Bank pricing under oligopsony-oligopoly: Evidence from 103 developing countries

We propose a generic oligopsony-oligopoly model to study bank behavior under uncertainty in developing countries. We derive a pricing structure that acknowledges market power in both the deposit and loan markets and identify two theoretical components to the loan rate: a rent extraction component resulting from the interaction between the choke price of loans and prevailing banking structures, and a markup on deposit funding costs that captures the transformation efficiency of financial intermediation. We then test our structural specification with longitudinal data for 103 non-OECD countries and find that both the market structure under uncertainty and the deposit rate matter significantly in pricing. However, the role played by the rent-extraction share in pricing, on average, dominates funding costs in developing countries, and so underscores the importance of market structure in banks’ pricing power.intermediation; bank pricing; market structure; uncertainty; developing countries

Bank competition and financial stability

Under the traditional"competition-fragility"view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative"competition-stability"view, more market power in the loan market may result in greater bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it more difficult to repay loans and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. But even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. The authors test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. The results suggest that - consistent with the traditional"competition-fragility"view - banks with a greater degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provide some support for one element of the"competition-stability"view - that market power increases loan portfolio risk. The authors show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.Banks&Banking Reform,Debt Markets,Access to Finance,,Markets and Market Access

Are Islamic Investment Certificates Special? Evidence on the Post-Announcement Performance of Sukuk Issues

The last decade has witnessed rapid expansion of Islamic financial instruments, notably with the proliferation of Islamic investment certificates called Sukuk. Sukuk generally represent the Islamic financial instrument equivalent to conventional bonds. We evaluate the economic differences between these financing techniques and appraise the implications on the future expansion of Sukuk. We use a market-based approach to investigate whether investors react differently to the announcements of issues of Sukuk and conventional bonds. We find that the stock market is neutral to the announcement of conventional bonds, but we observe a significant negative stock market reaction to the announcement of Sukuk. We explain this different stock market reaction using the adverse selection mechanism, which favors Sukuk issuance by lower-quality debtor companies. Unlike arguments presented in prior literature, our results support the view that differences exist between Sukuk and conventional bonds because the market is able to distinguish among these securities.Financial instruments, Islamic finance, sukuk, event studies.

What are the driving forces of bank competition across different income groups of countries?

This article has been made available through the Brunel Open Access Publishing Fund.This paper rigorously investigates the determinants of bank competition for 146 countries over the sample period 1999–2011. The results employing both the Lerner index and the Boone indicator, reveal the distinctive characteristics of the competition drivers across different income groups of countries. Amongst other things, a concentrated banking system jeopardises competitiveness in developing economies, however, such a causal nexus is absent for advanced and emerging economies. Contestability and institutional development seem to boost competition in less-developed banking systems, whereas inter-industry competition and financial freedom are beneficial to advanced banking systems. These findings survive robustness tests

Cooperative banks: What do we know about competition and risk preferences?

In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis the discussion on preventive regulatory policies has generally overlooked the role of different business models and goals. Credit institutions with mutual objectives are a case in point that is the object of this study, which focuses on the relationship between competition and financial stability in European cooperative banking between 2006 and 2014. Our results show that there exists a hump-shaped relationship between market power and stability, particularly in the loan market. Interestingly, we also find that, diversification in assets and liabilities significantly increases cooperative banks’ solvency

Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model, efficiency and stability

How different are Islamic banks from conventional banks? Does the recent crisis justify a closer look at the Sharia-compliant business model for banking? When comparing conventional and Islamic banks, controlling for time-variant country-fixed effects, we find few significant differences in business orientation. There is evidence however, that Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better capitalized. We also find large cross-country variation in the differences between conventional and Islamic banks as well as across Islamic banks of different sizes. Furthermore, we find that Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset quality and are less likely to disintermediate during crises. The better stock performance of listed Islamic banks during the recent crisis is also due to their higher capitalization and better asset quality

Bank competition and stability: Cross-country heterogeneity

This paper documents large cross-country variation in the relationship between bank competition and bank stability and explores market, regulatory and institutional features that can explain this variation. We show that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on banks’ fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, lower systemic fragility, better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit insurance and more effective systems of credit information sharing. The effects are economically large and thus have important repercussions for the current regulatory reform debate

Taxes, Governance, and Debt Maturity Structure: International Evidence

We provide a cross-country evidence on the impact of corporate and personal income taxes, and corporate governance systems on debt maturity structures and leverage using a comprehensive sample of 212,642 firm-year observations based on a sample of 19,573 firms from 24 OECD countries over the period 1990 to 2015. We find longer debt maturities, higher leverage, and, in a dynamic setting, a greater propensity to decrease short-term debt, in countries with high investor protection and where the potentials for debt tax shields and after-tax return of investors are high. Our results imply that when investors are protected, firms tend to have optimal debt maturities to maximise the gains from tax shields and minimise the tax cost of equity. In contrast, in low protection countries, investors prefer their firms to opt for low debt that is mainly short-term to mitigate the risk-shifting and debt overhang problems even if this entails forgoing the debt tax shields. Our results hold for various robustness checks including the hierarchical linear model specification, which corrects for a number of OLS biases

Is the MENA banking sector competitive?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the competitive conditions and revenue drivers of commercial banks in the MENA region in the context of Panzar–Rosse model. It is the first study of its kind that examines a large sample of MENA banks for an extensive period (1999–2012) during an era of political and economic unrest and transformation that includes the the global financial crisis (2007–2009). Panel data analysis using fixed effects was employed in order to examine whether the competitive conditions in MENA banks is explained by monopoly, monopolistic competition or perfect competition. Findings show that MENA banks operate under monopolistic competition, and bank-specific variables show a positive impact on revenue. These findings indicate that policymakers should relax capital adequacy requirements to guarantee the stability of the financial system. They also raise a concern that commercial banks in the MENA economies tend to concentrate on traditional lending activities, where their competitive position may be eroded in the long run by the decreasing state role of Islamic banks and by mergers that are not empirically justified for MENA banks during this period