Bank holding companies : a better structure for conducting universal banking?

Banking systems in many countries have become increasingly unstable in recent years. At the same time, market forces have pushed banks to expand into a variety of universal banking activities without impairing the stability of the banking system. The basic bank holding company proposal contains three major elements : first, any bank that wants to operate as a universal bank must first form a holding company and then conduct all riskier activities in holding company units rather than directly in the bank. The bank would continue to engage in traditional banking activities that involve the usual level of risk; second, the government would develop laws and regulations designed as safeguards to insulate the bank from any financial problems that might occur in holding company affiliates of the bank; and lastly bank regulatory authorities would impose little or no supervision on holding company units. The use of the bank holding company device to conduct universal banking activities can promise important public benefits including : 1) a sounder commercial banking system; 2) less banking regulation; and 3) greater competitive equality between banking and nonbanking units.Microfinance,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Small Scale Enterprise

Are failproof banking systems feasible? Desirable?

In recent years, instability of the banking system has returned as a major problem in many countries, particularly in the developing world. In many cases, this instability has been so threatening to financial intermediation and the functioning of the payments system that governments have felt compelled to intervene and restructure banks, often at considerable cost to the public budget. One response to these problems has been a proposal to create failproof banking systems - to radically transform the structure, priorities, and operation of the banking and financial system. Banks would be limited to issuing deposits, holding essentially riskless portfolios, and operating the payments system. To minimize the resulting disruptions to the financial system, banks would be authorized (and encouraged) to set up holding companies and then transfer to holding company affiliates all the functions - including lending - that banks would no longer be permitted to perform. So while the failproof banking proposal would severely restrict the activity of banks, it would not restrict the activities of banking organizations that convert to a holding company form of organization. This proposal would produce major public benefits. It would assure a nation of a smoothly functioning banking and payments system, would substantially reduce the resources committed to banking supervision, would prevent bank-type regulation from expanding to the rest of the financial system, and would place banking and nonbanking organizations on a level playing field for the financial activities in which they compete. There are two major problems with the proposal. First, it might be difficult to implement because of too few riskless assets in a nation's financial system. (The author suggests several modifications that would alleviate this problem in some countries.) Second, the proposal might hurt the financial market by: (a) increasing interest rates for higher-risk borrowers, forcing them out of the market; and (b) transfering greater risk to the nonbank sector of the financial system, making it more susceptible to crisis. Although the proposal would benefit developing countries (more prone to banking instability) more than industrial countries, it would also be more difficult to implement in developing countries. And the adverse effects of the proposal would be felt more severely in the financial markets of developing countries than in industrial countries, which have deeper, more responsive financial markets.Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Banking Law,Settlement of Investment Disputes

Deposit insurance in developing countries

About a dozen developing countries have deposit insurance systems and several others are considering establishing them. These systems are typically created to prevent contagious bank runs, to provide a formal national mechanism for handling failing banks, and to protect small depositors from losses when banks fail. Without a deposit insurance system, many developing nations in recent years have extended implicit deposit protection to depositors on a discretionary, ad hoc basis. Deposit insurance systems have several advantages over these implicit protection schemes. Deposit insurance probably gives the banking system more protection against bank runs, provides more protection for small depositors, and provides a faster, smoother administrative process. On the other hand, deposit insurance probably creates more moral hazard for depositors, thereby contributing to the erosion of market discipline and increased bank risk-taking. Deposit insurance also tends to be a more expensive mechanism for protecting depositors because it offers less freedom of action to policymakers than an implicit scheme. Finally, developing countries often do not adequately fund their deposit insurance schemes. As a result, the systems often lack credibility in the marketplace and bank supervisors may be unable to close insolvent banks because the insurer would be unable to pay off insured depositors.Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Financial Intermediation,Insurance Law

The state of the Martian climate

60°N was +2.0°C, relative to the 1981–2010 average value (Fig. 5.1). This marks a new high for the record. The average annual surface air temperature (SAT) anomaly for 2016 for land stations north of starting in 1900, and is a significant increase over the previous highest value of +1.2°C, which was observed in 2007, 2011, and 2015. Average global annual temperatures also showed record values in 2015 and 2016. Currently, the Arctic is warming at more than twice the rate of lower latitudes

Updated International Consensus Diagnostic Criteria for Eosinophilic Esophagitis: Proceedings of the AGREE Conference

Background & Aims: Over the last decade, clinical experiences and research studies raised concerns regarding use of proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) as part of the diagnostic strategy for eosinophilic esophagitis (EoE). We aimed to clarify the use of PPIs in the evaluation and treatment of children and adults with suspected EoE to develop updated international consensus criteria for EoE diagnosis. Methods: A consensus conference was convened to address the issue of PPI use for esophageal eosinophilia using a process consistent with standards described in the Appraisal of Guidelines for Research and Evaluation II. Pediatric and adult physicians and researchers from gastroenterology, allergy, and pathology subspecialties representing 14 countries used online communications, teleconferences, and a face-to-face meeting to review the literature and clinical experiences. Results: Substantial evidence documented that PPIs reduce esophageal eosinophilia in children, adolescents, and adults, with several mechanisms potentially explaining the treatment effect. Based on these findings, an updated diagnostic algorithm for EoE was developed, with removal of the PPI trial requirement. Conclusions: EoE should be diagnosed when there are symptoms of esophageal dysfunction and at least 15 eosinophils per high-power field (or approximately 60 eosinophils per mm2) on esophageal biopsy and after a comprehensive assessment of non-EoE disorders that could cause or potentially contribute to esophageal eosinophilia. The evidence suggests that PPIs are better classified as a treatment for esophageal eosinophilia that may be due to EoE than as a diagnostic criterion, and we have developed updated consensus criteria for EoE that reflect this change