between MPFC activity and future behavior for participants who were not preexisting sunscreen users than for those that were, potentially suggesting that non-users may have more room for self-integration to facilitate behavioral choices (whereas users already consider sunscreen use part of their self-concept). Finally, the fact that activity in both MPFC and rIPL was related to message-consistent behavior suggests that both personal valuation and cognitive rehearsal may contribute to self-integration during message encoding and may support downstream behavioral choices. Both theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed along with future directions

    Perceived perspective taking: When others walk in our shoes.

    No full text

    Perceived perspective taking: when others walk in our shoes.

    No full text
    A great deal of psychological research has investigated the influence of perspective taking on individuals, indicating that perspective taking increases the extent to which people like, feel a sense of self-other overlap with, and help those whose perspective they take. However, previous investigations of the topic have been limited to the study of the perspective taker, rather than the individual whose perspective has been taken. The purpose of the current work is to begin to fill this large gap in the literature by examining the consequences of believing that another individual is taking one's perspective, a phenomenon we refer to as perceived perspective taking. Over a series of 6 experiments, we demonstrate that perceiving that one's perspective has been taken confers many of the same interpersonal benefits as taking another's perspective. Specifically, our data suggest that believing that another person has successfully taken one's perspective results in an increased liking for, a greater sense of self-other overlap with, and more help provided to that person. Consistent with predictions, we find that one's self-other overlap with the perspective taker and the amount of empathy one perceives the perspective taker to feel operate in tandem to mediate the link between perceived perspective taking and liking for the perspective taker. Further, a mediational path from perceived perspective taking to helping behavior through liking is supported. Future directions are discussed, along with implications for theory and application in domains such as intergroup relations, conflict resolution, and political campaigning
    corecore