Reestablishing stability and avoiding a credit crunch: comparing different bad bank schemes

This paper develops a model to analyze two different bad bank schemes, an outright sale of toxic assets to a state-owned bad bank and a repurchase agreement between the bad bank and the initial bank. For both schemes, we derive a critical transfer payment that induces a bank manager to participate. Participation improves the bank's solvency and enables the bank to grant new loans. Therefore, both schemes can reestablish stability and avoid a credit crunch. An outright sale will be less costly to taxpayers than a repurchase agreement if the transfer payment is sufficiently low

Police performance measurement: an annotated bibliography

This study provides information to assist those involved in performance measurement in police organisations. The strategies used to identify the literature are described. Thematic sections cover; general overviews; methodological issues; performance management in other industries; national, international and cross-national studies; frameworks (e.g. Compstat; the Balanced Scorecard); criticisms (particularly unintended consequences); crime-specific measures; practitioner guides; performance evaluation of individual staff; police department plans and evaluations; annotated bibliographies in related areas, and; other literature. Our discussion offers two conclusions: the measures best aligned with performance are typically more expensive, while most operational data should only provide contextual information; the philosophy of open governance should be pursued to promote transparency, accountability and communication to improve police performance

What Do Community Benefits Agreements Deliver? Evidence From Los Angeles

Problem, research strategy, and findings: Advocates of community benefits agreements (CBAs) between coalitions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and real estate developers contend that CBAs promote public accountability and responsiveness to community concerns. This study assesses the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District (LASED) CBA, which scholars and practitioners have described as a model for such agreements. I assess compliance with key provisions of the agreement related to jobs, affordable housing, and parks and recreational facilities. I also assess whether compliance with these provisions has yielded benefits beyond those required under existing laws and regulations. I find that the parties to the agreement have technically complied with many, although arguably not all, of its provisions. But some of the provisions in the CBA are not legally binding, other provisions overlap with requirements that the developer would have had to satisfy even without the CBA, and some reports required by the CBA are unavailable. As a result, outcomes such as living wage jobs and funding for affordable housing units are not clearly attributable to the CBA; other outcomes, such as targeted hiring, are unknown due to a lack of relevant information.Takeaway for practice: Although CBAs may not fulfill all the claims that advocates make on their behalf, they can play important roles in community development by directing public and private spending to underserved neighborhoods. But collecting and verifying the relevant data may be challenging, even if reporting requirements are clearly spelled out in the CBA. As the complexity of a CBA increases, so do the challenges of assessing outcomes and assigning responsibility for those outcomes

Treasury Sanctions MS-13-Affiliates for Drug Trafficking and Contract Killings in Central America and the United States

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Yulan Adonay Archaga Carias a.k.a. “Alexander Mendoza” a.k.a. “Porky,” an MS-13 gang leader based in Honduras, and David Elias Campbell Licona a.k.a. “Jorge Eduardo Perez Paz,” an MS-13 associate based in Nicaragua, pursuant to transnational criminal organization authorities. Both individuals are heavily involved in drug trafficking, violence, murder, extortion, and money laundering

Non-compete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy Implications

[Excerpt] Non-compete agreements are contracts between workers and firms that delay employees’ ability to work for competing firms. Employers use these agreements for a variety of reasons: they can protect trade secrets, reduce labor turnover, impose costs on competing firms, and improve employer leverage in future negotiations with workers. However, many of these benefits come at the expense of workers and the broader economy. Recent research suggests that a considerable number of American workers (18 percent of all workers, or nearly 30 million people) are covered by non-compete agreements. The prevalence of such agreements raises important questions about how they affect worker welfare, job mobility, business dynamics, and economic growth more generally. This report presents insights from economic theory and evidence on the economic effects of non-compete agreements. It goes on to discuss policy implications, starting a discussion about how such agreements could be used in a way that balances the interests of firms with those of workers and society as a whole.UST_Noncompete_contracts.pdf: 184 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020